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ABSTRACT 
The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations 
by 
LEE Yu Pan 
Master of Philosophy 
Even though economic relations between China and Japan have improved in 
recent decades, their security relations raise the prospect of clashes due to the 
perceived incompatibility of their interests, as manifested for example in territorial 
claims and rivalry for energy resources. This thesis analyzes the two states’ security 
relations using the “security-dilemma” and “constructivist theories” of international 
relations.  
 
The security dilemma is a condition in which states’ attempts to increase their 
own security, out of the mutual fear and suspicion, results a decrease in security for 
all. The constructivist theories suggest that the identities of actors, social norms, 
states’ interests and government policies are inter-linked in both domestic and 
international politics; each component thus shapes and then reshapes others. 
International relations should not be understood by merely analyzing material 
capacities.   
 
In order to understand the security relations between China and Japan, it is 
imperative to investigate the threat perceptions of various actors within both states, 
including the general public, the political leadership, the military, the academics and 
other sub-state actors. 
 
By employing the mentioned theories, it is found that the general public in both 
states are the key sources to consider the other as a security threat.  Fear or 
resentment among states, which might initially be constructed by the behaviors or 
policies of other actors, would in turn further shape or limit other actors’ perceptions 
and interests. The public also put constraints on their governments’ freedom to 
maneuver diplomatically and to adopt policy choices, it thus affects the security 
relations between states. The thesis concludes that deepening interactions between 
people in both state and carefully conducted diplomatic behaviors, such as choice of 
wording in reconciliation actions and joint action by states’ leaders at symbolic 
occasions or locations etc, can be the key of preventing the security dilemma from 
escalating. As a result, in the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the security relations 
cannot be improved by deploying military means. 
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1. Introduction 
On March 20 2005, the UN (United Nations) Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in 
an effort to revitalize the United Nations, proposed a series of reforms to the 
organization’s structure. One of the proposed reforms was to expand the number of 
permanent members in Security Council, from five to eleven, with one of the likely 
candidates being Japan (Hoge 2005). A few days later, 22 million Chinese signatures 
were collected by several popular websites in China. These signatures expressed their 
opposition to include Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council; this was 
possibly the largest grassroots campaign in the People’s Republic of China to date 
and would possibly apply some pressure on how the Chinese government would vote 
on the issue (Kahn 2005).  The anti-Japanese movements did not stop at petitioning 
the U.N. In the following weeks, anti-Japanese gatherings and protests occurred in 
many major Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. The 
organizers of those movements utilized modern technology such as the Internet and 
mobile phone text messages to inform people and encourage them to go on to the 
streets (BBC 2005; Yardley 2005). Those movements resulted in rocks and bottles 
being thrown at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and the Consulate in Shanghai, and 
attacks on Japanese related businesses. It was believed that these incidents were not 
merely the reaction to prevent Japan from gaining a seat of permanent membership 
on the Security Council, but a mixture of issues such as: the junior school history 
textbook dispute; territorial claims over island and undersea gas reserves; Chinese 
submarine incursion to Japanese waters; and, Japan’s potential joint defense of 
Taiwan with the United States (French & Kahn 2005; Kahn 2005; Onishi 2005). The 
Sino-Japanese relationship had already experienced the toughest years since the 
normalization between the two countries, and these issues made the situation worse.  
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During the Junichiro Koizumi Prime Ministership, the situation, in May 2005, 
became increasingly bad that a planned meeting between Koizumi and China’s Vice 
Premier Wu Yi was called off. The opposition of Japan’s bid for UNSC permanent 
membership, while support India for doing so, was only one of the exemplifications 
of China’s resentment to the way Koizumi was handling Japan’s relations with China 
(Lin 2009, 293).  A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman considered it “basically 
unbelievable” for the Chinese police to be unable to take more steps to protect 
Japanese diplomatic buildings (Kahn 2005); implying that some of the protestors’ 
actions were under the acquiescence of the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura’s call for an apology for the 
Chinese protestors’ behavior, towards the Japanese people, faced a cold response 
from his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing (Kahn 2005). Additionally, the Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi then attempted to defuse the tension by expressing his “deep 
remorse” for Japanese wartime behavior at the Asia-Africa Summit, which was held 
in Indonesia (Greenlees 2005). These demonstrations thus upset and frightened many 
Japanese people and some believed it was a systemic setup, under the approval of the 
Chinese government. However, no matter what the truth was, as one writer pointed 
out, this series of events exemplified “the deep anger, distrust and resentment on both 
sides” (Johnston 2007, 119-120).  
These events also characterize a common pattern of recent Sino-Japanese 
relations, in that the history-related issues often become apparent during bilateral 
relations. The memory of wartime history is often closely linked with current issues, 
producing an interwoven lock between past and current events, and making some 
issues tough to handle.  In this case, Japan’s bidding for UNSC permanent 
membership, which is a current issue, was opposed by China with justification that 
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Japan could not reflect enough for its past aggression, a historical legacy. Therefore, 
China views Japan as being unsuitable to become a permanent member of the UNSC, 
as this position would develop Japan into a leading power in world affairs (Lind 
2009, 165).  Whether this is the real reason for China’s opposition in the debatable, 
but is an example that historical legacies are often brought up when current issues are 
discussed. 
What is notable is that, while their political relations seem to have been declining, 
the economic ties between China and Japan have become closer than ever before, 
with large flows of trade and investment between the two countries (Brooke 2005). 
And, many writers have already pointed out that the two countries live with each 
other as “both a vital economic partner and a political rival” (Katzenstein 2008, 23). 
Also, it is important to understand why years of close economic relations have not 
spilled over into political aspects and have not helped through the improvement of 
political relationships, at least in helping to get rid sentimental rhetoric.   
As Drifte points out, “[f]rom a constructivists perspective, the discourse of the 
Japanese on China and that of the Chinese on Japan is clearly shaped by their shared 
historical experience;” thus, history effects current security relations because many 
issues are handled against a context of historical experience (Drifte 2003, 14-15), and 
the security relationship is especially “sensitive to perceptions of intentions and to 
manipulations of these perceptions” (Drifte 2003, 15).  Additionally, one writer 
suggests that there has been a growing distrust among the Chinese leadership, public, 
and analysts of Japan, which has meant that Japan has become China’s primary 
security concern since the end of the Cold War (Jian 2007, 129). On the other hand, 
Japan has also become wary towards China in terms of military security; for example, 
China’s military transparency and the Taiwan Strait issues are mentioned in the 
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so-called “2+2” Joint Statement of the United States and Japan, in February 2005 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005); this shows that China’s security 
behavior is one of Japan’s main concerns. However, as the two leading powers in the 
region, China and Japan have important roles to play in managing the stability of 
Northeast Asia; therefore, their security relations should be managed with extra 
caution. 
Additionally, some actions carried out by certain actors in the two states show a 
lack of trust in each other, such as the anti-Japanese articles posted by Chinese 
internet users and advocates of the “China Threat Theory” in Japan. What especially 
deserves our attention is whether or not and to what extent, the security aspects of 
their relations are affected by perceptions of actors in the two states. And, using 
theoretical terminology in international politics, whether their current security 
relations can be understood using the concept of “security dilemma” – a situation in 
which both states engage in the building-up of arms due to the uncertainty of each 
others’ current and future intentions. By doing so, all involved state security is 
reduced rather than increased, even though no state has the aggressive intention. If so, 
how can an escalation be prevented? 
 
 
1.1 Objectives of the research  
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze security relations between China and Japan, 
using the international political concept of “Security Dilemma” as a base. The end of 
the Cold War brought about many fundamental changes to world politics, and the 
timeframe for this research focuses on the post Cold War era, especially on the late 
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1990s and early 2000s. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
security relations between the two countries, the researcher will look beyond the 
rationalist’s approach of international politics, namely the realism approach; which 
regards materialistic capabilities of states and states’ interests to be given 
exogenously by the system (Wendt 1991, 391). By exploring how perceptions and 
misperceptions, and identity and shared understanding exists between the two states, 
as well as how these have emerged and transformed, it is hoped that this thesis will 
provide an alternative way of understanding Sino-Japanese security relations.  And, 
in addition, help to foster a more stable long-term relationship these between these 
two countries. For the purpose of deconstructing how two countries understand each 
other and how these understandings change, the theoretical framework of this thesis 
will be mainly drawn from the constructivist school of international relations theories; 
but, some elements of other theoretical schools will also be used to complement the 
analysis. Therefore, it is hoped that a more convincing result can be achieved through 
a combination in the strengths of the different approaches. 
 
1.1.1 Anarchy and the security dilemma 
As one assumption is that there is no central authority having “the legal 
competence and the material resources” (Rittberger, Schrade and Schwarzer 1999, 
109), which can govern over a state’s behavior in the international system, the realist 
school of international politics believes a state as an actor needs to rely on self-help 
(Rittberger et al. 1999, 109).  There is no guarantee that other states will remain 
friendly or at least refrain from hostilities towards others, thus states are responsible 
for their own safety. However, this self-help behavior may result in a dilemma in 
developing security policy; the dilemma is: “not arming [themselves] may place the 
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country’s security at risk in [the] short run, [yet] increasing defense spending can 
trigger arming by neighboring states which can result [in] a net loss of security for all 
states in the long run” (Rousseau 2005, 753).    
The security dilemma can result from perceptions or misperceptions caused by 
history or past relations between states, which often contribute to how countries 
understand and perceive one another. Therefore, mixing these perceptions 
(misperceptions) with recent events, a country’s domestic civilian opinion, its 
national security posture, and foreign relations approach will be shaped. Security 
dilemma theories have suggested that what seem to be irresolvable predicaments can 
be the product of mutual misperception and suspicion of others’ intentions. 
Misperception yields misled judgment and further leads to counterproductive policies. 
This is especially dangerous when misperceptions come into play in the security 
aspect of bilateral relations, because military conflict and war may result. Many take 
the current antagonism between China and Japan for granted, considering it as a 
deadlock from which one can hardly see any light for potential improvement. 
The objective of this research is to analyze the Sino-Japanese security 
relationship using the concept of security dilemma. This is primarily a security case 
study which will examine the security aspects in Sino-Japanese relationships and the 
nature of current or potential security dilemmas, in this relation, by exploring the 
threat perception of various sub-state actors in both countries; and also analyze 
whether there is a way to mitigate and prevent the security dilemma.   
 
 
1.2 Security dilemma 
1.2.1 Detailed definition 
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In short, the “security dilemma” in this thesis can be summarized by Alan Collins, 
as follows: 
“[W]hen states take defensive measures to protect themselves, they can 
inadvertently signal to neighboring states that they might harbour expansionist goals. 
The scenario represents a deteriorating relationship based upon misperception, where, 
because the statesmen must provide for their states’ own security, a spiraling process 
of tension and arms procurement occurs. It is a tragedy, neither intends the other 
harm but, because they do not know this, their relationship deteriorates” (Collins 
1997, 23).   
 
Generally, the security dilemma is, in a raw realist definition, “the search for 
security on the part of state A [that] leads to insecurity for state B which therefore 
takes steps to increase its security [and] leading in its turn to increased insecurity for 
state A” (Baylis and Rengger 1992, 9); this is under the assumption that there is no 
“global sovereign authority” in the “international system” (Booth and Wheeler 1992, 
32). Therefore, the security dilemma is a tragedy because no involved parties will 
deliberately seek to threaten another, and no one wants to initiate a conflict.  
However, the security dilemma may not necessarily be triggered unintentionally. 
In distinguishing the intentionally or unintentionally types of security dilemma, Ken 
Booth and Nicholas Wheeler identified that the security dilemma could be caused by 
inadvertent actions, as mentioned above. Besides the “inadvertent” type, there is also 
another type of security dilemma which is created through deliberate actions called 
the “deliberate security dilemma”. This type of security dilemma can be further 
divided into two sub-types. The first sub-type contains a defensive state that poses an 
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offensive military posture, in order to deter others from being aggressive; while 
others may be misled to that such a defensive state is actually a revisionist state due 
to its military posture contradicting its declared intent. The second subtype of 
“deliberate security dilemma” is through an aggressive state pretending it wants to 
keep the status-quo. By doing so, other states may be lured in to believing the 
revisionist state and thus loosen their defensive posture this type is especially 
dangerous (Booth and Wheeler 1992, 31).  Both the “inadvertent security dilemma” 
and “deliberate security dilemma” could lead to disastrous results, as the former 
security dilemma poses an obstacle to cooperation between states.  Or, in a worse 
case scenario, it could drag the two states into an unwanted and costly conflict, while 
the latter would lure the “target state” into a dangerous trap of exploitation through a 
misperception of false security. Therefore, two terms which warrant clarification are 
“revisionist state” and “status-quo state,” because the definition of these terms is 
important to defining the security dilemma. The definition used here is that a 
revisionist “state seeks to alter the existing international territorial, ideological and 
power distribution to its advantage” (Plano et al. 1995, 9). It may “commit acts of 
aggression or declare war in its effort to change status-quo[…] Revisionist states 
tend to view diplomacy, treaties, international law, and international organization as 
means for gaining advantages in the power struggle rather than for ameliorating 
conflicts and resolving issues. For example, Nazi Germany […] threatened and 
lunched undeclared wars against considerately weaker governments” (Plano et al. 
1995, 9). While status-quo means “maintaining the existing international territorial, 
ideological, or power distribution” (Plano et al. 1995, 9). 
Regardless of the type of security dilemma, it is an issue which could bear 
significant consequence and pose a serious threat to the welfare of the population of 
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the involved states. Since the introduction of this concept, the security dilemma has 
become one of the important issues of security studies. 
 
1.2.2 Development of security dilemma in security studies 
The concept of having security dilemmas between non-aggressive actors, in 
international relations, emerged as early as the 1950s. It is believed that this dilemma 
originated in human nature in a condition of anarchy. Herbert Butterfield illustrated a 
scenario in his work regarding a situation, where the factors leading to human 
conflict are an “irreducible dilemma” (Butterfield 1951, 19).  
He suggested that, even the assumption is made that involved parties in the 
international arena, for example the statesmen of two states (or group of states), are 
virtuous men who bear reasonably high moral standards. Due to their morality, those 
statesmen do not pursue their national interests excessively, and would not want to 
resort to force when pursuing national interests. However, despite the fact that no one 
wants war, there is still what Butterfield called a “tragic element in human conflict”, 
which will come into play. The “tragic element” essentially refers to the “devils of 
fear and suspicion” towards the intentions of opposing states and groups. Both sides 
have a fear of the other while they fail to understand the “counter-fear” of their 
counterpart. With faith in their own good wishes and their rage at the others’ 
imagined-malign agenda, some states will have no other choice but to resolve their 
relations through conflict. No aggressors need to be involved in this type of conflict 
but the end result could still be devastating. As a result, the whole scenario is caused 
by what Butterfield terms a “system of self-righteousness” (Butterfield 1951, 19-20). 
This system is essentially a condition in which one state (or one group of states) is 
only able to acknowledge its own fears, fails to consider others having similar fears, 
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and regards others’ subsequent reactions to those fears as signs of aggression. In 
short, one considers itself as the only righteous party in the anarchic international 
environment. Thus, Butterfield concludes that this irreducible dilemma is the root 
cause and basis of all human conflicts and tensions between states (Butterfield 1951, 
20). 
    While Butterfield pointed out the tragic element of international relations, John 
Herz was credited as the first one to coin the term “Security Dilemma,” in his book 
Political Realism and Political Idealism (Collins 2000, 3). He argued that although 
life will come to an end inevitably, humans nevertheless want to extend it. However, 
one cannot destroy all of one’s potential enemies, which are other human beings 
capable to “inflict death upon him” (Herz 1951, 3), and thus we must be dependent 
on others in order to obtain “necessities of life.” This created a situation called 
“security dilemma,” in which individuals seek to find security against potential 
dangers brought upon by others around them, while also seeking cooperation from 
them. Using Herz’s own words, “man is at the same time foe and friend to his fellow 
man.” However, Herz suggested that the rise of such a dilemma has nothing to do 
with human nature. Whether human nature is inherently peaceful or aggressive, it 
does not bear much connection to the “security dilemma.” Competition for power is 
not driven by “power instinct,” it is more accurate to say it is driven by the “instinct 
of self-preservation” because of uncertainty about others’ intentions. In other words, 
it is a social condition. Unless humans consider life as “nothingness” or believe it 
merely as part of the process, then such “security dilemmas” will ever be present 
(Herz 1951, 3-5). He also argues that the feeling of insecurity will grow from the 
individual to larger groups (Herz 1951, 13). Therefore, the implication of Herz’s 
argument lays down the foundation of the interstate-level security dilemma.  
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  John Herz not only explored the concept of “security dilemma,” he also suggests 
that the “power and security dilemma,” which exists in all relationships between all 
groups, is most prominent, dramatic and brutal in the realm of international relations; 
in which no existing supervising power units are above state governments (Herz 
1959, 232-233). Also, one of the earliest works on this topic, in the context of 
international politics, is from Robert Jervis.  
In his work Perception and Misperception in International Politics, similar to 
John Herz’s assumption, Jervis also claimed the security dilemma has little to do 
with psychological factors and the nature of human beings. His view on the security 
dilemma underlies the anarchic nature of the international system.  In a process he 
called the “Spiral Model” (Jervis 1976, 62), because of the lack of central authority 
in the international system, individual state will rely on their own capability in order 
to survive, because there is no guarantee for friends to remain friendly. Jervis argues 
that, in the extreme case, certain states may even consider expansion and attacking as 
a means to ensure their own security. Thus, the dilemma is caused by the increase of 
a state’s self-defensive capabilities, because this will be simultaneously “too much 
and too little.” It will be too much because it is hard to define whether weapons are 
offensive or defensive in nature, and increasing the amount of weapons, even for 
self-defense purposes, will give a state the capability to carry out aggressive acts; this 
is why it is considered “too much.” On the other hand, by increasing armaments, 
other states will likely react and acquire arms themselves, in order to ensure their 
own security.  This means the first state will never have enough weapons in a 
relative sense, and is why acquiring weapons is “too little” because it can never 
enhance one’s security enough (Jervis 1976, 64). This concept underpins the word 
“dilemma”. In its traditional meaning, “dilemma” means that all choices in a given 
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situation are undesirable and no option is satisfactory. For example, if a state pursues 
a policy such as buying more weapons to enhance its own security, then the other 
state will most likely respond by counterbalancing policies; thus, the first state will 
still feel insecure, meaning this policy option is undesirable.  Meanwhile, if that 
state decides not to pursue security-seeking policies, then it may run the risk that 
other states look to exploit it; for example, to take advantage of the first state’s 
military inferiority. As it is difficult to be certain of others’ current or future 
intentions, not pursuing certain security policies is also an undesirable choice, 
because it could lead to undermining the first state’s security. Therefore, no matter 
whether a state pursues security policies or not, the end result could still be insecurity 
of the state and thus a “dilemma” (Collins 1997, 14).     
As a result, states fall into a never-ending loop of competing to increase their 
own capabilities, for example through arms races. The key feature of this “Spiral 
Model” is that states which are involved may not bear aggressive intentions. Despite 
states competing for more power, it is not their “power instinct” driving the security 
dilemma, but their “instinct of self-preservation” causing it. Jervis suggested that this 
model is more like the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the pursuit of “narrow 
self-interest with a narrow conception of rationality,” by states, will not yield the best 
outcome (Jervis 1976, 66-67).  
Booth and Wheeler further divided the security dilemma into two levels. In this 
interpretation, the security dilemma consists of two dilemmas: the dilemma of 
interpretation and the dilemma of response. The dilemma of interpretation is the first 
stage of a security dilemma and is caused by “irresolvable uncertainty”; 
decision-makers need to determine whether other state’s “military development is for 
defensive or self-protection purpose only […] or whether they are for offensive 
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purpose” (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4). After the intention of any others is decided, 
the problem turns to the type of response that decision-makers should take; thus, 
decision makers may choose to deter or reassure. If the decisions are based on an 
incorrect perception of the other’s motives, either through misplaced suspicions or 
trust, the consequences could be disastrous, because unwanted conflict or risk of 
being exploited may occur. A situation called “security paradox” would happen if a 
“spiral of mutual hostility” is created, when no involved parties actually want it 
(Booth & Wheeler, 2008, 5). Furthermore, Booth and Wheeler defined another term 
“security dilemma sensibility”, which they used to describe a measure of “an actor’s 
intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness 
towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it 
refers to the ability to understand the role the fear might play in their attitude and 
behavior, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking 
that fear” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 7). 
 
1.2.3 Definition of security dilemma used in this research 
Comparing the different versions of the security dilemma, Alan Collins 
summarizes there to be a shared presence of three features which is necessary in 
order to make a situation a “security dilemma.” First, it is the intention of all actors 
to only be a benign one, for it is said that no involved parties want to be the aggressor; 
the second feature is the uncertainty of others’ intentions, as it is extremely difficult 
to understand another’s mind or intent; the third is equally unsatisfactory policy 
options (Collins 1997, 23-24). 
The presence of a second feature suggests that, despite the existence of mutual 
fear and suspicion, no one carries an aggressive intention (the first feature), so the 
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mutual fear and suspicion comes from the inability of the involved parties to 
understand whether each other are benign or not. In short, the “irresolvable 
uncertainty” of international politics gives rise to the security dilemma (Collins 1997, 
23-24). 
As a result, this will lead to the third feature, where statesmen often face a choice 
of equally undesirable options while they are not, or unable to be, aware of the 
undesirability of the options. If a state chooses to “play safe” and conduct some 
policies to safeguard their security, then this could lead to a self-defeating result, 
mainly because other states could react by employing counter-measures, such as 
increasing their arms to nullify the effects of the first state’s actions on their own 
security. The end consequence is a decrease in security which can result in an 
arms-race. It can be seen that, what is perceived to be an appropriate policy of 
prudence for the first states will not be a desirable choice for all-knowing outsiders; 
however, if statesmen of the first state do nothing to safeguard their security in the 
world of uncertainty, they could be at risk of being taken advantage of, as they may 
present a window for others to exploit any weaknesses. This shows the dilemma that 
statesmen could face when choosing a security policy. Also, Collins argues that the 
three above features are necessary conditions for a security dilemma (Collins 1997, 
23-24), and that these are the key conditions with which this paper will determine 
whether a situation is a security dilemma. 
Despite realists’ claims that the security dilemma has no relation to psychological 
factors of humans, and that this dilemma almost certainly exists in an anarchic 
international system, this view is subject to challenge. 
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1.3 Research questions 
The research questions are: 
1. Does a security dilemma exist in Sino-Japanese relations?  
 Do elements in Sino-Japanese relations show the characteristics of a 
“security dilemma?” 
 To what extent do theories of a security dilemma help in understanding 
Sino-Japanese relations? 
 If there is a security dilemma, then why? What are the sources of the 
security dilemma?   
 
2. Is there any way to mitigate, prevent it from escalation, or even escape from it? 
 According to different international relations theories, what could be the 
possible solutions to prevent conflict between China and Japan, due to a 
security dilemma?  
 What are the practical policies or measures which can be recommended? 
 
 
1.4 Review of theoretical literature  
 
    As mentioned previously, there are several well-established theoretical 
approaches to studying world politics and international relations. This thesis will 
focus, in particular, on two approaches: realism and constructivism. 
 
1.4.1 Realism’s assumption of world politics 
   Realism is considered by many be an important theoretical school of international 
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relations.  Realists suggest that the world is “a dangerous and insecure place” 
(Burchill 1996, 70), and violence is unavoidable even though it is undesirable 
(Burchill 1996, 70). In other words, realism believes essentially believes that a long 
lasting peaceful international environment is a favorable but unattainable goal.  
As this thesis adopts an alternative view to refute the inevitability of violence and 
confrontation, in a bilateral relationship in the international system, which contrary to 
realists’ assumptions, it is useful for us to have a brief overview of some basic 
assumptions of realism before discussing the question from an alternative 
perspective. 
A number of variations in realism share a prominent assumption that the 
international political system is categorized by anarchy, the difference is on how each 
version views the importance of this feature in explaining state behavior. For 
classical realists, it is the “will to power” in human nature and desire to dominate 
others which is driving states in a power struggle (Mearsheimear 2001, 17, 19). It can 
be said that international politics, in the eyes of classical realists, is “evil” (Elman 
2007, 12).  
Defensive realism or structural realism, on the other hand, treats the anarchic 
environment of international politics as a security-seeking struggle between states 
and power, as an essential part of the international political system.  This is because 
it is important for a state’s survival but does not claim that human nature causes the 
power of such politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 19). Thus, defensive realism considers 
power to be a means but not the end in world politics, because defensive realists 
believe that having security is the prerequisite of all other goals and power is merely 
a route to gain security. Therefore, states seek security but not necessarily power and 
security should be achieved by self-help in the absence of a central governing 
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authority (Waltz 1979, 111, 126). Defensive realists also oppose states that acquire 
excessive power as long as security is achieved, because there is no incentive for 
them to do so, and if they do not want to attract balancing from other states. John 
Mearsheimer proposes another version of realism, offensive realism, and remarks 
that states will not stop acquiring power, because maximizing power is the best way 
to ensure a state’s own security; and states would not feel safe by merely maintaining 
status-quo, thus the ultimate security environment of a state cannot be achieved short 
of becoming the hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 20, 21).  
    Despite the detailed differences in these realism variations, they share certain 
core elements, one being that all forms of realism highly regard material power as a 
central analytic element of international politics; which is because this type of power 
they refer to is essentially material power. Another important feature is the chaotic 
nature of anarchy in the international political system. Due to the inherently 
competitive nature of the international system, states are, at best, rivals if not 
enemies. As states take a self-centered view, even though co-operation is possible, 
this would only be done out of short-term rationalistic consideration for their own 
self-interest, rather than out of trust or good-will. Also, because states are forced by 
the structural environment and do not completely trust one others’ intentions, merely 
the act of accumulating material power by one state is labeled as harboring a malign 
intention.  
After this brief overview of various realists’ assumptions, it is little wonder 
why realists consider the security dilemma to be a structural problem that originates 
from the anarchic condition of international politics.  Just as Robert Jervis argued 
that psychological factors of people play little part in this predicament (Jervis 1976, 
62). Also, the security dilemma seems to be difficult to mitigate and prevent, due to 
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the zero-sum nature of highly competitive international relations. 
Nevertheless, not all schools of international relations theory hold this zero-sum 
view, as constructivism holds a different view on international politics, by seeing the 
highly competitive and hostile nature of international politics as “what states make of 
it” (Wendt 1994, 388).  The different identities and interests that a state carries 
when interacting with another will shape the nature of relations between two or more 
states, whether this is friendly or hostile is not fixed (Wendt 1994, 388). Therefore, 
constructivists consider that the security dilemma might not necessarily be difficult 
to prevent or mitigate as realists have predicted, because the international 
environment is not necessarily hostile and zero-sum. 
 
1.4.2 Constructivism: culture, norms, identity & interest in the 
construction of international relations and security issues   
 
As discussed in the previous section, the security dilemma seems to be 
“irreducible,” as the dominant school of realism, in international politics, has 
assumed; especially in the peak of the Cold War era. However, new perspectives in 
analyzing this matter have gradually developed from other schools of international 
relations theory, and these new perspectives have challenged the irreducibility of the 
security dilemma. Other theoretical schools emerged to analyze the security dilemma 
because many suggested that the realist school tends to focus on a more narrow sense 
of power politics. In fact, overly emphasizing on one theoretical school or “insistence 
on received paradigm” may prove counterproductive when attempting to understand 
Japan and Asian-Pacific security affairs; therefore, more “eclectic theorizing” is 
required (Katzenstein & Okawara 2002, 168).  
One of the alternative theoretical schools is constructivism. Constructivists 
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argue that “the behavior of individuals, states, and other actors is shaped by shared 
beliefs, socially constructed rules, and cultural practices” (Mingst 2004, 50). 
Alexander Wendt points out that there is insufficiency in rationalist schools, such as 
realism and liberalism, through explaining a number of aspects of international 
relations. He admits that the rationalists’ assumption that anarchy in world politics is 
one of the possibilities, but he further argues that “an anarchy of friends is different 
from one of enemies” (Wendt 1994, 388). The problem of rationalists’ theories is that 
they assume the interest of states is constant and exogenously given; meaning there is 
little room for interest to transform and change (Wendt 1994, 384). In opposition, he 
claims that “the contents of national interests was in part a function of these 
structurally constituted identities (as well as of domestic ones)” (Wendt 1994, 386); 
and identities and interests are the dependent variables which are endogenetically 
hinged on interactions between actors (Wend 1994, 387). Martha Finnemore shares a 
similar view, as she considers states’ interests not to exist outside the objective world 
waiting to be discovered, but are constructed out of social interactions.  She also 
points out that, contrary to the classical realism assumption, power is merely an 
instrument for pursuing other things, how to wield them is dependent on what 
interests states have, and what states want will be socialized by international society 
(Finnemore 1996, 2). 
Wendt argues that the identification process, with others, presupposes whether 
states would define the interest with or without regard to others. In other words, 
states with a negative identification of others’ views, will view others as merely for 
an instrumental purpose without considering the other’s welfare. The tendency of 
rationalist views, that states are totally self-interested, is due to a lack of positive 
identification with others (Wendt 1994, 386).  
  
 
20 
Wendt also suggests that the formation of state identities and interests are 
endogenous and happen through interactions, and with such a process it is not merely 
the behaviors of states which will be affected (Wendt 1995, 394, 399). To initiate 
more than behavioral cooperation, change to existing identities is an important step. 
This is the reason why constructivists have a role, as they view the construction of 
identities and interests as more interesting.  
Alexander Wendt argues that international politics is also the result of social 
relationships; he further explains that “shared knowledge, material resources, and 
practices” are the three principle elements in social structures (Wendt 1995, 73). He 
argued that “social structures are defined by, in part, shared understanding, 
expectation, or knowledge. These constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of 
their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual” (Wendt 1995, 73). Wendt 
decides that the security dilemma is the result of intersubjective cognition making 
states which are suspicious of one another because of their worst assumption in 
others’ intentions. Secondly, Wendt does not consider materials themselves will bear 
meaning on their own, but will be through the actions and shared knowledge of 
human beings which offers them meaning (Wendt 1995, 73). Finnemore also makes a 
similar claim that materials alone have little meaning, and the meanings of materials 
are the products of “human cognition and social interaction,” which is why “my 
defensive measure is your security threat; my assault on free trade is your attempt to 
protect jobs at home” (Finnemore 1996, 6). She suggests that different meanings can 
be given to the same materialistic facts and the result of this not only differs in 
behavior but also produces confrontation. Therefore, the usefulness of any attempt to 
give meaning to materials alone, without considering other factors, is very limited 
(Finnemore 1996, 6). These assumptions exemplify why Japan is not afraid of the 
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United States (a nuclear armed state), but feels wary towards the North Korean 
nuclear project.  This is because Japan considers North Korea as a hostile state but 
not the United States. We could see that Japan has an entirely different attitude 
towards nuclear armed countries; giving meaning to nuclear weapons does not help 
us understand the deeper picture behind though; and this suggests, assuming Japan 
would hold the same attitude to all nuclear-armed states would not be helpful in any 
analysis.   
Wendt asserts that “social structures exist … in practices” and those practices 
“depends on shared knowledge,” with constructivists asking “why does one social 
structure exist[?]” (Wendt 1995, 74) One element that is produced by this “shared 
knowledge” is a norm. Norm is “likes rules that define the identity of an actor” and 
have “constitutive effects” to identify what actions are expected under a particular 
identity by others. On the other hand, a norm is a standard for framing what the 
“proper enactment” is of an established identity, thus having a “regulative” effect. In 
short, norms define collective expectations of specific actions under a specific 
identity (Katzenstein 1996, 5). Katzenstein uses an interesting example to illustrate 
how collective expectations can shape one’s actions: 
“We can easily conjure up the image of a the image of a column of 50,000 
tanks stretching from Cleveland to Seattle that tells us something about the size of 
the Soviet military at the end of the Cold War. It is harder to fathom what force what 
force caused Governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic candidate for president in 
1988, to dress up in military fatigue and ride around on a tank – looking foolish in 
the process – to demonstrate his toughness on the issue of national defense. 
Collectively shared expectations of the American public about military toughness of 
presidential candidates are what made the governor behave the way he did” 
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(Katzenstein 1996, 7). 
 
Such out of place behavior was undertaken to fulfill what Dukakis perceived to 
be American public expectation, and in this case through military toughness. Despite 
Dukakis’s tank-riding coming out as a public relations failure and used by his 
opponents to criticize his softness on defense (Schulte 2008), this example shows 
that political actors’ decision-making can be driven by a collective expectation which 
is shared by the public; even though these decisions can be considered unwise or 
irrational when viewed from another angle. 
For national security policy, Katzenstein argues that there are two social 
determinants: the cultural-institutional context and collective identity.  
The cultural-institutional context emphasizes the process of self-reflection; it 
can be understood that this is a process in the emergence of new norms through 
communication between actors. Such a process can be spontaneously evolving, 
consciously promoted, deliberately negotiated, or a combination/mixture of both 
types (Katzenstein 1996, 21). In fact, Wendt argues, in his earlier article that, 
“Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” that 
“identities and interest[s] are the dependent variable” and “people act toward objects, 
including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” 
(Wendt 1992, 394, 396-397). Through the transformation of identities and interest 
through practices, new institutions will be formed. Power politics, which realists 
believe to be the product of the anarchic structure of international politics, is not the 
certain outcome of a state system because “social threats are constructed, not natural” 
(Wendt 1992, 405). Based on a “process of signaling, interpreting, and responding 
completes a “social acts” and begins the process of creating intersubjective 
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meanings” (Wendt 1992, 406). Through this process, despite the difficulty of the 
change, it would be “constructing and reconstructing” the “intersubjective 
knowledge that constitutes the system.” Constructivists thus propose that identities 
and interests are the product of “expectation produced by behavior” (Wendt 1992, 
407, 416).  
He also argued that it was possible a “predator” in the international state system 
could be the result of being a victim in past events and thus could be socialized into 
being less aggressive in behavior through social interaction (Wendt 1992, 409). 
Despite hardly being qualified as a highly aggressive state, China’s unfriendly 
attitude towards Japan, in security issues, may be the result of its past as a victim of 
imperial Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Arnold Wolfers also makes similar 
claims, stating that those sensitive to security threats are victims of recent past 
attacks or those which have enjoyed a high degree of security but have been 
surprised by the sudden change in security environment (Wolfers 1962, 151). 
However, there are two constraints, the first is that it is an “incremental and slow” 
process and second, that “actors do not identify negatively with one another.” The 
two preconditions of such a change in self-identity are that “new social situations 
[……] cannot be managed in terms of preexisting self-conceptions” and the costs of 
change must be less than the rewards (Wendt 1992, 418-419). 
There is one point worth noticing; it is the institutionalization of new identities 
and interests which can generate both cooperative and conflicting relationships 
between actors, but one should not take institutions as the same thing as cooperation 
(Wendt 1999, 399). Intersubjective shared understanding can also create a condition 
for violence and exploitation, because there is no guarantee that shared 
understanding is “ethically ‘good’ or will lead to peaceful behavior” (Finnemore 
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1996, 6). However, Wendt suggests that if the aggressive behavior of a state was due 
to it having been a victim in the past, then there is better chance to turn it into a less 
conflicting actor if future social interaction is carried with certain measures, both 
carefully and appropriately (Wendt 1999, 409). Therefore, it is to say that states’ 
interests and identities should not be taken as a constant, and the process through 
which they are formed and changed is worthy of investigation. 
 
 
1.5 Main frameworks of the thesis 
 
This thesis utilizes two frameworks proposed in Peter J. Katzenstein and Alexander 
Wendt’s work for analysis. These are based on the causal-relations pathway between 
states’ norms, identities, and interests within a state, which are suggested in The 
Culture of National Security (Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt 1996, 53); and, the 
codetermination of institutions and process (Wendt 1992, 406), suggested in the 
article Anarchy is what states Make of it, with which the interaction between two 
states is explored. This thesis will attempt to combine these two frames in order to 
investigate the intra-states interaction within actors and the states, and inter-state 
interactions. 
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Relations between the environmental structure (cultural and institutional 
elements, such as “norms”), identity, interests and policy of the state are shown 
below. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Causal relations between norms, identities, interests and policies (Jepperson, Katzenstein and 
Wendt 1996, 53). 
 
Figure 1 shows the relations in how norms shape identity, interests and policy, 
and how identity further shapes interest, policy and norms in return (Katzenstein 
1996, 53). The term “norms” means “collective expectations about proper behavior 
for a given identity” or “rules defining an identity;” for example, anti-militarism 
norms have made it hard for the Japanese and German governments to employ 
certain “assertive” security polices (Jepperson et al. 1996, 53). Identity here has the 
following meanings: “(a) the nationally varying ideologies of collective 
distinctiveness and purpose (“nationhood” or “nationalism, for short”), and (b) 
country variation in state sovereignty, as it is enacted domestically and projected 
internationally (“statehood,” for short)” (Jepperson et al. 1996, 59). 
 
The following figure shows how identities, intersubjective shared knowledge, and 
interests are transformed. 
Norms Identities 
Interests 
Policies 
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Figure 2. The codetermination of institutions and process (Taken from Wendt 1992, 406). 
 
This thesis mainly utilizes the framework shown in figures 1 and 2. The 
relations shown in figure 1 are used to argue inter-relationships between sub-state 
actors, and how their identity and interest shapes and reshapes one another. The 
framework shown in figure 2 demonstrates the inter-state shaping of identity and 
interests which occur, and with which international relations can be defined and 
understand. 
 
1.5.1 Ambiguity of weapons 
 
    Jervis argues that the security dilemma might be aggravated or mitigated by a 
changing military posture and by the change of advantage of defensive and offensive. 
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First, he contests that being defensive has an advantage and the security dilemma 
would be much lessened with war being less likely. He used the interwar period as an 
example to illustrate this: the leaders of the allies expected the cost of war to be too 
high for Adolf Hitler to launch his venture and they reached this conclusion because 
of the memories of a defensive World War One. They decided the German threat was 
not that serious (Jervis 2001, 192-194). However, the outbreak of World War Two 
showed that this assessment, which was based on past wars, may not be accurate, 
because deploying different tactics with the same weapons could yield different 
results. Another issue which arises from judging the degree of security, from the 
nature of the weapon deployed by others, is that even though a defensive operation 
has an advantage and is easier than an offensive operation, statesmen might still want 
to bear the risk.  This is because it takes more than merely evaluating the easiness 
between offence and defense, when deciding whether to use the military as a way to 
solve the security problem (Collins 1997, 52). There were cases that states chose to 
go to war, even though they were clearly not strong enough or had a low chance of 
winning – Jervis believes some states “value fighting [in] itself” and for various 
reasons (Jervis 1990, 103). As a result, one state may never feel assured or safe by 
simply evaluating others’ arsenals or military strength. 
Moreover, one of the major obstacles in convincing other states over one’s 
intention of building arms, for defensive purposes, is the ambiguous nature of 
weapons. It is usually very difficult for statesmen to discern whether or not another 
state holds aggressive intentions, simply by examining their military hardware alone. 
This is because many weapons can be used both as offensive and defensive weapons. 
Booth and Wheeler exemplified this by suggesting “a gun can be the source of food 
for a family in a hunting community, or it can be used to spray bullets across a school 
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in a mad killing spree[…] What about everyday objects such as kitchen utensils, 
candlesticks and cars? Normally they are the things we use to make our lives fuller, 
but in some circumstances they are used to kill, as readers of crime fiction know 
well” (Booth and Wheller 2008, 43). In fact, there is seldom a weapon that can 
clearly be placed into the category of offensive or defensive alone.  
Therefore, we can understand the dilemma that statesmen face when discerning 
other states’ intentions and in their difficulty of mitigating the mistrust between other 
states by restructuring their weapons composition alone. In fact, some weapons 
which were viewed as having an explicit defensive nature could be treated as an 
offensive weapon. Even an obviously defensive weapon, such as an anti-aircraft 
weapon, can be perceived as a part of an offensive plan; just as a battlefield with 
good air-defense made the Egyptian attack on Israel possible, at the beginning of the 
Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Jervis 2001, 203). Such a demarcation in perception could 
also be exemplified by a recent event, when Japan tested a Standard-3 missile in 
collaboration with the US Missile Defense Agency. The intercept successfully shot 
down a ballistic missile on December 18th 2007, as part of an effort of creating a 
missile shield. This missile defense system will be installed on four Aegis Destroyers 
of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. It is widely believed that Japan 
speeded up the joint development project with US after the 1998 North Korean 
missile fire test, in which one Taepongdong-1 missile flew over Japanese territory 
(BBC News 2008). Related efforts to establish a comprehensive missile defense 
included launching satellites to create a global surveillance system and carrying out 
an exercise to assess the possibility of deploying a missile shield in Tokyo (BBC 
News 2008).  
Although it is understandable from Japan’s point of view to have a policy for such 
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a system, in order to safeguard national security and given the shock of North Korean 
missiles flying over, China has shown its reservation and concern about the missile 
shield. While a Japanese government spokesman, Nobutaka Machimura, said the 
Standard-3 missile test is “very significant for Japan’s national security,” the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed this after the test, by saying “We hope that the 
actions of Japan are beneficial to the peace and stability of the region and conducive 
to mutual trust of the countries in the region” (BBC News).  Therefore, it seems as 
though China’s and Japan’s other neighbors tend to see the potential harm to their 
national interests, which are brought about by this system in a number of other 
scenarios. For China, whether this missile defense will be used to defend Taiwan or 
to devalue the Chinese missile deterrent is most probably of utmost concern (Lovell 
2003, 132-133). In fact, the original Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) was termed the 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) by the Japanese government, because it was their 
intention to have a missile defense to defend itself and not use it as a general regional 
missile shield (Hook et al 2001, 142). It seems that the Japanese government wants 
to isolate such a system from being used in any other scenario, except the defense of 
Japan. China, nevertheless, viewed this as an indication Japan may assist the US in 
fighting China’s forces in the future, and the missile defense will be used to deter the 
use of China’s missile force (Hook et al. 2001, 233). In other words, the Japanese 
missile defense is a tool to undermine Chinese security and is not merely a defensive 
weapon. Just as Gideon Akavia points out, an effective defensive position can be 
used as the shield to cover other offensive operations (Akavia 1991, 45); because in 
some cases, establishing a strong defense is the pre-condition of acquiring offensive 
capabilities.  This is why neighbors around a strongly defended state may not 
necessary feel safe (Jervis 2001, 202). 
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On the other hand, it could be said that even weapons with a clear offensive 
character are, sometimes, viewed as a defensive tool of national security. Taking 
China as an example, the country possesses a considerable amount of  
medium-ranged (MRBM) and short-ranged (SRBM) ballistic missiles, and it is 
believed to be the one of the key components in deterring Taiwan from independence. 
This is because the ballistic missiles, and especially the short-range ones, would play 
a role in a certain estimated choice of actions (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 32). 
Giving the tremendous concern over territorial integrity, due to the humiliating past, 
reunification with Taiwan is still China’s “fundamental aspiration.” As a sign of 
national dignity, Reunification with Taiwan has become a nationalistic one and a 
primary function of the PLA (McDougall 2007, 124,174). With this objective as a 
national core interest, China’s government may consider it their right to prepare for 
the worst case scenario regarding Taiwan, and to use whatever means necessary to 
defend such interest. Thus, it fails to see why deploying and stockpiling more 
ballistic missiles would be perceived as offensive for those states that do not have an 
agenda on Taiwan’s political status. Whenever the core interest of a state is being 
infringed and threatened, whether it is unintentional or not, policy-makers may 
consider whatever measures they deploy as a defensive reaction. The above 
discussion underlines one of the main ideas of this thesis: that, due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing the nature of weapons, the possible dual purpose of weapons, and the 
differences in understanding what should be categorized as defensive weapons, 
changing the composition of states’ arsenals or military posture would be ineffective 
in the mitigation security dilemma. The fundamental solution to this issue still lies 
not only in the material force but in normative terms.   
It seems that what can be defined as defensive weapons, policies and measures, 
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will vary with the common belief and knowledge of a state. Just as constructivists 
suggest, whether increasing material capabilities (weapons) would induce fear 
among other states is varied, with the perception these states have of the 
arms-stockpiling state. Weapons themselves do not bear any significance in 
examining the security dilemma, if other psychological conditions and values are not 
included in the assessment. 
As analyzing the weapons alone does not have much usefulness to 
understanding the security dilemma, constructivists’ views on international politics 
throws light on the analysis, by integrating other normative factors into the analysis.  
 
 
1.6 Level of analysis  
   Typically, there are three levels of analysis which are commonly used in 
international politics research. This method of separation is thought to have been 
proposed first by Kenneth Waltz, when he suggested that the three levels to be: the 
individual, the state, and the state system (Singer 1960, 454). Although the naming of 
each level varies slightly in different literatures and some scholars alternatively 
propose four or even five levels, these three levels are the three main approaches in 
current international political research. Each level has its own strengths and 
weaknesses; and the choice of level used in this research will be justified.  
    One of the assumptions from the realists’ view on international politics is that, 
as Wolfers identifies, “states are conceived of as the sole actors in the international 
arena. All units in the system behave essentially in the same manner; their goal is to 
enhance if not maximize their [own] power, each of them must act with a single mind 
and a single will…” (Wolfers 1962, 82). Under this assumption, many realists do not 
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believe it is necessary to divide a state into sub-state actors, when analyzing motives 
behind diplomatic policies and behavior; it is taken for granted that the statesmen 
represent the collective will of their respective population in each state. This 
approach focuses on how each state, as a unitary actor, interacts in the international 
system, and how the system constricts and regulates the behavior of states.  
Therefore, this is the international system level of analysis. This perspective is useful 
if we merely want to know what a state’s actions are and use those as a basis to infer 
how others would respond. However, this approach only informs us of the 
“correlative” relationships of an event at best (Singer 1969 23); it does not become 
that useful or sufficient if we want to understand why and how states’ interests, and 
their views on others’ behaviors generate, in order to deduce more deep causes of a 
state’s actions. Another problem arises from taking the international system as the 
main level of analysis, where it assumes that national actors’ behaviors are more or 
less the same, thus diversities between different states are often neglected. “[N]ations 
may differ widely in what they consider to be the national interests, and we end up 
having to break down and refine the larger category” (Singer 1969, 23).   
However, the constructivism school of international politics holds a view about 
how actors and systems mutually constitute one another through social interaction. 
Just as Alexander Wendt suggests, constructivists believe that the world is socially 
constructed and how the state perceives its interest and relations to others, is based 
on shared knowledge. Although Wendt’s arguments focus mainly at the systemic 
level, namely states as the main actor, he does suggest that domestic factors can play 
a part on the formation of new identities and interests (Wendt 1992, 388). Despite his 
claims that states are still the central unit of study, states themselves are entities 
which are composed of many sub-state actors; and they all contribute to the 
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construction of states’ identities, interests, and the perception on themselves and the 
outside world. As a result, it is essential to look into the internal sub-state actors, if 
we seek to understand the sources of mistrust and fear with which the security 
dilemma is caused.  
The imperative of sub-states’ actors will prompt the use of a nation-state level of 
analysis, as the main level of this thesis; because this level will raise the question of 
“goals, motivations, and purpose in national policy.” Also, this level “investigate[s] 
which national goals are selected, [and] the internal and external factors that impinge 
on those process[es]…”(Singer 1969, 25). In fact, Barry Buzan provides a clearer 
definition of the different levels of analysis. He further divides three levels into five 
levels, which are: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, 
and individuals (Buzan 1998, 5-6). By employing this definition, the original nation 
state-level of analysis is then divided into two levels – the unit itself and subunits 
within units, and this division provides a clearer fashion to employ this research. By 
understanding the subunits, we may then understand the outcome at unit level (Buzan 
1998, 6). Therefore, it is fair to say that the unit- and subunit-levels are the focus of 
this thesis. Of course, the state as a whole would be still a useful unit of analysis, but 
because the state is constituted by various domestic forces, certain selected domestic 
actors and their views on Sino-Japanese relationship will be taken into account.  
 
     Therefore, the main level used in this thesis is the subunit-level and unit (or 
nation)-level of analysis, supplemented by other levels when needed.  By reviewing 
the different interactions and perceptions between sub-state actors (subunits) in 
China and Japan, such as the interaction between China’s military and Japan’s 
military, the Chinese government and the Japan government, and how each civilian 
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society views the other, the sources of fear can be identified. 
 
1.7 Mitigation of security dilemma 
    Realism traditionally holds a fatalistic approach to the security dilemma, with 
traditional theorizing and suggesting that this dilemma is inherent from the anarchic 
environment in international politics.  
However, the security dilemma could be mitigated, and there are several 
relevant approaches to the question concerned. One key feature of the security 
dilemma is the uncertainty and misunderstanding of another’s intention, even if it is a 
benign one. Thus, it is imperative to see whether these “clouds of suspicion” can be 
removed or lessened if the security dilemma is to be mitigated or removed (Collins 
1997, 45).   
 
1.7.1 Costly signaling theory of reassurance 
    Costly signaling theory was based on the assumption that mistrust and suspicion, 
between actors in international politics, can be mitigated through sending a “costly 
signal.” Those signals are costly, as the name suggests, because one who does not 
sincerely wish to reassure others, or be trustworthy, will not send them. First, the 
“costly signal” must be indeed “costly;” any attempt which does not bear any 
significant loss in certain capability (for example, significantly reducing the 
offensive strength of their military) would be considered as “cheap talk” and will 
thus be unable to build trust. Another criterion to this approach is that the 
“trustworthy type” value focuses more on making peace than towards the risk of 
being exploited (Kydd 2000, 326).  
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Andrew Kydd modified such a model in the reassurance game, which 
simulated the scenario that both actors are uncertain of the trustworthiness of each 
others, but one will take “a lesser initial round” to build up initial trust, which will 
then be followed by a second round. The flow is shown in figure 3. 
                  
Figure 3. The Reassurance Game (Taken from Kydd 2000, 333). 
 
Kydd used this theory to explain why the Cold War ended; he did not suggest 
this to be the only factor contributing to the end of Cold War, but argued that this 
approach was part of the reasons. At the beginning, the reform-minded Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev failed to reassure the West about his intention to improve Soviet 
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relations with them, by suspending nuclear tests and ending the deployment of more 
SS20 IRBMs in 1985. The West considered this to be cheap talk, because it did not 
profoundly alter the strength of the Soviet’s nuclear capabilities. The change of the 
Soviet’s image and increase in trust of Gorbachev came from several dramatic moves, 
including: advancing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) without posting 
conditions on the United States concession on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and 500,000 troops cut from the Soviet’s 
armed forces – indicating the change of military posture to a defensive one. US 
President Ronald Reagan expressed his change of view in the Soviet image at the 
Moscow summit in 1988. All of these dramatic steps successfully changed many 
views in the West, even amongst conservatives.    
The above illustrates how the costly signaling theory can be used to lessen 
suspicion and gain trust by a series of steps.  
 
1.7.2 Symbolic reconciliation action led by high profile figures 
The security dilemma is rooted in how states perceive one another and their 
perception of others’ intentions, but not necessarily out of genuine threat or danger 
posed by others. One way to pave the way to lessen animosity is through symbolic 
gestures of friendship, conducted by highly respected and popular high-level figures. 
One author uses Franco-German reconciliation as an example; French President 
Charles de Gaulle and the German Chancellor concluded the Elysees Treaty in 1963, 
by setting the course of the Franco-German reconciliation (Cheow 2006, 37).  This 
was a dramatic act symbolizing the reconciliation between Germany and France, 
which happened on September 22nd 1984, when French President Francis Mitterrand 
and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stood in front of the charnel house in Verdun, 
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one of the fiercest battlefields in World War One.  Holding hands for a number of 
minutes in the rain (Cheow 2006, 37; Today in History), this move is highly dramatic 
and symbolic, and the German press deemed the picture of the moment “will go 
down in history” (Today in History). Cheow suggested that the Japanese Emperor 
Akihito and Chinese fourth generation leader Hu Jintao are well-suited for this role, 
as they have little mental connection to the war itself (Cheow 2006, 37). 
For Sino-Japanese relations, the symbolic gesture should bear more weight 
than it currently does. China and Japan have already signed a formal document to 
promote friendship and reconciliation, in 1978, through the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship. However, there has not been a symbolic occasion which has been similar 
to Verdun, between Chinese and Japanese leaders; this gives the impression that 
Sino-Japanese relations have not moved from their superficial instrumental nature to 
genuine cooperation.  
Of course, it is not appropriate to conclude that Franco-German reconciliation 
was only out of emotional or moral reason, for the Elysees Treaty was signed under 
common security concerns (Wetterqvist, 1990 59).  And, the “hand-holding” 
between Mitterrand and Koln in 1984, were both aimed towards increasing the bond 
between France and Germany; which was out of concern over arms-control and 
promoting Franco-Germany military dialogue in response to the Soviet’s SS-20 
missile deployment (Wetterqvist, 1990, 59-61).  However, high level figures 
displaying symbolic or even dramatic acts would bring more psychological impact, 
which would bring about the air of reconciliation to people in both states, even if 
only for instrumental purposes; this is because a lessening of suspicions could 
increase cooperation between the two states.     
 
  
 
38 
 
1.8 Summary of the basic assumption of this thesis 
Here I will summarize the basic assumptions which provide the basis of this 
research, as mentioned above. 
1. Sub-state actors, as constituting units of states, are important analytical units if 
we seek to understand how perceptions emerge and how they can be transformed. 
2. Interstate relations are influenced by perceptions or misperceptions between 
states, which are constituted by actors within states such as the general public, 
politicians, and academics; and it is those actors, within the states’ identities, 
interests and intersubjective knowledge, who are forging those perceptions and 
misperceptions.   
3. Material capabilities alone do not explain relations between the two states.  
4. Identities, intersubjective shared knowledge, and interests are not fixed and can 
be transformed. 
5. There are three conditions for a security dilemma to exist: 
A. Irresolvable uncertainty over whether current or future intentions of the 
other state are benign or malign. 
B. Neither of the involved parties will harbor actual malign intentions.  
C. There is no desirable or satisfactory policy choice because all policy 
options lead to some undesirable or negative consequence; no policy 
choice can handle the issue without also contributing negative side effects.  
6. The security dilemma is a condition created by perceptions and misperceptions 
between actors within states; thus, it is possible to mitigate or prevent it if those 
perceptions and misperceptions are changed. 
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  This chapter explored the definition and development in the security dilemma 
concept, and the main argument and assumptions of the constructivism, which is the 
main theoretical basis of this thesis.   
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2. Overview on Sino-Japanese relations 
Japan is the first Asian power to modernize, joining the club of the advanced 
economies in the 1960s and overcoming setbacks in its economy. However, the 
country experienced a long-term economic recession in the 1990s; therefore, there 
has been some doubt over the country in both its regional and global role. China’s 
colossal economic growth, resulting from 30 years of economic reform, has been the 
main engine for the country to gain influence and weight in world politics; this is 
despite facing challenges and obstacles, including the current global financial crisis; 
and, the momentum seems as though it will remain strong for the foreseeable future. 
China is now considered to be one of a number of countries which will bring 
significant impact on the global situation, should the current trend continue. China 
could also surpass Japan to be the world’s second largest economic power and 
become a major military power by 2025; while the consumption of imported natural 
resources and pollution, which will be caused by this rapid development, will also be 
significant. Meanwhile, Japan will face reconstruction of its domestic and foreign 
policies, in order to maintain its position as an upper middle ranked power, while 
also combating its various internal challenges (National Intelligence Council 2008, 
33).    
China, with its large population, rapidly growing economy and rising influence 
on the diplomatic stage, is an actor playing a strong role among its neighbors, and it 
currently has more power that it could use to wield international relations. China is 
considered as strong as other major states in the region if its power is measured in 
“absolute terms,” because its military budget was ranked third among all the states in 
2003, after adjusting the buying power of the RMB on a “parity purchasing power” 
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(PPP) basis, which has been rising steadily since. The People’s Liberation Army’s 
military doctrine, after absorbing the experience of high-tech warfare conducted by 
the United States in the 1990s, has shifted from a “people’s war” to a “limited war 
under high-technology conditions” (McDougall 2007, 61). The latest annual U.S. 
Congressional Report “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007,” 
describes China’s current military doctrine as being able to reform the PLA into a 
force which is capable of fighting a “local war under conditions of infomatization,” 
and the result of the reform is largely “impressive” but actually yet to be tested (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2007, 15).  
Also, it is interesting when exploring whether their earlier history has brought 
about an impact on their current identity, as neither state are considered remarkably 
weak. In the following section, some major events of Sino-Japanese relations will be 
explored. 
 
2.1 Overview on early history of Sino-Japanese relations until World 
War Two 
China and Japan have had centuries of interaction; the first recorded 
diplomatic relations can be traced back to as early as the 7th century. Japan, under the 
rule of Empress Suiko, sent an envoy to Sui Dynasty in China in the year 607; this 
was the beginning of the first diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
However, diplomatic relations did not end when the Sui Dynasty ended, as the 
successor of Sui, Tang Dynasty, maintained the relations with Japan. This was also 
the period when Chinese culture had considerable influence on Japan, and Japan sent 
students and monks to China in order to learn. Since this time, the Japanese political 
system, economies and education are believed to have been under the influence of 
Chinese culture (Cheng 2001, 1).     
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As interaction deepened between the two countries, some major events 
occurred; some of which have greatly impacted on later generations. Kublai Khan of 
the Yuan Dynasty sent two expeditionary forces to Japan, in order to force 
submission to Yuan’s rule. Both of these failed due to the fleets being damaged by 
typhoon. However, after these two attempts, the Yuan Dynasty never again attempted 
to conquer Japan by any means (Cheng 2001, 82-86).   
Another major event was the intensification of the Wokou (Japanese pirates) 
raid on the coastal area of Ming China in the mid-1500s. However, the name of 
Wokou (or Japanese pirates) can be misleading, because these raiders did not 
exclusively consist of individuals from Japanese origins. It is believed that some 
raiders had Chinese renegade members, even though, at the time, Ming asserted 
Japanese involvement in such activities (Grygiel 2006, 153). The word Wokou can 
be referred to how the Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Portuguese who harassed the 
coastal region of China (Cheng 2001, 121). The reason the Wokou were such a 
problem was partly due to the Hai-Jin (Ocean Forbidden) of Ming Dynasty and 
economic aspirations of some Japanese individuals (Cheng 2001, 122), In 1555, the 
Ming government declared sea-going in a large, single mast boat as a crime, yet the 
Ming’s naval fleet declined this at the time (Kane 2002, 28). With seafaring being 
forbidden, a neglect of naval power being made by the Ming navy and naval skills 
being non-existent, the Ming government had to reply on some rather ineffective 
passive defensive measures (Grygeil 2006, 153). However, Wokou activities declined 
to a great extent by the end of the 1500s, following improvements in military tactics 
and equipment, permission to sea trade by Ming, and the unification of the Japanese 
allowed it to commit to improve domestic economic (Cheng 2001, 129). However, 
the Wokou made a significant impression on the Chinese. Although many of the 
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Wokou members were not Japanese, Japan is sometimes associated with the word 
Wokou.  Additionally, one interesting example is that a China website, which has 
various news and information about Japan, has the domain name 
“www.wokou.net.cn”.  This is an example of how Japan is associated with this 
word and with explicit negative meaning (Jin ru Riben).   
The Ming Dynasty’s successor, the Ching Dynasty, did not establish formal 
relations with the Japanese Shogunate, but interactions at civilian level were still 
frequent (Cheng 2001, 2). Since the Meji Restoration of Japan in the mid-1800s, 
Japan had achieved much technological modernization compared to its neighboring 
countries. In the famous article, Datsu-A Ron published 1885 (An argument for 
leaving Asia), Yukichi Fukuzawa believed that China and Korea could not revitalize 
themselves in the face of Western power; he suggested Japan should join the league 
of Western powers (Cheng 2001, 286-287).  He also proposed that Japan should 
stay away from the Asian countries and learn to be a western-style power (Boyle 
1972, 347). The relatively advanced Japan and traditional China finally clashed in the 
first Sino-Japanese war from 1894 to 1895. The cause of this war was over the 
control of Korea, as Korea had important strategic value to both China and Japan 
(Lindberg, Todd 2002, 80-81). The Ching government suffered fatal blows from 
Japan, including the loss of the Beiyang Fleet in the Battle of Yalu and eventually 
signed the humiliating Treaty of Maguan/Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th 1895. 
According to the treaty, China ceded land to Japan, including Taiwan and the 
Laiodong Peninsula; they also paid 200,000,000 Kuping taels to Japan as war 
reparation and opened several cities for Japan to trade (Zheng 2006, 64-67). Japan 
then remained in possession of Taiwan until the end of World War Two.  
In 1900, shortly after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion took 
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place in various regions in China. This rebellion had an anti-foreigner nature, which 
was partly due to resentment towards Western imperialistic adventure and Christian 
activities in the country (Cheng 2001, 377-379; Li and Li 2006, 149-151). Some 
conservative factions within the Ching Court believed the Boxer could be used to 
expel any foreign influence in China, so Empress Cixi did not order effective 
measures to put it down. And, it is suggested by many that the Ching even 
encouraged the Boxer movement.  After, the Boxer Rebellion eventually led to the 
invasion Alliance of Eight Nations (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with the justification of 
protecting their citizens and property, and the occupation of Beijing on August 14th 
1900. The Ching government was forced to sign another treaty, the Boxer Protocol, 
with eight nations. This treaty further humiliated the Ching government and struck 
another fatal blow to the already weakened sovereignty of China. Among the 47,000 
troops dispatched by eight nations, 22,000 were Japanese soldiers; Japan received 7.7 
percent of the total 450 million taels and enjoyed other benefits stated in the Boxer 
Protocol (Cheng 2001 383-390, 394-395; Li and Li 2006, 208-213).  
Nevertheless, Sino-Japanese relations witnessed a bitterer and bloody chapter 
in the first half of the 20th century. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan acquired 
several rights from Russia, including the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula, access to 
the railroad between Port Arthur and Harbin, and mining rights in the Liaodong 
Peninsula (Cheng 2001, 449). China’s sovereignty was further damaged as it failed to 
regain its influence of the Shandong province from Germany; instead, Japan 
expanded its influence to the Shandong and acquired several interests which were 
enjoyed by Germany before World War One (First World War.com 2002). Later, in 
1928, the influential warlord of Northeast China, Zhang Zuolin, was assassinated by 
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an alleged Japanese Kwantung Army plotter, by planting a bomb on the railroad to 
blow up his train.  This assassination was believed to be part of the attempt to 
separate three provinces in the Northeast region from China (Cheng 2001, 586-587). 
Japan’s aspiration to expand its influence to three provinces of Northeast China 
finally succeeded in 1931.  In the 1931 Mukden incident, the Japanese Kwantung 
army occupied Mukden in the name of self-defense, after a failed bombing attempt 
on a Japanese troop train in the north of Mukden (Perkins 1997, 110). Then, Japan 
established a puppet regime, Manchukuo, in the Manchuria after the incident. 
The full scale warfare of the second Sino-Japanese war started from the 
Marco-Polo bridge incident. This incident occurred on July 7th 1937, when a 
Japanese Army unit, which was stationed in China, attacked the town of Wanping to 
find a missing soldier from a military exercise the night before. The Japanese unit 
claimed it was the Chinese garrison, stationed near the town of Wanping, who 
captured the soldier in the brief exchange of fire the previous night (Perkins 1997, 
126). This war was bloody; one major incident was the Nanjing incident (also called 
the Nanjing Massacre, the Rape of Nanjing or the Nanjing Atrocities), which was a 
controversial topic in both Japan and China. The official number of casualties 
proposed by China was 300,000, while the number of casualties estimated by 
Japanese scholars ranged from around 50,000 to 200,000 or more (Askew 2002; 
Dahl 2008, 249). The war lasted for eight years until Japan surrendered in August 
1945; this war was devastating to both China and Japan and has had a long-term 
impact on the relations between the two states. 
The legacies left by the war and previous events in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries remain one of the most discussed and debated issues among the people, 
elites and politicians of the two states (Lind 2008, 160-163).  One example 
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suggested by David Askew is that events such as the Nanjing incident have been 
important in shaping the “modern identity of China” (Askew 2002).  Furthermore, 
the geographical proximity between the two countries makes both of them the source 
of important mutual geopolitical concerns for the other. However, despite their 
ever-growing trade and investment record (Wan 2006, 46-55), some believe they are 
going to compete in many arenas. Issues such as energy security, rivalry for regional 
and global political influence, and territorial disputes mark a sharp distinction 
between the politically-cold portion and the economically-hot in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship. Mixing these concerns with the nationalistic pride experienced by 
individuals in both countries, means that the relations between China and Japan 
appear difficult to improve substantially; this is mainly due to the existence of 
fundamental incompatible core interests (Scott 2008, 145-150).   
Nevertheless, it is still too assertive to judge that geostrategic competition 
between these states must result in rivalry or conflict. For example, Germany and 
France have long been major competitors for the dominance of the European 
continent in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, but they eventually genuinely 
reconciled into a European community in the Post-War era. Apparently, it takes more 
than geostrategic concerns to push two states into deep animosity.  In the following 
section, the major events after the normalization of relations between China and 
Japan will be explored, in order to identify what historical legacies and contemporary 
events have come into play in recent decades. 
 
 
2.2 Overview on major events in the history of Sino-Japanese 
relations since normalization of the relations 
In this section, there is an overview of the major events in the Sino-Japanese 
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relationship since its normalization, with a focus on the post Cold-War era. 
 
2.2.1 1970s 
The rapprochement between China and the US, in the 1970s, brought 
Sino-Japanese relations into a new era. Given the changes in international order in 
Northeast Asia, Japan adopted to change as well. In fact, the attempt to re-establish 
contact with mainland China can be traced back to much earlier.  When Shigeru 
Yoshida, the Prime Minister of Japan in the immediate post-war period, together with 
his colleagues, engaged in an interest to re-establish ties with the mainland Chinese 
government and were not prepared to completely isolate the newly born People’s 
Republic of China (Rose 2005, 43-44). It is worth noting that Yoshida’s idea of 
building contacts with the mainland government did not necessarily mean “contact” 
with China was a formal diplomatic relationship, as Japan had formal diplomatic 
relations with the Republic of China concerning Taiwan. The idea of contact was also 
not because of sympathetic feelings or other personal political preference; rather it 
originated from a more traditional pragmatic consideration, as Yoshida’s idea was 
linked to traditional Japanese economic interests on mainland China. Yoshida was 
poised to take a rather ambiguous attitude towards the issue of recognition of which 
government legally governed mainland China (Drifte 2003, 14). Another reason for 
avoiding bad relations with the mainland was that Yoshida believed he had predicted 
the potential deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship, and considered it was an 
unwise decision to have a complete breakdown of any relationship with the Beijing 
(Iokibe 2007, 57). However, such an idea was unable to be put in motion under U.S. 
pressure; Yoshida was left with little room to maneuver, except to recognize the 
Republic of China as the legitimate government of China itself (Rose 2004, 44).  
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As seen above, Japan was a major ally to the U.S. in the region and the 
management of its relations with China largely followed U.S. direction in much of 
the Cold-War era. Its normalization of the relationship with China needed to be under 
the consent of the U.S. (Kokubun 2006, 23). Following the “ping pong diplomacy” in 
1971 and the “Nixon shock” in early 1972, voices promoting the normalization of 
relations with China emerged in Japan; and, following Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka’s decision to visit China, a survey conducted by the NHK in August 1972 
showed that more people liked China than disliked it (18% of interviewees liked 
China while 4% disliked the country) (Wang 2008, 232-233).  
It was only after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s expression of his willingness 
to have rapprochement with China that Japan began to seek normalization as well. 
The path to normalization was further paved by several reiterations through the 
waiver in demand of war reparations from Japan, by PRC leaders such as Zhou Enlai.  
This subsequently included a Clause in the 1972 Joint Statement, in which the PRC 
government “renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.”  Nevertheless, 
the wording used by Japan, regarding their invasion of China, used by Tanaka during 
his visit in September 1972, marked the beginning of the wording and ways of 
apology debate which would arise later in the 1990s. That Tanaka first “causing 
trouble” on September 1972, using an unclear apology wording which resulted in 
upsetting China, he clarified and issued a clearer wording on the following day (Rose 
2005, 47-49). However, the Joint communiqué was eventually signed and formal 
diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan were severed; Japan accepted the 
PRC government as the “sole legal Government of China” and Taiwan as the 
“inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” (Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan). Despite the fact that the war reparation issue was 
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denounced by the PRC government, certain issues such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands were left unsettled, in order to speed up the normalization (Hook et al. 2001, 
166). Henceforth, the two countries’ diplomatic relations were normalized. 
Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the negotiation for the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship took much longer because Japan was reluctant to 
include an anti-hegemonic clause, which was directed at the Soviet Union; while the 
Chinese government wanted such a clause to be included. Japanese resistance was 
largely due to the country having little gain, in security terms, through the addition of 
such a clause; this was because its security had been secured by its alliance with the 
United States (Wan 2006, 21, 92). Nevertheless, the treaty was eventually signed in 
October 1978. 
The normalization of the diplomatic relationship, and the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship, can also be understood to mean that China accepted close security ties in 
the form of an alliance between the U.S. and Japan; which was through formal 
relations being established with Japan (Kokubun 2006, 23). During the Cold War, the 
common strategic concern of the U.S. and China against the Soviet Union, also 
affected Chinese perceptions of Japan. The Chinese considered the rearmament of 
Japan as having a helpful role “against Soviet hegemonism.” However, the strategic 
security importance of China for the U.S. declined with the détente in the Soviet-US 
relationship near the end of the Cold War.  Therefore, China viewed Japan’s 
military build-up in a negative way because it considered Japan as a future 
competitor (McDougall 2007, 146-147).  
 
2.2.2 1980s 
Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s can be characterized as a period of 
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“strengthening,” while also seeing several ups-and-downs due to a number of 
different disputes between the two countries (Hook et al. 2001, 168). One of the 
more constructive developments between two countries was the beginning of 
government loans which were offered by Japan to China. In December 1979, Japan’s 
Prime Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, promised the first ever government development 
assistance (ODA) to China, in order to facilitate the economic reform of China 
through strengthening the infrastructure of the country (Iokibe 2007, 142). The 
second batch of government loans came during Nakasone’s visit to China in 1984; 
this batch of loans was worth 470 billion Yen (Iokibe 2007, 162). The third 
government loan package, in the form of an ODA, was promised by Noboru 
Takeshita during his visit to China in August 1988; he promised a 700 billion Yen 
loan to China which was to be completed in a six year period, from 1990 to 1995 
(Hook at el. 2001, 169).  
Despite the overall friendly atmosphere in the previous year, Nakasone’s visit 
to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 was a setback to bilateral relations. Yasukuni Shrine was 
a shrine built in Toyko to enshrine dead soldiers of Japan’s past war.  The 
controversy was that Japan’s Bereaved War Families Association (Izokukai), a 
political influential group, had moved the memorials of several class-A war criminals 
of World War Two into the shrine (Johnston 2007, 120-121).  Since then, the 
Yasukuni Shrine has become the equivalence of a shrine for war criminals of World 
War Two. China expressed its concern on this matter in the regular Japan-China 
foreign minister meetings (Iokibe 2007, 162), and this event marked the beginning of 
China’s concerns over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which kept happening back in 
the future. 
    Another outstanding issue in the late 1980s which casts a shadow on the 
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bilateral relationships between the two countries was Kyoto University’s Kokaryo 
Hostel for Chinese students. The Kokaryo was originally built and owned by the 
Nationalist government of China (Wan 2006, 355). However, the Taiwan government 
attempted to consolidate ownership through a series of legal actions. Finally, the 
Osaka high court delivered a verdict in favor of the Taiwan authority, in February 
1987 (Iokibe 2007, 163; Shimada 1999, 339; Wan 2006, 355). The PRC government 
argued that the hostel should belong to the People’s Republic of China.  This was 
based on the fact that PRC was the sole legitimate government of China and 
considered the verdict of the Osaka high court to be in violation of the 1972 Joint 
Communiqué and the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Peace (Hook at el. 2001, 160; 
Shimada 1998, 339).  Deng Xiaopeng even warned that the “Kokaryo issue is a 
“two Chinas” verdict and reflect[s] the tendency of resurrection of militarism” 
(Shimada 1998, 341).  
Another important issue, which started in the 1980s, was the “textbook 
controversies,” first emerging in June 1982. The media reported that the Japanese 
Ministry of Education was accused and criticized by the governments and various 
pressure groups in Asian countries (including China), because certain amendments 
and revisions to Japanese school textbooks were distortions of historical fact.  With 
the most controversial revisions including terms that regarded Japanese military 
activities, in other Asian countries, being changed from shinryaku (invasion) to 
shinshutsu or shinko (an advance) (Hook et al. 2001, 168). Subsequently, China 
cancelled a scheduled visit by the Minister of Education in August 1982, as a show 
of anger towards the issue (Iokibe, 2007, 151). Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki later 
said, in late August, that “It should be left to historians of later generations to judge 
on the war-time activities of our country, however, it is true that international society, 
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including China, has made harsh criticism and rose the historical understanding issue 
on our past “invasion”, as a government, we should have a full acknowledgment on 
that” (Iokibe 2007, 15); then, in September, he promised to look into the issue (Hook 
et al. 2001, 168). The textbook controversy was thus settled, at least for the time 
being. However, a further textbook incident occurred in 1986, as a new history 
textbook, named Shinpen Nihonshi (A New History of Japan), generated more 
controversy (Ross 56, 2004). The textbook was edited by Nihon o mamoru kokumin 
kaigi (National Conference for Defending Japan) and this volume successfully 
gained the approval from government for its publication. The textbook was 
considered to be an achievement for rightists and was the first time in the post-war 
era that a rightists’ written textbook had been published (Beal et al. 2001, 178-179). 
The criticized contents of this textbook included: claims that Japan civilians were 
unaware of the rape of Nanjing until the post-war era, and the truth of this event 
needed to be further investigated (Shimada 1998, 332).  Also, the book claimed the 
killings in Nanjing were not on a substantive scale, were by no means a “holocaust,” 
and the actual death toll was still in debate (Beal et al. 2001, 182).  It also suggested 
the Marco Polo Bridge/Luguoqiao Incident and the subsequent Sino-Japanese war in 
1937, were due to Chiang Kai-shek’s order of full mobilization and Chinese 
communists joined forces with Chiang’s.  It then categorized the Pacific War as a 
war of liberation for Asian people, from the hands of a European-American 
hegemony; and it was only with Japan’s effort and enormous sacrifice, despite being 
eventually defeated, that the Asian countries had been freed from European 
oppression and was “the turning point of world history” (Shimada 1998, 332). 
Near the end of the 1980s, Sino-Japanese relations were challenged by another 
event. Following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China attracted a series of 
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condemnations and sanctions from major western countries. Japan faced a dilemma 
of whether to choose to follow the stance of its western allies to condemn and 
sanction China harshly, but avoid damaging Sino-Japanese relations by doing so. 
Eventually, the path chosen by Japan was to maintain a rather soft attitude towards 
China, comparing it to other major powers such as the other G7 countries. Japan, 
despite imposing sanctions such as suspending loans, preventing high-level official 
exchanges, and issuing tourist warnings, was among the first countries to re-contact 
China after the Tiananmen Square Incident; by resuming the Second Yen loan and 
lifting the business travel ban near the end of 1989 (Drifte 2003, 29-30). Japanese 
reluctance over imposing serious sanctions and using harsh wording against China 
was exemplified in the G7 Summit in July 1989.  Japan’s Prime Minister, Sosuke 
Uno, called on G7 members to include content over not isolating China in their joint 
declaration which condemned China. Later, China showed its appreciation to Japan’s 
attitude in handling this matter (Jin 2008, 182).  Although certain sanctions 
remained in place, Sino-Japanese relations were soon improved by a series of 
measures such as high-level official exchanges and economic aid and agreements (Li 
2007, 27-33; Shimada 1999, 366-367, 369-371).  The relationship between the two 
countries was fully restored Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s and the Japanese 
Emperor’s visit to China, in August 1991 and October 1992 respectively (Drifte 2003, 
30; Sutter 2008, 224). On his visit to China, Kaifu said that the third batch of Yen 
loans would be provided as promised and then proposed a broadening of bilateral 
relations as a “Japanese-Chinese relations in the global community” (sekai no naka 
no Nitchu kankei), by exploring bilateral relations on the global community level in 
order to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on international issues such as arms 
control and the environment (Drifte 2003, 123; Feng et al. 2006, 454). 
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Generally speaking, the Sino-Japanese relationship, in the 1980s, witnessed both 
cooperation and disagreement. Although there was progress of their bilateral 
relationship, certain issues, especially those relating to their past history, became 
prominent in the 1980s; some of which would continue to affect the Sino-Japanese 
relationship in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
2.2.3 1990s 
In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War marked the end of more than five 
decades tension between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, an end came to the 
rivalry between the two countries; the United States then enjoyed a superpower 
position which had previously been unprecedented.  
The Sino-U.S. relationship was more or less shaped by the context of the Cold 
War before the 1990s. Since the 1970s, the U.S. rapprochement to China showed 
common strategic concerns of both countries to restrain the Soviet Union. Yet, 
Sino-U.S. relationship, in the 1970s and 1980s, can be categorized as a “strategic 
partnership.” The example of close relations between the two countries was 
exemplified in the wake of formal relations with the Republic of China, in 1979; 
America sold arms to China in the 1980s and various cooperative events were 
proposed in the 1980s (McDougall 2007, 116-117).  Although it has been argued 
that China, as a strategic weight, became less important during the Reagan 
administration than during his predecessors (because of Reagan’s assertion of 
establishing a huge military), it enjoyed a “pivot” position due to the worsening of 
U.S.-Soviet relations (Yahuda 1996, 78-79).  
The Soviet Union as the “common target” for the United States, China and 
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Japan was no more, following the collapse of the Soviet Union which marked the end 
of the Cold War. As a result, their strategic commonality has since been lost 
(Kokubun 2006, 24). As economic issues were given a higher priority in the 
post-Cold War period, China and Japan enjoyed relatively warm relations in the early 
1990s because of their increased economic interdependence. In history, there were 
some positive developments as well, for example, Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa, the first non-LDP Prime Minister, admitted that World War Two was a 
mistake, apologizing for Japan’s invasion and “war of aggression” in World War Two, 
which he also did during his visit to China. However, it was reported that he was shot 
and wounded on May 30th, 1994 (but was no longer Prime Minister), because of his 
statements on World War Two (Hook et al. 2001, 171; Jin 2008, 191; Ross 2003, 
101). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama gave a statement of apology 
for Japan’s war of aggression “on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war 
end,” and expressed this by saying: 
 
“During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken 
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people 
in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous 
damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian 
nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of 
humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of 
deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of 
profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan).  
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His statement was then thought to be a benchmark to judge any apology 
attempts later attempted by Japan (Rose 2005, 102-103). 
Despite the signs of a warming of bilateral relations which were witnessed in 
the early 1990s, the change in mindset following changes in the strategic 
environment (the end of the Cold War), marked changes in security concerns for both 
China and Japan; with several events illustrating this change. Without the Soviet 
Union as a key security concern, for Japan, China seemed to become one.  A 
Japanese scholar, Tomohide Murai, wrote an article “On the potential threat of 
China” and discussed China as a potential enemy in terms of comprehensive national 
strength (Ateba 2002, 3; Li 2007 86). This article was one of the first signs of the 
approaching discussion over the “threat of China.”  China’s leaders also realized 
that the “threat of China” or “China threat” had become a hot topic and took 
measures to counter this wind of discussion; thus, a series of diplomatic actions were 
taken by China in the early 1990s, in an effort to counter this issue (Drifte 2003, 35).  
Meanwhile, China became more sensitive and gave increasingly negative 
comments on any potential Japanese movement to expand its role and diplomatic 
sphere, especially through participation on security issues. In the post-Cold War era, 
issues emerged such as a lighthouse built by the Japanese on the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, which was criticized by China as a “brazen invasion” and “resurgence of the 
ghost of Japanese militarism” (Ash 1991, 209). China also seemed to have more 
negative views on how Japan was potentially expanding its role in security. When 
Japan sent 500 hundred personnel and six minesweepers from the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF), to assist in minesweeping operations after the Gulf War 
in 1991 (Zhang 2002, 144), China’s official Xinhua News Agency expressed worries 
over such an agenda and questioned whether it would set a bad precedent; they 
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remarked that: “…If mine-sweepers were sent now, what […] was to stop 
submarines or cruisers from being dispatched in the future?” (Ash 1991, 674)  
Later, in 1994, the Japanese government defined the term “neighboring area,” 
which is mentioned in the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, to 
include the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea (Wang 2007, 145). Thus, Chinese 
concern regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance developed in subsequent years.  
Due to historical and practical reasons, China was deeply concerned by the 
Japanese defense policy in the post-Cold War era. The U.S. and Japan issued a new 
“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security” in 1996, which marked the first step in 
the revision of the decades-old Security Alliance. Later, in September 1997, the final 
version of the revised defense guidelines mentioned that Japan could become 
militarily (in terms of logistical and humanitarian support) involved in assisting the 
U.S. if there are “situations […] in the areas surrounding Japan” (Drifte 2003, 92). 
This worried China, as it suspected these guidelines would be applicable to a future 
Taiwan scenario and even a Spratly Island one.  
To make matters worse, later interpretation by the U.S. and Japan failed to 
comfort China, and added even more confusion and suspicion (Drifte 2003, 91-93, 
97-99). The use of ambiguous terms was intended by the U.S. and Japan, in order to 
settle China’s beliefs that it was a direct target of the guidelines. Nevertheless, Japan 
failed to comfort China by clarifying the new guidelines in a way China desired. 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said the guideline was a situational but not a 
geographical concept, it does not define any specific area, but he did not make it 
clear the areas excluded Taiwan (Jin 2008, 201; Mathur 2000); which is why China 
has never felt easy with this new definition. However, such an approach failed to 
convince China. One Chinese scholar pointed out that the revised guidelines for the 
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U.S.-Japan alliance heightened China’s distrust and alert over Japan’s future 
intentions on the Taiwan issue as well as the country’s strategic goals; the feeling was 
reinforced because the newly-defined alliance seemed to change the nature and role 
of Japan from “the protected” to “an active participant,” and its strategic doctrine 
was edging from “internal defense” to “maintaining peace and stability of the 
Asia-Pacific;” from “defensive” to “offensive” (Jin 2008, 200). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that this new definition of alliance also produced some Japanese 
concern over whether a more regionally-defined arrangement would drag Japan into 
conflict, where Japanese soil may not be attacked directly.  This fear caused 
opposition from the Communist, Social Democratic and Democratic parties in the 
Diet in 1999, when the law for implementing this guideline was discussed 
(Katzenstein 2008, 106 - 107).  
For Japan, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 was one of the triggers for the 
revision of the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Drifte 2003, 64). In this crisis, China attempted 
to use missile tests and military exercises to influence the Taiwan presidential 
elections, and to show it would not allow any attempt for Taiwan to gain 
independence (Hook et al. 2001, 221-223; Iokibe 2007, 191). It should also be noted 
that the site of the missile test, in March 1996, was close to Japanese territorial 
waters, with one of the closest points being 60 kilometers from Okinawa (Hughes 
2004, 166-167). Japan’s reaction during the crisis was quite restrained; Prime 
Minister Hashimoto decided not to send the MSDF to the area near Okinawa, even 
though there was request from the people of Okinawa for him to do so.  He decided 
it would be a move that would increase tensions between Japan and China. Despite 
the overall restraining attitude of the Japanese government, the Chinese military 
exercise raised (or re-confirmed) the dangers of China as a rising power in the minds 
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of the Japanese public, elite and academics; and, even pro-China politicians found 
the exercise unacceptable.  In short, China’s exercise produced Japanese concern 
over China’s future behavior and long-term goals (Drifte 2003, 65, 67, 69). Another 
effect after the 1995/1996 exercise was damage to China’s image amongst the 
Japanese public. A public opinion survey conducted the Prime Minister’s Office, in 
1996, found that 51.3% of Japanese people thought: “I do not have friendly feelings 
towards China,” which overtook thoughts of “I have friendly feelings” (45%), for the 
first time. 
The missile exercise may also have led to another development – the Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) – which some interpreted to mean the emergence of Japan’s 
interest to join this project was partly due to the 1995/96 exercises that alerted Japan 
to China’s missile threat; but, these were along with other reasons such as the 1998 
North Korea missile test (Drifte 2003, 94). Japan’s National Security Council first 
approved joint technological research with the U.S. in 1998 and the Japanese cabinet 
formed an agreement: “Exchange of Notes Concerning a Programme for Cooperative 
Research on Ballistic Missile Technologies with the U.S.” (Hughes 2002, 69); 
therefore, this marked the beginning of Japan’s official involvement in the TMD 
program. China’s primary concern over a potential missile defense system operated 
by Japan was that the system would provide a potential missile shield to Taiwan, and 
thus encourage Taiwanese independence.  One key method the Chinese had of 
deterring Taiwan from moving towards independence was through the large number 
of short- and medium-range of ballistic missiles, including the M9 and M11 (Hughes 
2002, 76; Katzenstein 2008, 110; Mathur 2000; Wan 2006, 37). Another Chinese 
concern was the potential transfer of such a technology to Taiwan from the U.S.; if 
the project was a success (Hughes 2002, 76), then the transfer of missile defense 
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would develop the current informal relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan into a 
“quasi-alliance.”  Therefore, this would mean Japan would then need to commit or 
be involved in defending Taiwan if such a conflict arose (Christensen 2002, 13-14). 
Another of China’s concerns was that, even though Japan was not a nuclear-armed 
state, its missile defense would be robust enough to defend against Chinese nuclear 
and conventionally-armed missiles over the East Sea; thus, undermining its 
capability of deterrence (Mathur 2000). Additionally, the TMD technologies could 
also have a “spillover effect” to other defense programs (Katzenstein 2008, 110).  
Nevertheless, the U.S.-Japan Alliance had been useful for China, as the 
Chinese leadership believed that such an alliance would mean that Japan had no 
reason to become a military power in its own, when the U.S. shares a considerable 
part of Japan’s defense. Also, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could 
lead to a power vacuum which Japan would be drawn into. However, the alliance 
would only provide short-term benefits in terms of hedging Japanese military 
resurgence and therefore, may cause more harm than good, should the content or 
nature of th alliance change from China’s perspective (Ong 2007, 170). And, when 
the revised and redefined alliance in 1996/97 came, this worry seemed justifiable. 
Giving the delicate history and geopolitical relations between China and Japan, 
Sino-Japanese security relations are deemed to be sensitive in nature. Japan, being a 
U.S. ally, could be at risk of being “be caught in the middle of a “tug of war” 
between the US and China,” implying that Japan would find it hard to stay isolated 
from any potential Sino-American conflict (Hook et al. 2001, 172). China is also 
concerned about the strength of the Japanese military and economic potential, 
viewing it as the main competitor in East-Asia. China’ attitude towards the 
U.S.-Japan alliance is mixed; this alliance is viewed as both a measure to restrain 
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Chinese influence in the region and a way to prevent Japan from developing 
militarism. However, what role the U.S.-Japan alliance plays in the Taiwanese issue 
is another Chinese concern. China’s antagonism to Japan, playing a large security 
role, was exemplified when Japan attempted to contend for permanent membership 
of the UN Security Council.  In early 2005, China strongly opposed this move and 
asserted that Japan had simply not done enough to reflect on its war guilt, which 
meant the country was unsuitable to play a larger role in the Security Council 
(McDougall 2007, 155-156). Another concern from China is the apparently growing 
trend of rightist movements and voices within Japan, calling for Japan to be a 
“normal country.”  In 2005, the 2+2 meeting (The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative 
Committee meeting between Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director 
General of Defense Agency and the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense) created 
new controversy as the joint statement included “the peaceful resolution of issues 
concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue,” as one of its objectives. China was 
again concerned with this statement because it considered the Taiwan question, 
because China’s internal affairs and foreign powers had no right to comment on it 
(Takagi 2006, 122-123). 
Another example, in recent years, was China’s frustration over Japanese 
ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. This was an issue that already occurred in 
1985, when Nakasone visited the Shrine as Prime Minister; and, Ryutaro Hashimoto 
visited in 1994 and 1995 before becoming Prime Minister (Ross 2003, 110). In July 
1996, Hashimoto also visited the shrine in his capacity as Prime Minister of Japan, 
and his visit received much protest and criticism both within and outside Japan; this 
resulted in him not to visit in any subsequent years (Feng & Lin 2005, 4; Ross 2003, 
113). What was remarkable about Hashimoto’s visit was that he became the first 
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Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine after Nakasone (Togo 2005, 
152). Meanwhile, Japan was frustrated by persistent Chinese demands for an apology 
over its wartime crimes against China. In fact, the historical issue is considered to be 
a source of concern and distrust between Japan and China, since more Japanese 
politicians continue to visit to the Shrine (He 2006, 78). The frustration over an 
apology of war time behavior can be exemplified during President Jiang Zemin’s 
(China’s President) time in Tokyo at a summit in 1998.  The Japanese Prime 
Minister, Keizo Obuchi, decided not to offer Jiang an “explicit public apology” 
(Goldstein,2005 165), which he had given earlier to South Korea’s President Kim 
Dae-jung. Instead, Obuchi simply expressed his regret for Japan’s wartime behavior. 
According to Avery Goldstein, Obuchi made this decision based on the fact that 
China refused to give him a guarantee that an explicit public apology would be the 
final chapter of the ever-recurring apology-demand from China, yet South Korea 
made this guarantee. Also, Japanese leaders had been continually providing an 
apology and expressing regret/remorse in a number of statements to China, but China 
did not seem to be satisfied and often raised the matter when they thought it would 
be useful. Therefore, Obuchi decided not to entertain China as, in his eyes, it was not 
beneficial to do so (Goldstein 2005, 165). Jiang responded to Ohuchi’s refusal to 
issue an official “written apology” by repeatedly mentioning the wartime history on 
several occasions during his visit, including his speech at the Imperial Palace.  
Unsurprisingly, such moves attracted and heightened much resentment in Japan and 
most possibly damaged any benefits gained from this visit (Drifte 2003, 17, 79-80; 
Iokibe 2005, 202). 
However, it is worth thinking about whether history itself is truly the concern 
of the Chinese CCP leadership, or whether they merely “play the card” in a 
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diplomatic arena; using it as an excuse and smokescreen to hide its true agenda. 
Drifte concludes that the frequent usage of “the history card” by China was to 
distract other Asians from paying attention to its own “unfriendly security policies” 
(Drifte 2003, 183-184). However, such an approach by China could be 
counterproductive. 
Territorial disputes re-emerged in the 1990s as another source of Sino-Japanese 
argument. In 1996, when Japan included Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in its territory, 
several Japanese rightists asserted that the islands belonged to Japan and built a 
lighthouse with a flag. However, Chinese nuclear tests, in 1995 and 1996, also 
brought a shadow over bilateral relationships; this was because the tests linked in 
with Japan’s reduction in economic assistance – however, economic assistance was 
then resumed in March 1997 (Murphy 1996; Hughes 2004, 93; Togo 2005, 152). It is 
the potential of these remote islands providing an energy source, through gas and oil, 
which makes them the center of concern (Sutter 2008, 230).  
Many factors contribute to the ever-increasing security concerns of both 
countries towards each other. In fact, many consider a military conflict between 
Japan and China to be a likely scenario and ones that needs to be addressed. For 
example, one scenario, which was developed through recent research by the RAND 
Corporation, focused on a naval skirmish around the Diaoyu Island (Congressional 
Research Service 2006, 19).  
In the Sino-Japanese relationship, it is interesting to note that whatever the 
troubled issue is, history is often mentioned. It is undeniable that history (or 
respective interpretation of history by the individual country) has been an important 
part in the shaping of perceptions and opinions over Sino-Japanese relations; and, 
policies may be formed against the context of historical legacies. On the other hand, 
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history may not simply be rooted in problems in its own right, as history-related 
animosity could also be a by-product which is generated from the methods used by 
both governments, when dealing with their current internal problems and contesting 
diplomatic objectives (Heazle and Knight 2007, 7). Therefore, it can be understood 
that historical issues are both the reason and result of certain policies and approaches 
taken by the two governments. 
Japan, despite being eclipsed by China in economic growth in recent years, is 
still not an actor to be overlooked. Since the signing of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 
April 1952, Japan has been the main Asian ally of the United States, and the alliance 
with the U.S. has been intertwined with the main pillars of Japan’s security. Despite 
Japan relying on the U.S. to provide a security umbrella, Japan itself has established 
a powerful Self Defense Force (SDF). Also, despite the SDF lacking in numbers, the 
SDF’s equipment is far more advanced and modernized than its neighboring 
counterpart (Drifte 2003, 85). Furthermore, Japan upgraded its Defense Agency to 
the Defense Ministry in January 2007, and the Chinese government have stressed 
that Japan should still follow the path of peaceful development. Moreover, a 
professor at the China Institute of Foreign Affairs claimed the upgrade was a 
significant move by Japan for increased freedom over international affairs and to 
become a key military power (Le 2007).  
As mentioned previously, one key aspect of the Sino-Japanese relationship is 
through issues over their history. The different attitudes toward history are one of the 
major reasons fueling mistrust between them. A clear example was China’s 
frustration over the Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Meanwhile, 
Japan is frustrated by persistent Chinese demands for Japan’s apology in wartime 
crimes. In fact, historical issues have consistently been a source of concern and 
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distrust between Japan and China, since more Japan politicians have visited the 
shrine (He 2006, 78).  
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeatedly visited the shrine in the 
mid-2000s, which angered China and brought Sino-Japanese relations to a new low. 
The next Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was quite vague about his attitude on 
Japan’s war history – he expressed certain controversial comment on those matters 
before he became prime minister. Nevertheless, he did not visit Yasukuni Shrine and 
made an effort to improve Japan’s relations with China, such as his visit to China 
shortly after taking office. After the resignation of Abe, his successor Yasuo Fukuda 
showed his willingness to foster a more cooperative relationship with China; 
remarking during his visit to China, in December 2007: “I had in-depth discussions 
with Chinese leaders and agreed that Japan and China can do more if they co-operate 
than each can do single-handedly,” and said that he would not visit Yasukuni Shrine 
(BBC News 2007).  
Signs of an improvement in these relations have been apparent so far, but 
whether such a trend is sustainable is another matter.  Given the usually relatively 
short duration in office of Japanese prime ministers, there is a possibility that each 
new Japanese prime minister will adopt a new direction and perspective from the 
previous one. For Chinese leaders, concern was through the moderate line of former 
Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda towards China, in that such a moderate line may not 
pass onto his successor and that a new hardliner conservative could come to office. 
In fact, the current Prime Minister, Taro Aso, was known for making hard-line 
comments about China as a security threat (Takahara 2005) before he became Prime 
Minister. Also, Chinese leaders may consider it safe for them to prepare for another 
Koizumi-like leader, or indeed a more hostile Japanese leader. China’s government 
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would never be too comfortable with the Japanese attitude toward history issues 
because of the frequency of a new Japanese prime minister. Thus, it seems a difficult 
task for trust to be built upon between the two countries over this issue. 
Both China and Japan have substantial economic and military power, so any 
clash between them would have devastating consequences to the world’s economy. 
Whether tension between these two states originates from the mistrust, which is 
rooted from history, or is for other strategic reasons isn’t clear; but, their security 
relationship needs to be handled carefully and should be examined and investigated 
thoroughly. Furthermore, it is hoped that a solution can be sought which could help 
prevent a potential conflict that could cost the welfare of billions of people.   
In this section, a number of major events of Sino-Japanese relations, covering 
the past three decades, has been presented. The following section will discuss the 
perceptions of various actors that have been formed over recent years within the two 
states. 
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3. The perception of actors within the two states 
 
A constructivist argument is that identities and interests will lead to “relations 
of enmity” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 94), but that these are subject to change by “new 
understanding of ‘self’ and ‘other’” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 94). Thus, it can be 
understood in the way that, in Sino-Japanese relations, whether each state or actors in 
each state view and understand the other state as a threat or not contributing to the 
presence of the security dilemma. It has been argued that emotional factors, including 
fear, are the main driving force of the security dilemma, rather than other structural 
factors (Crawford 2000, 119). 
For example, although the U.S. seems to be the most powerful military 
presence in East Asia, China, to some extent, would rather to have the U.S.-Japan 
alliance than the withdrawal of the U.S. in the area. This is irrational if one believes a 
stronger military power means a larger threat, as Beijing should welcome the 
dissolution of the U.S.-Japanese alliance; however, this is not the case. China has a 
profound distrust in Japan for various reasons, but mainly due to the dissatisfaction 
and distrust over how Japan has handled certain historical issues. As a result, and 
even though Japan is a weaker military power than the U.S., Japan seems to be 
trusted less and more disliked than the U.S. in the eyes of China (Christensen 2003, 
27-28). Japan’s perceived attitude in handling historical issues is believed to attract 
suspicion from other Asian countries, and often leads to speculation on the future 
direction Japan will go in (Montaperto, Ming 1999, 76). One may believe it to be 
illogical and irrational for China to trust or fear a strong military power rather than 
the weaker one, if material military strength is considered the absolute condition in 
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determining whether a state is a threat. Therefore, it seems in this case that other 
factors such as threat perception play a larger role than material strength.    
Therefore, the research focus of this thesis is to investigate if a security 
dilemma exists in Sino-Japanese relations. Although the threat perception may not be 
an exclusive reason to determine if a security dilemma exists in international 
relations, this thesis chooses threat perception as the main research focus of the 
investigation.  
Therefore, identifying these emotional factors is a crucial step in understanding 
international relations and whether a security dilemma exists. Constructivism, 
convinced that internal image is a driving force of a state’s foreign polices, argues 
that Asian countries would be relatively more competitive in nature due to their 
diverse identities, including democracies, non-democracies and states with different 
religious beliefs, when comparing to a less diverse region such as Europe (Nau 2003, 
216). 
In the following section, several groups of sub-state actors in both states will 
be the focus of discussion. They are the general public, military, scholars, younger 
generation, and political leaders. The business sphere was initially planned to be 
included in the discussion; however, resulting materials were found insufficient to 
formulate a meaningful analysis. As a result, business research and analysis is not 
included. Information for some groups is rich, while others are relatively less due to 
availability of information. 
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3.1 General Public  
3.1.1 Form both sides 
In 2006, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey: “Publics of Asian 
Powers hold negative views of one another.”  Judging from the title, the result from 
this project identified that several Asian countries hold a negative view of 
neighboring countries. Some of the findings of this survey, regarding China and 
Japan, will be illustrated below.  
The researchers from Pew conducted face-to-face interviews with 2,180 
Chinese adults, aged between 18 and 60 years of age, who lived in six Chinese cities 
and surrounding rural areas, being: Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Xinxiang, 
Jinzhong, and Luzhou. However, most of the interviewees were from urban areas. 
The Japanese interviews were conducted by telephone, with target respondents being 
adults of 18 years of age or over; there were 500 successful Japanese interviews 
conducted. It is noted that using the telephone as the method of contact does mean 
that only households with a telephone service can be reached (The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project 2006, 10). 
The research found that 71% of Japanese respondents disliked China, while 
70% of Chinese respondents expressed negative views towards Japan. It is also noted 
that the ratio of Chinese having negative feelings is the highest toward Japan, when 
compared to their attitudes towards other Asian countries such as India and Pakistan. 
Meanwhile, only 21% of Japanese respondents favored the Chinese, showing a 
decreasing trend from 55% who showed favorable views in 2002 (The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project 2006, 1, 3). The reason for holding unfavorable opinions toward 
Japan shows that history was the main factor, as 81% of Chinese respondents 
believed Japan had not reflected enough for its World War Two behavior; while only 
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44% of Japanese respondents believed they had not apologized enough.  The 
Chinese also believed that Japan had not been totally freed of militaristic roots and 
was exemplified by Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, an action 
that 78% of Chinese respondents opposed (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 
1-2, 16). Another interesting finding is that, while an overwhelmingly 95% of 
Chinese see the growth in China’s military strength as a positive development, the 
same overwhelming 93% of Japanese saw it as a bad thing (The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project 2006, 1). Another common shared feature by both Chinese and 
Japanese respondents was that they tended to see each other with negative 
characteristics, while positive characteristics had gone unnoticed. They associated 
each other as competitive, greedy, selfish, and arrogant; while very few saw the other 
as honest and generous. Also, 65% of Chinese and 50% of Japanese respondents 
believed their counterparts were violent, and the majority viewed each other as 
nationalistic (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 2, 13-14).  
It is worth noting that 71% of Japanese individuals said they had “not too 
much confidence” or “no confidence at all” in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s ability 
to handle world affairs; with no one remarking they have “a lot of confidence” in him. 
Also, 58% of Chinese respondents lacked confidence in Prime Minister Koizumi 
(The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 14). Furthermore, 39% of Japanese 
individuals considered China to be their greatest danger (the highest percentage 
among all choices), while 58% of Chinese respondents named the U.S. as the 
greatest danger (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 14). Additionally, 33% and 
34% of Chinese respondents believed Japan was an “adversary” or “a serious 
problem” respectively; while more than half, 53%, of Japanese interviewees said the 
Chinese were a serious problem, and 31% believing Chinese was an “adversary” 
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(The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 4, 15). On a positive note, 68% of Japanese 
interviewees considered China’s economic prosperity to be beneficial to their own 
country (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 15). Also, 67% of Japanese 
respondents opposed the amendment of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution, facilitating 
the change in nature of the Japanese military; therefore, it seems that pacifism is still 
seen in the majority of the Japanese population (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 
2006, 5, 16). The Pew also conducted another project “The 2008 Pew Global 
Attitude Survey in China: The Chinese celebrate their roaring economic, as they 
struggle with its costs – near universal optimism about Beijing Olympics.” This 
project consisted of 3,131 face-to-face interviews with Chinese adults, who were 18 
years old or above and in eight major cities: Beijing, Changsha, Chongqing, 
Guangzhou, Harbin, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xi’an; as well as rural areas and smaller 
towns in the eight provinces. When asked the question, “Overall, do you think of 
Japan as more of a partner of China, more of an enemy of China, or neither?” Those 
who answered “more of an enemy” consisted of 38% of total respondents, which was 
slightly more than those who answered neither and much more than “more of a 
partner” (11%).  Also, 76% of respondents said that Japan had not apologized 
enough, which has slightly decreased from 81% in the 2006 result (The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project 2008, 21, 43, 46-47). 
Given the growing economic strength of China, the cold political relationship 
seems to worry some professionals in the business sphere. This worry seems to be 
exemplified by a reduction of approximately $2billion worth of high-speed train 
connection because of an internet movement opposing China’s railroad being placed 
in the hands of the Japanese (Brooke 2005). A Japanese business leader, Toyoo 
Gyohten, even made a comment saying that “I […] believe that [Japanese] should 
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apologize as many times as possible” (Brooke 2005). Gyohten was the President at 
the Institute for International Monetary Affairs and held several important business 
related positions in several organizations, including special adviser to Japan’s Prime 
Minister (Council of Foreign Relations; BusinessWeek).  
Another survey, conducted by the BBC World Service, also seems to exemplify 
the negative view the Chinese public hold on Japan and vice versa. This annual 
service, which began in 2005, asked people in several countries about how they view 
the influence of other countries, and whether they believe such influence to be 
positive or negative.  
The world public generally views Japan’s influence as well received and it is 
one of a few countries that are viewed in positive light on a continuous basis in 
surveys during 2006 and 2009. A persistent trend is that China is among the few 
countries where respondents have a negative view on Japan’s influence. In a 2007 
report, it was said that China, along with South Korea, were the only two countries 
that had more respondents holding a negative view than a positive one on Japan’s 
influence. This result is consistent with the finding of the previous year, with a slight 
drop in negative views of respondents, from 71% to 63% (BBC World Service 2007, 
9). In the 2008 survey, China remained one of the two countries, out of 24, that 
considered Japan’s influence as negative; however, the percentage of those holding 
this opinion was down from the previous year, 63% to 55% (BBC World Service 
2008, 10). In the 2009 poll, Chinese respondents were still one of two countries 
(although the other was now Turkey) where the number of people giving a negative 
view on Japan’s influence outweighed those with a positive one; although this 
number dropped further from 55% to 50% from the previous year (World Public 
Opinion 2009).   
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On the other hand there is Japanese opinion on China’s influence; where 78% 
of Japanese respondents hold a negative view of “China becoming more powerful 
militarily” (PIPA & Global Scan 2005, 3). However, there is no data in the 2007 
report over Japanese opinions of China. Japan was then included in the 2008 edition, 
but it became apparent that Japan was the country with the highest percentage of 
respondents providing a negative view of Chinese influence; where only 12% of 
respondents considered China’s influence to be positive (BBC World Service 2008, 
14). However, there was no data available for the 2009 edition; with a statement 
remarking that the global view on China has seen a general decline (World Public 
Opinion 2009). 
Another survey, conducted by Genron-NPO in 2007, provides more interesting 
information. The survey researchers interviewed 1,000 Japanese and 1,609 Chinese 
individuals (Genron NPO 2007), and found the overall perception between the two 
countries had improved. Multiple answers to the question “Which countries or 
regions do you think are a military threat to Japan or China?” resulted in 35.4% 
Japanese respondents saying that China was a military threat, second to North Korea 
(81.4%); while 41.1% of Chinese respondents named Japanese as a military threat, 
second to the U.S. (55.6%) (Genron-NPO 2007, 27). For the question “reasons why 
you feel Japan is a threat for China,” resulted in the following answers. 
Why do you consider China to be a threat? (for Japanese respondents) 
Chinese military power will likely 
continue increasing, becoming a threat in 
the near future. 
56.2% 
China often trespasses into Japanese 
waters. 
46.0% 
China has nuclear weapons. 44.9% 
Chinese military capabilities are already 
powerful. 
40.7% 
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China doesn't exclude the possibility of 
using military means to block Taiwan's 
independence. 
25.4% 
There is little information about Chinese 
military capabilities. 
23.7% 
Other 1.1% 
Source: Genron-NPO Third, China-Japan Opinion Poll p.28 (http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/20070817_e_press.pdf).  
 
Why do you consider Japan to be a threat? 
Japan had wars of aggression in the past, 
and some people want to revive 
militarism. 
61.8% 
Japan's military capabilities are already 
powerful. 
40.3% 
Japan follows the U.S. strategy. 39.4% 
Japan is actively involved in international 
security and peacekeeping operations, 
and strengthens its military capabilities, 
trying to become a military superpower. 
32.1% 
Worsening China-Japan relations. 17.2% 
No answer/ Don’t know. 1.7% 
Other 0.3% 
Source: Genron-NPO Third, China-Japan Opinion Poll p.28 (http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/20070817_e_press.pdf).  
 
 
3.1.2 Japanese public’s view on China    
In recent years, the intimacy and favorable feelings of the Japanese public 
toward China have been on the decline. In the 2008 edition of the annual Public 
Opinion Report, completed by the Japanese Cabinet Office, this trend showed true.  
The 2008 survey researchers interviewed 1,826 people, consisting of 839 males and 
987 females. Responses to the question “your affinity feeling with China?” were 
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31.8% of all respondents said they do “feel affinity” or “somewhat feel affinity”; and 
those who felt affinity were made up of 7% of respondents. Of the 66.6% saying they 
had “no affinity”, over half (34.2%) said they did not feel any “affinity” at all. If we 
examine past trends, then it is shown that these are the lowest percentages of 
respondents who feel affinity to China, in all of the years since the signing of the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship; this figure is even lower than the result taken in 
1989 after the Tiananmen Square Incident (51.6%). It is interesting to see the age 
group that has the highest ratio of people answering “I feel affinity,” which was 
individual aged between 20 and 29.  The group aged 60 to 69 had the lowest ratio of 
feeling close to China and more male respondents expressed affinity than female 
respondents (Government of Japan Cabinet Office, 2008). 
In the same survey, when asked to rank “current Japan-Chinese relationships,” 
23.7% of respondents gave a positive rating; however, only 2.5% remarked that 
current relations were excellent, while 21.1% said it was probably good. The ratio of 
those providing a negative assessment was quite overwhelming, as 71.9% of 
respondents ranked this negatively.  This has reached a new high when compared to 
the previous year and is the highest of all the years where the respondents of negative 
opinion surpassed those of positive a positive one. Of all the people providing 
negative assessment, 42% said that current relations between the two countries were 
not good in some aspects, while 29.9% thought they were completely negative. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that people living in urban areas seemed to 
provide a negative ranking to the Japan-China relationship (Government of Japan 
Cabinet Office, 2008). 
It is not surprising that those people who had affinity feelings with China 
tended to view the current Japan-China relationship more positively than those who 
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did not feel affinity; however, there was still less than half (46.7%) among the former 
group who had affinity feelings. On the other hand, those who did not have an 
affinity feeling to China, overwhelmingly viewed current bilateral relations 
negatively (83%) (Government of Japan Cabinet Office). 
    Other polls were conducted by Yomirui Shimbun and Gallop, in 2005 and 2006 
respectively. In the 2005 poll, 76% of the respondents remarked they “feel threatened 
by China,” while 44% of respondents said China was a security threat in the 2006 
poll; this was second only to North Korea. Yasuhiro Matsuda considers a “threat” as 
bearing a similar meaning to “fear” and “concern,” and the source of this fear came 
from the judgment that a non-democracy, with growing military and economic 
strength, is deemed to be dangerous (Matsuda 2007, 3).  
Another survey also indicated that China is considered to be a long-term threat 
by Japanese public opinion. In 2006, a version of Japan’s Cabinet Office survey on 
the Self-Defense Force and Defense Problem, which has been conducted every three 
years since 1969, a “modernization of Chinese military and maritime activities”, of 
36% out of 1,657 valid questionnaires, is chosen as a concerning to be most 
concerned issue of question “attentive areas for Japan’s Peace and Security,” behind 
the “Korean Peninsula Situation” (63.7%) and “Activity of Terrorist Organizations” 
(46.2%). It is noted that the 2006 survey is the first time that “modernization of 
Chinese military and maritime activities” was included as a choice (Japan Cabinet 
Office 2006, Lee 2007, 135-136) and swiftly occupied third place. It was also ranked 
higher than other issues such as “managing and reducing WMDs and Missiles” 
(29.65%), Russian related issues such as “U.S.-Russian relations” (11.7%) and 
“Dispatch Russian Army in the Northern Islands” (14.2%) (Japan Cabinet Office 
2006, Lee 2007, 136).  It is interesting to note that both China and Russia have 
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territorial disputes with Japan, but China is considered the larger military threat, over 
Russia, by the Japanese public.  
 
3.1.3 China’s public’s view of Japanese 
Here there will be three polls used which have been conducted by the Institute 
of Japanese Studies at the China Academy of Social Science, to illustrate the Chinese 
public’s opinion towards Japan in recent years. The polling project, which was 
released in 2002, 2004 and 2006, were all led by Jiang Lifeng, who was the director 
of the institute at the time.  The aim of these projects was to provide a systemic 
investigation on China’s view of Japan, since similar researches lacked the time 
required (Jiang 2002). The sizes of the valid samples were 3,157, 2,987 and 3,915, 
for the 2002, 2004 and 2006 polls respectively. In all three polls, 60.5% or more of 
the respondents had an education of college level or above (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). 
In the 2002 poll, 43.3% of respondents said they were “unfriendly” or “very 
unfriendly” toward Japan; this proportion increased to 53.6% in 2004 but decreased 
to 52.9% in 2006.  On the other hand, those saying they had a “friendly” or “very 
friendly” feeling toward Japan were 5.9%, 6.3% and 7.5%, for 2002, 2004 and 2006  
respectively; which showed a slight increasing trend. The proportion of those who 
said “neutral” was 47.6% in 2002, 35.5% in 2004, and 37.6% in 2006 (Jiang 2002; 
2004; 2006). The reason that most people chose as affecting their feeling toward 
Japan was that “Japan [had] invaded China not long ago, and it has not reflected 
enough on it” in 2002 and with 63.8% of total respondents.  In the 2004 and 2006 
polls, the reason given by respondents were further divided into more items, and the 
reasons given were collected separately with those saying “friendly” and 
“unfriendly.”  As a result, for the negative opinionated individuals, 26% gave the 
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reason that “Japan invaded China not long ago” and 61.7% criticized Japan for “not 
reflecting enough for its war of aggression” (roughly equal to 47.09% of all 
respondents).  While in 2006, 27.3% of those choosing “unfriendly” said the reason 
was “Japan invaded China not long before,” 63.5% criticized Japan, by remarking “it 
has not reflected enough for its war of aggression” (roughly equal to 48.01% of all 
respondents).  There were positive aspects such as the “two countries have had [a] 
long history of friendly interaction” or “Japan provides economic assistance to 
China,” but these failed to be a reason affecting individuals’ thoughts toward Japan 
(Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006).  It should be noted that 10.8% in 2002, 3.7% in 
2004(computed by the researcher) and 2.8% in 2006 (computed by the researcher), 
of the respondents, chose the reason “Japan has formed [a] military alliance with [the] 
U.S., threatening the security of China” as the reason of being unfriendly toward 
Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). 
It should be noted that among all of the criteria set by the researchers that the 
groups “can understand Japanese language and have interaction with Japan” and 
“Chinese residing in Japan” are the groups which have higher proportions of 
respondents choosing the “friendly” or “very friendly” option. It is suggested that 
direct interaction is a very important way to improve the impression of Japan 
amongst the Chinese (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006).   
 
3.1.4 Discussion on public opinion 
The popular opinion poll results which have been cited above clearly identify 
two features. First, at least from the polling samples, the public from both China and 
Japan generally hold a negative view of the other. Second, people generally hold a 
low opinion of the military and security aspects on the other side.  
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3.1.4.1 Japanese public 
As mentioned above, the various polls, conducted by Pew Research Center, 
BBC World Service and Japan’s Cabinet Office (2006-2009), all showed a negative 
view toward the China by Japanese respondents. The annual Cabinet Office poll has 
steadily shown a declining trend of the Japanese’s “affinity feeling” toward China. 
The percentage of respondents saying “no” or “completely no affinity” reached a 
new high in the most recent 2008 edition; this figure even surpassed the percentage 
of similar answers in the 2005 edition, which was completed several months after a 
series of anti-Chinese riots in China. Therefore, it seems that the warming of bilateral 
relations between China and Japan, after Koizumi stepped down from office, have 
not changed the Japanese public’s opinion on China. But, this deeply rooted negative 
opinion could be as a result of other factors.   
 
   (Taken from http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-gaiko/images/z10.gif. Japan’s Government Cabinet Office Website.) 
 
Not only did Japanese respondents not feel “affinity” to China, 71.9% of respondents 
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considered the current Sino-Japanese relations as overwhelmingly negative; the most 
negative assessment in terms of proportion over all recorded years, as shown in the 
following chart.   
 
(Taken from http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-gaiko/images/z12.gif. Japan’s Government Cabinet Office Website.) 
 
The Pew Global Opinions also identified China to be the most disliked country for 
Japanese respondents in 2006, where 71% percent of individual said they disliked 
China and increasingly less people had a favorable opinion towards them; the 
Chinese were associated with some negative personality qualities. Also, most 
respondents did not trust the Hu Jintao leadership and no one had confidence in his 
ability to handle world affairs. The BBC World Service also showed Japan to be the 
main country having the most negative feelings toward China. 
In general, Japanese public opinion has been overwhelmingly negative in 
recent years; as opinions fell sharply during the Koizumi cabinet and have not 
recovered, even with a change of Prime Minister. It is possible that the series of 
negative events, together with the Chinese government and public reaction to 
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Koizumi, during Koizumi’s cabinet, caused the rise of negative opinion in China. 
However, do these unfavorable feelings mean they fear China as a threat? The 
following data may provide us with some answers to this. 
The same Pew Global Attitude Project asked how individuals viewed growing 
of China military power, 93% said it was a bad thing and 3% thought it was good. 
Also, 39% of respondents considered China as a great danger to Japan, suppressing 
concerns over North Korea (35%) as the greatest threat (The Pew Global Attitude 
Project 2006, 14). Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop, in 2005 and 2006, found that many 
Japanese considered China a security threat, as well as another poll by the Cabinet 
Office on the Self-Defense Force and defense problems which identified similar 
opinions.  In this poll, 36% of respondents chose “modernization of Chinese 
military and maritime activities,” which ranked as the third most important issue 
concerning individuals (Japan Cabinet Office 2006; Lee 2007, 135-136). And, this 
ranking is lower than the North Korea issue but higher than the Russian territorial 
dispute. The Genron-NPO also identifies China as the second military threat to Japan, 
with main reasons including the growth in China’s military strength, Chinese ships 
trespassing into Japanese territorial waters, possession of nuclear weapons, and 
China already having a powerful military (Genron-NPO 2007).  
It is apparent that the result from these various polls not only shows that the 
Japanese public has a general negative view toward the Chinese government and 
Chinese people, but also that they consider a growth in the Chinese military to be a 
threat to them. However, these polls are unable to determine the actual reason that 
has created such fear because poll data has failed to answer “why” the fear first came 
about. Matsuda has provided one explanation that, the Japanese public, who live in a 
democratic society, do not trust a militarily powerful non-democratic state (Matsuda 
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2007, 3). Also, as the MoD Defense White paper suggests, the lack of transparency 
of the Chinese military influences the Japanese public to become uncertain on any 
intentions the Chinese may harbor. As Rosemary Foot points out, despite numerous 
efforts by the Chinese government to establish a peaceful image, it will take much 
more effort to assure Japanese public opinion. It is difficult to develop a benevolent 
image while also modernizing a military and significantly double digit annual growth 
on the country’s defense budget, even though such military developments seem to be 
mainly targeted at Taiwan (Foot 2009, 143-144). For the Japanese, this worry could 
be deepened by behavior that seems to be directed toward Japan, such as the show of 
naval force in 2005 near disputed territories, and the continuous criticism of Japan on 
historical issues. However, in contrast to China’s general approach of a “peaceful 
development,” Japan stands out as one of the few to receive less favorable treatment.  
In general, it would be fair to say that the majority of the Japanese public do 
not have a positive attitude toward China, economics aside, but they are also quite 
afraid of the Chinese military and future intentions. 
 
3.1.4.2 Chinese public 
Public opinion data regarding thoughts of the Chinese public is significantly 
less than that of the Japanese. Nevertheless, by reviewing these data, it is possible to 
gain an overview of how the Chinese view Japan. 
One of the larger scale surveys covering Chinese public opinion was 
conducted by the China Academy of Social Sciences.  The three editions showed 
that the Chinese were generally dissatisfied over Japanese apologies and reflection 
regarding their past aggression and nearly half or more of respondents chose “not 
reflecting enough for its war of aggression” or “Japan invaded China” not long ago 
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was a reason for disliking Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). Similarly, and in some 
instances more overwhelming, was an observation from the editions of the Pew 
Global Opinion poll; some Chinese respondents held the view of “somewhat 
unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” toward Japan and this generally consisted of 
70% or more of respondents.  Also, this was something which peaked in spring 
2007, when 78% of respondents said they had a negative opinion on Japan (The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project 2008). 
If the data shown indicated the Chinese have overwhelming bad feelings 
toward Japan, then do they fear Japan as a military threat or as an enemy? The 
difficulty in finding data to this question is considerably hard. However, there is 
some relevant but limited information identified below. 
The Pew Global Project Attitude found that 33% of respondents considered 
Japan an adversary and 34% considered Japan a serious problem; also, 22% of 
individuals said that Japan was the greatest danger but was second to the U.S. (The 
Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 4, 15). The 2008 Pew report also suggested that 
the Chinese, who chose Japan as an enemy was the largest group among all choices, 
even though it was hardly overwhelming and the majority in terms of percentage 
(The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008, 47).  
The three CASS surveys also included Chinese individuals, although a 
relatively small percentage compared to the Pew reports, who considered Japan as a 
security threat because it is an ally with the United States.  Despite this small 
percentage the CASS researches, one should note that “this security threat” choice 
was ranked as the second and third most chosen option, which were higher than “this 
choice is a war of aggression in recent history” and “not reflecting enough for 
wrongdoing.”  As a result, the Japan-U.S. alliance, as a security threat, was the 
  
 
84 
number one non-history related issue to be considered as a reason for disliking Japan 
(Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). The Genron-NPO also shows Japan was considered to be 
the second major military threat to China, with main reasons including worries of a 
resurgence of militarism, Japan already possessing a powerful military, Japan 
following U.S. Strategy, and Japan’s attempt to be a great military power 
(Genron-NPO 2007, 27-28).  
However, it is too assertive to claim that the Chinese public absolutely 
consider Japan as a security threat or fear Japan’s military. However, even though 
identified data were limited, they did give the impression that a certain proportion of 
the Chinese population did have some concerns over the military and security issue. 
Therefore, the conclusion of this is that the majority of the Chinese population 
dislike Japan, but it can only be concluded that they are quite afraid or suspicious 
toward Japan’s military and not completely certain. 
 
 
3.2 Military 
The following section will focus on official defense white papers which have 
been issued in recent years by the two country’s ministries, such ministries are in 
charge of the respective national defense forces and they will be analyzed to identify 
if they contain comments on security issues.  
 
3.2.1 Chinese military 
3.2.1.1 China’s white paper on national defense 
The biannual white paper is issued by the China State Council, which is under 
the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC is supposed to be the most 
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important organ in terms of the Chinese military and has the “authority and all 
decision-making power to deploy China’s armed force” (Shambaugh 2003, 111), and 
is currently headed by the Chinese President, Hu Jintao.  
 
2002 
The paper briefly mentioned Japan in the context of ASEAN+3 cooperation, 
resuming military exchanges in Japan, meetings with the Japan Defense Agency, and 
urging Japan to defuse and remove chemical weapons left behind in northern China 
by its invasion force of World War Two. And, most of the content is of a descriptive 
nature covering security cooperation and military interaction (China State Council 
2002). 
 
2004 
This year’s edition includes similar wording to the 2002 one, with some more detail 
and new additions. It reviews Japan’s possible amendment to the constitution in 
order to take a larger role in deploying military overseas, to jointly develop missile 
defense with U.S.; and it also mentions increased SDF military activities overseas. 
The paper also uses several major powers’ defense budgets, including that of Japan, 
to show that Chinese defense expenditure is not higher than world standards (China 
State Council 2004). 
 
2006 
This year’s edition is similar to the previous two, with some change toward more 
explicit phraseology. It also remarks that: “Japan seeks to revise its constitution and 
exercise collective self-defense. Its military posture is becoming more 
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external-oriented.”  Giving more details on how to handle the chemical weapons 
left behind by both countries (China State Council 2006). 
 
2008 
This year’s edition is almost the same as the previous one, but mentions some 
positive developments such as the first naval vessel visits and the first consultation 
over the establishment of a maritime liaison mechanism between the two countries.  
 
3.2.1.2 Other sources 
 
As early as 1997, the former deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Xu Xin 
suspected that the new U.S.-Japan defense gridline was to target China and would 
bear more aggressive intentions (Zhang, Montaperto 1999, 75). Michael J. Green, the 
Japan chair and senior advisor to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
commented in an interview that the PLA feel wary about the strengthening of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance.  Japan’s improvement of its internal defense capabilities and 
participation in the development of a missile defense also generated much resentment 
within the PLA. Green suggests that the PLA uses historical issues as a basis to 
“demonize and mobilize against Japan” (Green 2006); and he believes it is difficult 
for the civilian leadership to restrain the PLA in anti-Japanese attempts (Green 2006). 
Other sources regarding the Chinese military or indeed related personnel, on 
their threat perception of Japan can be found in articles in the People’s Liberation 
Army Daily (PLA Daily), the official newspaper of the Chinese Central Military 
Commission (China Military Online 2004). The articles found in this paper provide 
an opportunity to understand some individual viewpoints within or reflect the 
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thinking of the PLA. It seems that the PLA are especially sensitive or even suspicions 
towards some of Japan’s intentions and actions. An article in 2005 suggested an 
attempt by a number of Japanese politicians, including Prime Minister Koizumi, to 
pave the way to play an increased global military role; providing legal grounds for 
intervening in the “situation surrounding Japan” and nourishing the enlargement of 
military development. The article questioned whether Japan would stay on course 
and continue to be a pacifist, if Article 9 of the constitution was amended (Sheng and 
Zhao 2005). The U.S.-Japan alliance was also the target of criticism. Japan was 
blamed for attempting to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and to “internationalize 
the internal affairs of other states” (Xie and Sheng 2005). It was said that Japan 
wanted to use the alliance with the U.S. to upgrade to the status of Asian leader, but 
the attempt was futile and led to its isolation (Xie and Sheng 2005). Also, Japan was 
often thought to be using “China’s military threat” as a justification to encourage 
Japanese people to support a high military budget to strengthen the capabilities of the 
SDF (Wang 2005). Wang suggested that, since China had clearly expressed it would 
not be a threat to any country, Japan had no grounds for maintaining such a high 
military budget or upgrading SDF capabilities; he even criticized a SDF 
advertisement, in which the images of the SDF seemed to be “bellicose and 
murderous,” as an exemplification of Japanese military ambition (Wang 2005).  The 
upgrade of the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense was another source 
of worry; the PLA Daily suggested that this upgrade would “loosen the tie on the 
SDF” and allow Japan to become a great political and military power. The upgrade of 
the Defense Agency was also considered to be preparation for amending the Peace 
Constitution; the writer said that it was right to worry about the potential amendment 
of the Peace Constitution, as Japan had not thoroughly reflected on its historical 
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issues (People’s Liberation Army Daily 2007). 
Meanwhile, there was some positive coverage. For example, the PLA Navy 
Destroyer Shenzhen visited Japan and was reported with details of various related 
activities.  Also, this visit was said to be an important step toward improving 
Sino-Japanese relations (Si and Ding 2007). The PLA Daily conducted an interview 
with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy, on how that particular visit would 
benefit Sino-Japanese relations (Si, Ding 2007). 
 
3.2.2 Japanese military 
3.2.2.1 Japan’s Defense White Paper 
The Defense White Paper is an annual document published by the Defense 
Agency, recently renamed as the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of Japan, to explain the 
general defense policies and military security of Japan. It contains chapters focusing 
on Japan’s neighboring countries and countries which relate to the defense of Japan. 
Recent editions (2005-2008) of this white paper will be discussed, in order to 
understand the official opinion of the Ministry of Defense toward China. 
     
2005 
In the 2005 edition of the white paper (all versions discussed here are the 
translated English version), the Defense Agency (former body of the current Ministry 
of Defense) expressed their concern over China’s “Anti-Secession Law,” which had 
been enacted in March 2005.  JDA considered the law to add uncertainty and 
destabilizing effects to the security environment of the Taiwan Strait relationship, 
and one which caused worry to Japan (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 11). The paper 
acknowledged the Chinese had been promoting “RMA with Chinese characteristics” 
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“aggressively” and advancements in modernizing PLA in various aspects (Japan 
Defense Agency 2005, 12-14).  It also expressed dissatisfaction and concern on the 
official defense budget announced by the Chinese government, claiming that 
significant military related spending such as purchasing weapons and R&D expenses 
were not included in the official figures (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 12-13). The 
paper highlighted an incident in which a Chinese Song-class nuclear-powered 
submarine was discovered in waters near Japan’s territory, in order to exemplify the 
increased activity by China’s naval and research vessels near Japan’s maritime 
territory (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 14). 
Part of the strategic goals, stated in this white paper in regard to China, were to 
“develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a 
responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally” and “encourage 
China to improve transparency of its military affairs” (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 
35).   
 
2006 
In the 2006 edition of the Defense White Paper, when reviewing China’s 
relations with Taiwan, “The Anti-Succession Law” was once again mentioned but, 
unlike the previous year, the passage covering the negative effects from this law had 
been removed (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 40). 
In terms of military transparency, this edition of the white paper once again 
urged China to increase transparency of its defense policies and capabilities, in order 
to reassure other countries about its intentions. The paper had clear indications over 
which aspects of China’s military lacked transparency, including: equipment status, 
progress in improvement, force composition, records of military activities and 
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exercises, and a more detailed defense budget. On the other hand, the paper praised 
China for issuing its own defense white paper as a right step to improving military 
transparency.  Although, the paper did express dissatisfaction over the details 
included in that white paper and recommended further improvements by adding more 
detailed information in future versions (Japan Ministry of Japan 2006, 44).  
The 2006 white paper again expressed concern over the accuracy of China’s 
defense budget, as it had in the previous year; but, it also predicted that should 
China’s defense budget be maintained at the same level as the past 18 years (as of 
2006), then it would overtake Japan’s budget by 2008.  The paper also identified 
China’s budget increases were two fold every five years, with an overall 10% annual 
growth rate (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 44). 
The 2006 white paper included more detailed illustrations of China’s military 
strength in comparison to the previous 2005 edition. It includes a more detailed 
description of China’s nuclear arsenal and delivery means, along with graphic 
illustrations covering actual range (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 46-47). In the 
section regarding China’s air power, it explicitly suspected that frequent activities of 
Chinese aircraft near the vicinity of Japan, were an attempt to gather intelligence 
“against Japan,” and that such activities should be closely monitored (Japan Ministry 
of Defense 2006, 47-48). Another remarkable event mentioned was the successful 
mission of the first Chinese manned spaceship “Shenzhou V” and its military 
implications (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 47). This edition mentioned the 
Chinese maritime activities near Japan too; and once again mentioned the 2004 
Chinese submarine incident and recent observations of suspected Chinese research 
vessels operating near the Shirakaba/Chunxiao oil gas field.  Also, other Chinese 
naval activities in other sea regions where China has territorial disputes with other 
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countries were also present. The white paper suggested “attention should be paid” to 
Chinese maritime activities (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 49). 
Generally, the white paper indicated a general improvement on China’ military 
capabilities, in terms of hardware and training and the development of personnel 
(Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 45-48). 
 
2007 
In the 2007 white paper, the same concerns were expressed as in the previous 
editions, such as lack of military transparency, potential use of growing military 
capabilities other than for Taiwan issues, and doubts over the Chinese defense budget 
(but without mentioning the predicted time at which it would surpass Japan’s) (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2007, 53-54). Another event marked in the paper was China’s 
anti-satellite weapon in January 2007.  Japan demanded that China clarify the 
purpose and intention of such a test, but the reply given by Chinese authorities 
cannot reassure Japan (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 53). The section covering 
the Chinese military strength was similar to the previous year but with some 
additions; it mentioned China’s interest in obtaining/building an aircraft carrier to 
further develop a “blue water navy.”  Also, China’s air force acquisition of 
S-300PMU-2 Surface-to-Air missiles and Il-76 from Russia, in order to enhance its 
air-defenses and develop air-refueling capabilities were questioned (Japan Ministry 
of Defense 2007, 57). However, there was an additional section in the 2007 white 
paper regarding the “trends in Education and Training,” this section reviewed the 
shift in training of PLA personnel to adopt a new doctrine and skills. And, it was 
hoped that the PLA would be informationalized by 2020; which is a new project for 
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nurturing talented people for an informationalized armed force and warfare (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2007, 58). 
Besides certain issues mentioned in the previous year, this edition highlighted 
an incident in which a Chinese Navy Song-class nuclear submarine emerged near the 
U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, near Okinawa. Nevertheless, there is some positive 
indication over military exchanges and exercises with several countries, including the 
first joint exercise between the Chinese and U.S. navies in 2006. However, not unlike 
the previous year, increasing maritime activities of the Chinese Navy are to be 
closely monitored (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59). 
 
2008 
The contents of this year’s edition are more or less similar, in terms of subject 
matter, as the previous years; yet there are several additions. First, China refused to 
allow the USS Kitty Hawk to enter Hong Kong on a scheduled day, but then allowed 
it to enter after revising the date in November 2007; this move raised concerns over 
the “decision-making and behavior of China’s military.” This edition once again 
urged China to improve transparency of its military and defense related issues, if it 
wants to lessen the concern of other countries over its growing military power (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2008, 50). This edition also included a more detailed section on 
China’s nuclear and ballistic missile force, in comparison to previous years. This was 
the first time a white paper implied China had been conducting research on the 
development of aircraft carriers (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 54). Another event 
illustrated was the incursion of China’s Air Force Hong-6 bomber into the air 
defense identification zone near the median line, between two countries over the East 
China Sea. The paper suggested carrying out surveillance on Chinese Air Force 
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activities. (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 54) Nevertheless, several efforts by 
China to enhance military exchanges with other countries, in 2007, were also 
recorded. Although having such positive development, establishing facilities and the 
increase of maritime activities near Japan, were also suggested to be put under close 
monitoring (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 56). 
The general tone of Japan’s white papers, discussing China’s military and 
defense development, has become more specific in recent year, rather than simply 
making general comments.  
Taking the 2005 edition as an example, we can see that this edition merely 
mentioned a single incident of Chinese submarines being submerged in Japanese 
waters in 2004, while not providing much of an account over other maritime related 
issues/incidents. In the 2007 and 2008 editions, the 2004 submarine incident was 
again mentioned and it was mentioned that such action was “violating international 
law” (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 56); 
however, this accusation was not found in the 2005 and 2006 editions.  
Generally speaking, there are increasing details to be included since the 2006 
edition. There is a section specifically about the Chinese missile force since 2007 and 
a number of detailed graphic illustrations (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 46-47). 
Also, the discussion of maritime related issues has been in greater detail since 2006. 
Rather than merely informing of the general trend of Chinese naval development, the 
editions since 2006 explicitly identify certain disputes between the two countries, 
such as the East Sea oil gas issue and Chinese maritime activities in other sea regions 
such as Spratly Island. And, all three recent editions advise that Chinese maritime 
activities need to be observed and closely monitored (Japan Ministry of Defense 
2006, 48-49; Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 
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55-56).  
The concern over the Chinese defense budget is a persisting topic over the 
Chinese military. In all of the editions examined, the doubtful attitude on Chinese 
official figures of its defense budget is clear; the general comment is that the overall 
figures are understated. Charts have been added in the three recent editions to 
provide illustration of the growing trend in official numbers (Japan Defense Agency 
2005, 12-13; Japan ministry of Defense 2006, 44-45; Japan ministry of Defense 2007, 
54; Japan Ministry of Defense2008, 50-51).  
Since 2006, there has been a discussion over China’s military transparency, 
and the overall dissatisfaction and criticism is expressed in all of the white papers. 
The Japanese MoD has not found the Chinese level of transparency to be enough to 
reassure others over their military intentions and has suggested that more steps 
should be taken for the Chinese government to improve on this aspect (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2006 44; Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 44; Japan Ministry of 
Defense 2008, 49-50).  
Overall, all versions of Japan’s Defense White Paper have expressed a 
suspicious attitude towards the Chinese military.  
 
3.2.2.2 Gen. Tamogami’s essay incident 
The then Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, General Toshio 
Tamogami, published an essay in 2008 over his views on the Pacific War.  This was 
published for a competition and to celebrate a book named “The Shocking Truth 
about Modern History.” However, he was quickly dismissed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Defense. The reason for his dismissal was because his opinion was 
“inappropriate” and inconsistent with the view of the Japanese government (BBC 
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2008). In his essay, Tamogami suggested that the “Greater East Asia War” should 
not be considered as a “Japanese invasion” (Tamogami 2008, 1).  This was because 
the Japanese Imperial Army in Asia entered based on a number of treaties – namely 
the treaties signed legally after the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War – in 
order to protect its rightful interests over its Asian neighbors.  Tamogami 
considered that, even though those treaties were signed by the Chinese, it was 
nothing out of the ordinary because such practice is normal for a country signing a 
treaty under pressure. He also accused the provocation and aggressive acts from the 
Chinese side as the cause which led to the outbreak of war, and it was the Japanese 
intention to co-exist peacefully with its neighboring countries (Tamogami 2008, 1, 3). 
He also praised Japan’s relatively generous rule over its colonies, comparing this to 
other colonial powers as the time.  This was because the Japanese government 
allowed people from its colonies to become well-educated, developed the 
infrastructure and economies of its colonies, and tried to integrate colonial people 
into Japanese society (Tamogami 2008, 2-4). He then concluded that some Asians 
view this particular war positively and believe “it was certainly a false accusation to 
say that our country was an aggressive nation” (Tamogami 2008, 6). 
 This essay quickly attracted criticism from the Chinese, as the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Jiang Yu, said she was shocked that a high-ranking 
officer made such comments denying and glorifying past aggression, and that it was 
an “undeniable historical fact” that Japan’s invasion brought pain to Asian people 
(Klamann 2008). Also, the incident ignited comment from Chinese website and 
internet users; Zhang from the Hong Kong newspaper “Wenweipo” commented that 
a cautious mind has to be maintained in order to be alert of the potential rise of 
Japan’s rightists, as many historical and academic discourses relate to current politics. 
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Comments made by Japan’s rightists could well be an indicator of whether Japan 
would indeed maintain the path of peaceful development (Zhang 2008). Another 
newspaper, the “International Herald Leader” suspects the Tamogami incident could 
be merely “a tip of an iceberg” in denying Japan’s past aggression, because 40% of 
235 contestants in the competition were officers of the Air Self-Defense Force. Also, 
the competition was held by the AGA Group, a real estate developer, and the boss of 
the company holds some rightist’s views on history, according to the newspaper 
(International Herald Leader 2008). China.com.cn also cited an article from China 
Youth Online, saying that Tamogami was a role model-like figure within the SDF; 
and, many of his colleagues admired him because he was “optimistic, ambitious and 
smart” and this could prove that his views might be remarkable and also dangerous 
among SDF officials (China Youth Online 2008). Additionally, there are plenty of 
other critics in the Chinese media, journalists, and internet users, and some of which 
are fairly radical. For example, one internet user’s comment has gone so far as to say 
that there is no hope for reconciliation, and Japan should be attacked and destroyed if 
it acquires nuclear weapons (China Youth Online 2008). Of course, this is by no 
means saying that this type of opinion represents mainstream opinions of the Chinese, 
but it does show the sensitivity of some historically related issues.  
The Japanese government quickly responded to this incident by sacking 
Tamogami, changing the curriculum of history at the Air Self-Defense Force 
Academy and replacing two lecturers, who were considered to have rightists’ views 
on history (China News 2008). 
 
3.2.3 Discussion on military perceptions 
3.2.3.1 Discussion on Chinese military perception  
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It is almost impossible to deduce meaningful inference by examining China’s 
white paper on National Defense alone. This is because the white papers lack detail 
and seem to have a tendency of reporting “good news,” yet largely downplaying 
“bad news”; they do not include much content on how they view other countries’ 
military, or which aspects of security behavior concern them. The part covering 
Japan contains a few words on a potential amendment of the constitution of Japan, an 
increase of SDF overseas activities, and on the World War Two chemical weapons 
left in China. For the overall pattern of the white paper, these three issues were the 
exception and the only “concerns” which were expressed. First, it can be interpreted 
that the revision of the Japanese constitution and future role of the SDF is indeed a 
concern of the Chinese military, or at least they would be attentive to those issues 
within the white paper. Second, China wants to remind others that the issues left 
behind after World War Two have not yet been settled.  This included as an 
example of Japan’s debt to China and as a sign for reminding Chinese people to 
safeguard against Japan as a security threat. 
Also, it is true that the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” does not exclusively 
report on the negative aspects regarding Japan. However, it is often shown to be 
quite sensitive to any Japan defense and history related activities, such as the Peace 
Constitution (Sheng and Zhao 2005), the status of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Xie and 
Sheng 2005), and visits to the Yauskuni Shrine by the Japanese Prime Minister 
(Sheng and Xin 2001). The paper often expressed suspicion and criticism of Japan’s 
intention or attitude over handling these issues and urged Japan to reflect and rethink 
how those actions have affected people and what damage has been caused. There are 
two possibilities for the paper to do so; first, the PLA Daily may be a mouthpiece for 
the Chinese government to pursue “history card” tactics whenever necessary; or, 
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secondly, it reflects PLA personnel or the groups’ mistrust and resentment of Japan, 
serving both purposes. Either way, it seems the PLA see Japan as one of the most 
likely future threats, and thus will need to be cautious and alarmed over certain 
security actions by Japan, which they feel are directed towards China. The event, 
similar to the Tamogami incident, may further impact on the perception that PLA 
personnel have of the Japanese military. As David Shambaugh concludes, 
anti-Japanese emotions can be observed from PLA personnel of all levels and 
generations. Not only do they detest the implication of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but 
they also consider Japan to have its own ambition to be a great power, and be 
independent of its alliance with the Americans. Generally, PLA personnel do not 
trust Japan and often hold wary views of its intentions; they are only restricted from 
being anti-Japanese explicitly by current constraints (Shambaugh 2002, 300-301). 
 
3.2.3.2 Discussion of Japan’s military perception 
The main sources of analysis in this section are based on official documents 
such as the Japan Defense White Paper, with the recent four papers being used in this 
discussion. The overall impression of these white papers is through the growing 
worries of the Defense Ministry of Japan over the Chinese military. Two of the 
foremost concerns are Chinese maritime activities and the lack of transparency by 
the military. The combination of the two is especially worrisome because Japan, as 
an island country, relies on clear and safe sea lanes to import resources and 
necessities for its state-survival.  
It can be seen that most of the topics of concern surround maritime security, 
such as the Chinese submarine incursion incident, which is mentioned in all four 
examined editions, and further comments such as “violating international law” in the 
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2007 and 2008 editions (Japan Ministry of Defense 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). The 
gradual increase in toughness of words shows the seriousness of the incident in the 
eyes of the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fact, this incident was the first time since 
1999, when two North Korean ships intruded Japanese maritime territorial waters, 
that the Japan Maritime Defense Force was put into high alert.  Therefore, the 
seriousness of the two events can be seen as quite comparable (BBC 2004). 
Submarines, in the time of military conflict, are an extreme effective force in 
controlling sea lanes and setting up blockades, due to their stealth-like nature; for 
example, the Russian-imported Kilo-class diesel powered submarines are well-suited 
for this purpose as they have an extremely quiet nature (Goldstein and Murray 2004). 
Similar incidents have occasionally happened, when an object was believed to be a 
Chinese submarine was detected within Japanese territorial waters, resulting in 
diplomatic interactions being initiated between the two governments (Przystup 2008, 
116). This is why the Japanese Ministry of Defense is sensitive to the Chinese 
submarine force.  
The lack of transparency in the military budget yields another major concern. 
Japan’s White Paper argument is that the Chinese official defense budgets have not 
provided a detailed breakdown on how the money was spent. Meaning this problem  
generates a significant amount of suspicion over the intention of China’s military 
modernization; the concern comes from being unable to know exactly how much 
money has been spent on military and hardware. Even though it is not unusual for a 
country to conceal its military profile, the Japanese MoD fear it especially justifiable 
because there are other suspicious and not-so-friendly activities allegedly carried out 
by the Chinese.  This includes an intensification of activities near Japanese air space 
by Chinese military aircraft. It is reported that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force 
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scrambled aircraft 105 times to intercept PLA aircraft in 2005 alone, marking a sharp 
increase from less than 20 cases in 2004 (Matsuda 2007, 7).  Also, there has been an 
increase in activities by Chinese vessels in the disputed maritime region, as well as 
within the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Japanese Ministry of Defense 
2007). With plenty of potential conflicting elements with China, such as territorial 
disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the East China Sea energy competition, a lack 
of transparency in China’s military budget and posture, the Japanese MoD wants to 
ascertain the true long-term intention of the Chinese military and why it is being so 
secretive. 
As a result, the Defense White Paper, an official standpoint on the Japanese 
military security situation, reflects the MoD’s growing fear of Chinese military 
intention; this has been shown through the increasing number of pages regarding the 
Chinese military and an increase in the amount of illustrations over incidents 
requiring the reader’s attention.  
Therefore, it is clear that the Japanese MoD has a genuine and legitimate fear 
concerning Chinese security intentions towards Japan. 
 
 
3.3 Scholars’ opinion  
  
3.3.1 Japanese scholars’ perception 
     In this section, some Japanese scholars’ opinions are cited in order to illustrate 
some commonly held views among Japanese academics’ perceptions of China.   
Generally speaking, Japanese scholars, regardless of how they view China in 
terms of security, consider China as an important neighbor having significant impact 
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on Japan.  
Japanese Tomoyuki Kojima, a professor at Keio University and renowned 
China expert, published an article in the January 2007 issue of the magazine “Gaiko 
Forum” in which, he states that Sino-Japanese relations have entered into “strategic 
mutual beneficial relations.”  He suggests that this relation is permanent, not 
temporary, and these relations will be influenced not only by China and Japan, but 
also by many other states. However, he also points out some uncertainties which may 
hinder the development of Sino-Japanese relations. These uncertainties include: the 
decrease of Japan’s economic strength in relative terms, the rise of anti-Japanese 
sentiment amongst the Chinese, and a decline of affinity feelings toward China from 
Japan; the latter development over historical disputes, the Taiwan issues, East Sea 
energy competition, China’s domestic politics, and whether China seeks hegemony 
or to become a cooperative great power. Kojima states that in order to prevent the 
failed experience of the past, namely having “cold” political relations, both states 
will need to manage any uncertain factors through cooperation which is desirable for 
both (Xinhua News 2007). In fact, Kojima pointed out these uncertainties as early as 
2000, and at the time he advocated a “partnership for peace and development” by 
smoothing out certain problems existing in Sino-Japanese relations (Kojima 2000, 
10-12, 16). However, that “partnership for peace and development” was considered 
failed by 2007, because cold political relations between the two states influenced 
historical problems and added new uncertainties (Xinhua News 2007). Judging from 
his comments, Kojima acknowledges that there are plenty of issues to be managed 
and/or settled before Sino-Japanese relations can move in a new direction. It is 
believed that, even though there are many obstacles to be overcome, building 
constructive cooperative relations will be essential, because these will be beneficial 
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to both states, the East Asia region, and the rest of the world. 
Professor Akihiko Tanaka at Tokyo University made a speech in 2003 and 
identified that the role of China, in the eyes of Japan, has changed since the end of 
the Cold War. China has somehow become an ideological antagonist of Japan and the 
United States, despite its growing economic weight in the world. However, Tanaka 
stresses that the so-called “China threat” is nothing compared to the “Soviet threat.”  
This is because the United States has absolute military primacy; China, unlike the 
Soviet Union, does not completely reject western liberalism by promoting its own 
ideology to the world. Despite having many conflicting factors, Tanaka concluded 
that, even though it is impossible to eliminate conflicts entirely, the cost of allowing 
the conflicts to spiral out of control was too high for both states to bear; this was 
because of the intensity of interaction between China and Japan. He even suggested 
it was good for the two states to engage in virtuous competition for leadership of the 
regional economic regime, like ASEAN because this would only deepen free trade, 
through which peace and prosperity will be ensured. However, he did point out that 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance was still necessary in preventing China from enjoying 
military superiority in the East Sea, as there is still the possibility that China would 
use military force in a scenario, such as Taiwan (Tanaka 2003). 
After all, Tanaka considers it necessary for Japan to express that “China is not 
a threat, a strong China is good for Japan” and the “Japan-U.S alliance has to be 
maintained.” He states that both principles are not contradictory because China is no 
longer a threat to Japan’s physical survival and ideology, but that Japan will also 
need to ensure military balance in the region, in case unexpected situations occur. 
Overall, he considers developing economic relations to be the primary objective, but 
the ultimate goal of bilateral cooperation would be to enhance security and rid 
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mutual suspicion (Tanaka 2003). He further re-instated, in a speech in December 
2008, the necessity for the U.S.-Japanese alliance to be maintained and adjusted, in 
order to cope with the shift in military balance, which has occurred in the face of a 
rise in Chinese military strength (Bajoria, 2009).  However, he also stresses that he 
does not consider China as a threat to Japan. Japan and the U.S. should see China as 
a partner in global affairs rather than a problem, because China is already on the road 
of “peaceful rise.” Nevertheless, as there are still some uncertainties over China’s 
military, political, and societal development and international behavior, the 
U.S.-Japanese alliance will be important to encourage China to reduce some of those 
uncertainties. Meanwhile, he suggested that an engagement such as human 
interaction is equally important and Japan should socialize with China as a 
responsible member of the international community (Tanaka 2008).  
Both Kojima and Tanaka possess similar attitudes toward China, despite the 
difference in detail; they were both cautiously optimistic over Sino-Japanese 
relations and acknowledged plenty of obstacles existed, yet recognized opportunities 
existed. However, both hold some reservations over security issues in the face of a 
rising China, but insist on the development of Japan’s cooperative relations with 
China rather than seeing China as a threat. As a result, it seems they may not be 
completely convinced of China’s intention but do not consider China as an 
immediate and clear threat; the enhancement of cooperation and interdependence is 
possible to achieve and through which the security in the region will be strengthened.  
Another Japanese scholar, Okabe Tatsumi, who was a member of the New 
China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan 1998), once said he opposed Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine because 
this action would lead to people in China and Korea interpreting it as revenge for the 
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defeat in World War Two (People’s Daily Online 2004). In fact, he opposed anyone 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in the capacity of Japanese Prime Minister, before 
receiving China’s understanding and acceptance (Feng, Okabe 2008, 30). He even 
commented that Koizumi was a “layman to diplomacy and international relations” 
(Obake 2006), as he was not aware of how important China was as Japan’s neighbor 
(Okaba 2006). He further suggests that Sino-Japanese relations should not be based 
on “emotionalism” but on “shared interest” (Feng, Okabe 2008, 32).  Mainly 
because Okabe considers China and Japan to be on the path of cooperation in a 
global context (Feng, Okabe 2008, 34), but the “deeply rooted mistrust among the 
people of the two countries” is an imperative issue which needs to be handled (Feng, 
Obabe 2008, 32). 
One way he deemed able to improve Japan’s impression on China was to 
improve its transparency regarding its military buildup, especially naval capability 
(Feng, Obabe 2008, 33). He also does not see that there is a scenario in which China 
and Japan would engage in an all-out war, but a small-scale military clash is still 
possible.  The damage done by such a clash to their relations would be hard to 
repair, so even such a conflict needs to be prevented by increasing mutual trust 
between the two (Feng, Okabe 2008, 35) Overall, he does not see the “China threat 
theory” to be an unsupported argument for the current international situation (Obake 
2006). 
     Professor Takashi Shirashi commented that Japan should support China to 
ascend peacefully, because China’s influence on other nations is on the increase. He 
suggested a concept that is similar to the stakeholder argument by the United States, 
where countries are encouraged to play a more important part in the international 
community by helping to address global issues. He also called for China and Japan to 
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work together to “map[…] out some norms and rules” (Shirashi 2006, 2), and for 
China and Japan to cooperate in the international community. He believes that an 
institutionalized high-level trilateral meeting between the U.S., China and Japan is 
one way to put this idea into practice. By utilizing this practice, China will be 
encouraged to rely less on unilateral actions and will then be able to contribute more 
to the international community (Shirashi 2006, 3-4). 
     Taka Fukuyama, a former SDF officer and Harvard University visiting fellow, 
proposed an imagined scenario of China’s invasion of Taiwan, in a magazine 
Syuukan Shinchou.  He suggested that Japan was unlikely to be left out of this 
conflict because China would infiltrate Japan with special forces prior to the invasion, 
in order to disturb the U.S. garrison to mobilize and intervene the invasion; as a 
result, it would be likely that many important facilities in Japan would be attacked 
(An 2006). Hisahiko Okazaki, a former Japanese ambassador to Thailand and the 
director of a strategic think tank in Japan, is “infamous” in China for his standpoint 
on East Asia strategic thinking. He also suggests, in a 2004 article within an 
influential magazine, that if China is unified with Taiwan, then the national interests 
of Japan would be damaged because important sea lanes would be under Chinese 
control. As a result, Japan would need to “find another way out” if such a scenario 
occurred (China Youth Online 2006). Okazaki often expressed similar opinions over 
China being a potential strategic threat of Japan and the Taiwan issue (An 2006, 
Wang 2005, Global Times 2006).  Fukuyama’s and Okazaki’s viewpoints were 
heavily criticized by Chinese media and websites for propagating the “China threat” 
theory and Taiwan conflict as an excuse to pave the way for Japan to become a great 
military power (An 2006, Wang 2005). Public opinion of the mainstream Japanese is 
said to be influenced by considerations that Taiwan is an issue that Japan must get a 
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hold of (An 2006). Chinese scholars, including the Director of the Institute of 
Japanese Studies and Jiang Lifeng at the China Academy of Social Sciences, also 
criticized Okazaki’s worries of China, as a potential military threat to Japan, as 
unrealistic, without evidence and from the Cold War mentality (International Herald 
Leader 2006).  
Nevertheless, not all academics hold a pessimistic or negative view toward 
China; Akio Takahara, a professor of Chinese politics, suggests that the pro-Japanese 
sentiment is slowly growing in urban regions of China; and, this is turning into 
something more positive because the Japanese economy is benefiting from the rapid 
economic development of China. Another reason for the steady reduction of 
anti-Japanese sentiment is from results in the advancement of cultural interaction, 
and one of the facilitators of cultural exchange is the immense popularity of manga 
(Japanese comic) in China (Shorrock 2005).    
    
 
3.3.2 Chinese scholars’ perception 
Japanese developments on defense are a major concern of Chinese academics. 
One recurring theme is the extent to which Japan would participate in future conflict 
such as the Taiwan Strait. Despite the moderate welcome to the U.S.-Japanese 
alliance, as a ‘bottle cap’ to stop Japan’s potential in rearmament and becoming a 
great military power (Mochizuki 2007, 246; Wang 2006, 54), strengthening and 
broadening of this alliance is not welcomed by the Chinese government (Mochizuki 
2007, 246). China scholars often side with this official line and view Japan as 
wanting to adopt a large military role. 
Citing one author as an example, Dr. Xu Wansheng, an associate professor in 
the People’s Liberation Army University of Foreign Languages, expressed concern 
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of over strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance since the mid-1990s; and the 
Japanese government’s amendment of laws in order to legalize overseas deployment 
of the SDF to support U.S. anti-terrorist efforts after 9/11 are seen as a dangerous 
milestone for Japan become a great military power.  This is because Japan has not 
reflected enough on its military aggression in the past and is not considered sufficient 
in its efforts toward gaining trust from Asian states. What is worrisome is whether 
Japan would play a part in “explicitly intervening and provoking China’s internal 
affairs and sovereignty,” by “following U.S. footsteps on infringing Taiwan as a holy 
territory of China” (Xu 2006, 52-53). Wu Jinan, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute 
for International Studies, also expressed concerns over the increasing military 
interaction between Japan and Taiwan.  Nevertheless, he concluded that current 
interaction between the two was still limited in scope, but there was the possibility of 
an intensification of military interaction between Japan and Taiwan.  This is one of 
the reasons for the importance of the Taiwan Strait being part of the sea route, as 
80% of oil from the Middle East and raw materials from Southeast Asia, which are 
imported into Japan, pass though the Taiwan Strait. As a result, it is in Japan’s 
interests to keep Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait out of mainland China’s control (Wu 
2006, 58, 59). Nevertheless, he foresees their interaction to be restricted to a certain 
extent as there are some external constraints for deepening military exchanges 
between Taiwan and Japan (Wu 2006, 63).  
These worries or concerns raised by Chinese scholars, over Japan’s military 
future development, defense polices, and attitude over Chinese territory and 
sovereignty, are too numerous to be cited in this paper.  However, no matter how 
serious these concerns are, it is not common to see them expressing concerns over 
the possibility of military aggression, or indeed the use of force by Japan in the 
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future. Around the academic circle, there is expressed criticism over Japan on the 
issues-based manner, without explicitly stating that potential military conflict seems 
to be in line with the “peaceful development” approach (Guo 2006, 1-2).  A concept 
developed from Zheng Bijian’s “peaceful rise,” with which China would avoid 
disturbing stability while rising to a great power status (Zheng 2005).  
In fact, the usual pattern of many Chinese academics through discussing 
Sino-Japanese relations is by mentioning the problems or criticism first, including 
security and historical issues; then, they will propose policy recommendations, and 
offer advice and measures while also advising the Japanese to reflect on its position 
and take a more cooperative scope; but, not to do anything to harm their bilateral 
relations so they may foster better long-term mutual beneficial relations.  This is all 
done without significant mention of the possibility of more serious conflict. For 
example, Jiang Yuechun, in his article, names several important uncertainties and 
disagreements between the two states.  But he generally proposes some suggestions 
for both states for them to settle their disputes and issues, while failing to mention 
the possible escalation of those differences into a serious military conflict, or even 
proposing a more hard-line approach to handling the issues (Jiang 2008, 7-11). 
Taking the following as an example, Zhang Yunling also raises the China-specific 
challenge of redefining the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and its potential challenges in the 
rise of China and unification with Taiwan; however, the paths of coping with these 
issues, which he purposed at the end of the chapter, are peaceful ones which include: 
attempting to make a U.S. alliance “less harmful” to China, striving to make 
China-U.S.-Japan triangular relations, having a “multi-winner” approach and to 
“integrate” the U.S. alliance East Asia security cooperation. It seems that it is only 
through non-conflicting and non-violence that the future of Sino-Japanese 
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disagreements can be overcome (Zhang 2003, 225-253). Another example is taken 
from a journal article on the China-Japan maritime disputes. Although the author 
heavily criticizes Japan’s actions and attitude on various territorial disputes, the 
strategies suggested will restrict the establishment of bureaucratic institutions on 
maritime affairs, exploring legal aspects on those issues, and seeking joint 
development opportunities with Japan. However, he does not include military 
readiness as a recommendable solution (Liu 2006, 25-34). 
Liao Xuanli analyzes the mainland international relations think tanks’ attitude 
on the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, because this alliance is still 
considered to be a cornerstone of Japanese security; therefore, their attitude on this 
alliance can bear significance on how they view Japanese security issues as a whole. 
Liao analyzed that government or military affiliated think tanks considered the 
newly-redefined U.S.-Japan alliance to bring more negative effects to regional 
stability. China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a 
research institute affiliated with the Ministry of State Security and one of the largest 
and most influential think tanks in China (Liao 2006, 57, 76-77), considers the 
enlargement of the Japanese SDF’s role and the expended scope of this new 
definition, to include Taiwan and encourage pro-independence of the island, as a 
violation of the Japan Peace Constitution; and, the target of this alliance is now 
clearly directed toward China, due to the lack of trust between China and U.S-Japan. 
CICIR and a scholar from the National Defense University judge that having 
multilateral dialogue with the alliance would be of more benefit because the bilateral 
security relations between the U.S. and Japan still dominate the region (Liao 2006, 
132-133).  
Meanwhile, think tanks, under the control of the China Academy of Social 
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Sciences and university system, hold more diverse opinions; some researchers share 
similar negative views to Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group- related, and military 
related think-tanks, while also considering that the U.S.-Japan alliance has a positive 
effect on restraining Japan from further developing its military, as well as asserting a 
more independent stance in the diplomatic arena. However, other groups of 
researchers are more optimistic, they see that the alliance is defensive in nature and 
Japan will only develop into a “regional military power” to the largest extent.  Japan 
is also unlikely to enter into direct military conflict with China unless the situation in 
the Taiwan Strait becomes grave.  Due to this more optimistic view, they consider, 
with the unfavorable strategic environment posed by this alliance that, economic 
cooperation rather than an arm race will be the right way to solve the problems.  
They also encourage dialogue with the U.S. and Japan, and consider that China is 
still able to influence the process if it becomes involved soon (Liao 2006, 133-134). 
Liu’s conclusion is that there is a growing influence of civilian think tanks on the 
China leadership and their decision making process; however, the military think tank 
no longer holds a superior position, which means a signified decline of military 
influence on the civilian leadership. This conclusion has reflected in a more 
pragmatic, political oriented approach, but without a more hard-line military means 
over disputes, which were proposed by military-related think tanks , taken by 
China’s leadership in handling Sino-Japanese disputes (Liao 2006, 137, 139-140). 
 
 
3.3.3 Discussion on the scholars’ opinion 
3.3.3.1 Discussion on Japanese academics 
While the above scholars hold a more balanced view on Sino-Japanese 
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relations, there are other groups of scholars (some of whom are ex-officials) who 
consider China as a security concern.  Such people as Okazaki and Fukuyama view 
China as a long-term threat to Japanese sea lane security, while others hold a 
relatively positive or optimistic view on Sino-Japanese relations.  Professor 
Takahara, of Tokyo University, offered a surprisingly positive yet cautious 
assessment during the low point of the Sino-Japanese relationship in 2005 (Shorrock 
2005). However, to complete a comprehensive evaluation of Japanese academic 
opinion, on whether the majority view China as a threat or not would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  The scholars’ opinions which are cited above are merely a tip 
of the iceberg and is not exclusive by any means. Due to various limitations, such as 
time and language ability, it is too arbitrary to assert either side of the different 
views.  
Borrowing Reinhard Drifte’s assessment, in his 2003 book, it can be argued 
that there are divided opinions among Japanese writers and scholars; one group 
considers that China wants to complete for a regional hegemonic position, exerting 
military pressure on neighboring countries, controlling vital sea lanes to Japan in the 
South China Sea and East China Sea, and growing naval activities in the sea region 
near Japan. While another group consider the Chinese military far from being a threat 
because of their outdated technologies, backward training methods, low industrial 
levels, and lack of interaction between military and the population. Some skeptics 
have also suggested that China became a threat at the end of the Cold War due to the 
loss of other external threats and it is wrong to assume China was inherently 
dangerous.  Nevertheless, the use of force was still possible if changes in the 
status-quo occurred, especially in Taiwan (Drifte 2003, 81-82). It seems that Drifte’s 
assessment supports the view that there is divided opinion among Japanese 
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academics. However, his book, which was published in 2003 and analyzed whether 
the threat perception remained, is worth thinking about. As various incidents 
occurred post 2003, including: the Chinese submarine incursion in 2004 (Japan 
Ministry of Defense 2005-2008); the anti-Japanese movement in 2005 (BBC 2005; 
Yardley 2005); the Chinese anti-satellite missile test in 2007 (Kaufman and Linzer 
2007); an increase in maritime activities near disputed sea regions; the acquisition of 
new military technology such as the J-10 fighters (Yardley and Lague 2007); 
Song-class submarines being submerged near the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk 
incident; and rapidly deployment and development of new Naval vessels (Lague 
2008).  
As a result, if Japanese scholars’ opinions in 2003 were slightly leaning to 
negative terms of threat perception, then it is likely that more Japanese academics 
would lean toward viewing China as a security threat now.  This is due to the lack 
of transparency regarding its long-term intentions, more proactive and suspicious 
military behavior, and further military modernization. Although China does not seem 
to have an immediate tendency to be openly hostile toward Japan, there is clearly 
public expressions from the Chinese leadership that they need to maintain a good 
relationship with Japan (Fackler 2008).   China merely wants to safeguard what is 
perceived to be its rightful interests such as the oil gas fields and preventing Taiwan 
from independence; however, suspicious signs of Chinese military activity may still 
be a source of fear for many Japanese academics, both now and in the future. 
However, it seems that mainstream scholars presently hold more balanced views of 
China, encouraging better cooperation and exchange in terms of security, yet they are 
still cautious over China’s military development.  
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3.3.3.2 Discussion on Chinese academics 
As discussed previously, Chinese academic circles generally consider Japan as 
an important and non-ignorable factor in terms of China’s security. Although they 
often criticize Japan over historical issues, the U.S.-Japan alliance, potential 
enlargement of Japan’s military in term of its size and roles, and Japan-Taiwan 
relations, it is rare that we see them explicitly mentioning and predicting a military 
conflict between China and Japan. This pattern gives the impression that writers 
within Chinese academic circles may try to avoid opposing or accept the Chinese 
leadership’s official viewpoint of “peaceful development” (Guo 2006, 1-2). However, 
this will add to the difficulty of determining whether a future military scenario is 
truly unthinkable or inconceivable, or if they have little fear over Japan’s military.  
However, it is difficult to judge whether their writing or opinions are bound under, or 
indeed conform, to a certain political atmosphere.  
Another observation is not surprising. Scholars from the different Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group-related or military related think tanks and research 
institutes, which include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Shanghai Institute of 
International Studies (Liao 2006, 83), the National Defense University, and the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), tend to express a more 
hard-line opinion or propose through policies regarding Japan-related security issues. 
They also hold more pessimistic assessments on Japan-China security relations and 
are suspicious of Japan’s intentions on the Taiwan situation. On the other hand, these 
think tanks and institutes, under the CSSA or university system, hold more diverse 
opinions whether optimistic or pessimistic.   
Another event also yields some interesting observations. During the low point 
of Sino-Japanese relations in 2002, there was a “new thinking” idea proposed by Ma 
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Licheng, a journalist at the ‘People’s Daily;’ this was echoed by Professor Shi 
Yinhong, a renowned international relations scholar at the People’s University. The 
“new thinking” essentially called for the Chinese to look over historical issues and 
attempt to analyze diplomatic relations with Japan with a more rational or realistic 
approach, as many argued that emotional anti-Japanese nationalism would hinder 
China’s image and thus the rise of China in the international community. Ma argues 
that Japan militarism is unlikely to resurge due to Japan’s democratic nature that 
imposes many constraints on its military.  Also, Shi argued that China and Japan 
should cooperate to balance the U.S. rather than concentrating over historical issues 
(Jian 2007, 22; Jian 2007, 132-133). However, this “new thinking” ignited 
widespread debate, and Ma and Shi were labeled as “traitors,” were attacked and 
received death threats (Jian 2007, 22-23). Subsequently, it was reported that a 
number of Chinese academics agreed with Ma and Shi’s ideas (Jian 2007, 29); 
however, their views received even more criticism, both within academic circles and 
from the general public (Jian 2007, 132). Nevertheless, Ma and Shi’s new thinking 
did not materialize into any mainstream ideas. Scholars who did not attack the “new 
thinking” stance also did not accept “new thinking” as a feasible concept (Jian 2007, 
136-137).  
In general, the negative way in which Ma and Shi were treated, because of 
their proposal in alternative thinking might hinder others’ willingness to propose 
innovative ideas or comments on Sino-Japanese relations, as they have served as an 
example of how individuals could be attacked if their idea was not popular with the 
public; as Ma was forced to resign from “People’s Daily” and eventually relocated to 
Hong Kong (Jian 2007, 23). Also, this identified mainstream opinions within the 
Chinese academic circles that they seemed to lean to a more pessimistic viewpoint.  
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And, when they assess the Sino-Japanese relationship, they deem that Japan will not 
welcome a rising or a strong China, because Japan has the intention to delay or 
contain this from happening. As Jian argues, many Chinese analysts still believe 
Japan would somehow be involved in the Taiwan issue, including supporting 
Taiwan’s Independence, competing for energy, and global influence in the long run 
(Jian 2007, 139-141). Jian Yang concludes that many Chinese analysts “are 
pessimistic about the relationship in [the] short and medium terms. Some are 
optimistic about the long term.”  However, the root cause is a distrust of Japan that 
is based on a “historical legacy, […] Japan’s military capabilities and its increasing 
activism in its alliance with the U.S.” (Jian 2007, 143-144).  
In short, although it is unclear whether or not, or with what reason, Chinese 
scholars seem to avoid to predicting or analyzing a hypothesized military conflict 
scenario (unlike their Western counterparts), this is not because they do not worry 
about it happening. On the contrary, it is believed that the majority have some 
mistrust over Japan’s intentions regarding China’s rise; that they hold low hopes of a 
genuine reconciliation with Japan and even have a fear of Japan’s potential 
involvement in intervening in China’s core interests, such as Taiwan. Additionally, 
moderate scholars such as Ma and Shi are not the majority..   
 
 
3.4 Younger generations 
    The educational system, either formal or informal, is considered to be a 
socialization agent through which a political regime can transmit messages to the 
younger generations. Although it is important to have socialization agents and their 
part in shaping one’s political belief and behavior is still debatable, many political 
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regimes still consider schooling as a desirable way to deliver messages (Barner-Barry 
1985, 89-90).  
Japan’s former Education Minister, Kenji Kosaka, an advocate of including 
disputed territories as Japanese territories in school textbooks, expressed it necessary 
for such texts which were taught in schools to reflect an “official standpoint” (The 
Chosun Ilbo, 2006). This is one example of schools becoming an agent in delivering 
official messages and representing an official stance; a clear example showing why 
some would perceive the school curriculum as an indicator of the government’s 
standpoint.  Regardless of whether the schools are truly a mirror of the official 
position or not, the state education curriculum is a source of debate and concern for 
both parties in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In both states, textbook authorization 
procedures have aroused controversy. In the following section, the discussion will 
focus on how the educational system in both China and Japan can influence and 
shape younger generations’ perceptions and surrounding issues. 
It is not uncommon that educational systems are used for instilling patriotic 
ideas. Providing the bitter history between China and Japan in the 20th century, 
through a series of textbook “offensives” advocated by some LDP members, the 
Ministry of Education and right-wing political groups against “biased” history 
textbooks, as well as the increase in “patriotic tone” throughout the education 
curriculum, often come under harsh criticism from China (Rose 2005, 55-57).  This 
is because the revision of the textbooks’ contents is viewed as a prelude to the rise of 
historical revisionism, which is sensitive to the Chinese government and its people. 
Taking a third textbook offensive which started in 1996, the Tsukuru kai (an active 
right-wing group, formed in December 1996) argues that the seven textbooks, which 
went through a Ministry of Education screening process in 1996 , were unable to 
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help Japanese children feel proud of their nation due the inappropriate approach, 
portrayal and contents; these included a discussion on the comfort woman, and the 
Nanjing Massacre (Rose 2006, 136-137). Meanwhile, the group also blamed the 
Japanese government for not being tough enough against foreign states that put 
pressure on the textbook issues and its “diplomacy of apology” (Rose 2006, 138). 
One of the founders of the Tsukuru kai, a University of Tokyo professor, Nobukatsu 
Fujioka, had written several books in which Japan’s aggressive wartime brutality 
against its neighboring countries and their people was diluted; these books were 
best-sellers and his views had attracted many different supporters (Kattoulas 1997, 
Kristof 1997). Meanwhile, the opposition to and criticism of downplaying Japan’s 
wartime aggression in these textbooks did not only come from neighboring countries; 
some domestic forces, including one outstanding figure, Professor Saburo Ienaga, 
filed three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education’s screening of his textbook 
drafts as he believed they had violated the constitution. In the verdict in 1997, the 
Supreme Court gave Ienaga a partial victory, saying that censorship from the 
Ministry of Education should be refrained as far as possible (Kristof 1997). His 
struggle against Japan’s Ministry of Education has been well-received in China, and 
it can be seen that the Chinese media praised him in a number of articles posted 
which mourned his death in 2002 (Chu 2002; Wenwei Po 2002). It should also be 
noted that Professor Ienaga was continuously threatened by right-wing radicals 
throughout the three decades of legal struggle over the history textbook issue 
(Kattoulas 1997).  
In Japan, despite right wing groups attempting to promote the use of the 
controversial textbooks, popularity of them did not develop. This fact is reflected in 
the market share of some of the right-wing written textbooks; for example, there 
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were only 0.13% of all 11,134 junior high schools using the Tsukuru ka’s production 
The New History Textbook (Atarashii Komin Kyokasho) in May 2003.  This figure 
was acquired after more than two years after its approval by the Ministry of 
Education and an intensive promotional media campaign (Takahashi 2004). The final 
adoption rate of this textbook was around 0.032% to 0.039% of all schools (McNeill 
2005; Takahashi 2004; Shimazu 2006, 142). The New History Textbook was 
expected to have a 10% market share, but the end result was far below initial 
estimates. Part of the reason behind the low adoption rate of The New History 
Textbook was the result of efforts from pressure groups such as, The Children and 
the Textbook Japan Network 21 (Shimazu 2006, 142). 
    Tsukuru kai’s next wave of textbooks offensive subsequently became one of the 
triggers to the 2005 anti-Japanese mass movement in China. Rather than scaring off 
the rightists from asserting their objectives, the anti-Japanese movement in China 
further fueled undesired feelings among some Japanese individuals; this resulted in 
China being portrayed as a dangerous country and an unfriendly neighbor, using 
history as a diplomatic instrument and China was thought to be trapped by 
stereotypical issues.  Comments by some Japanese media commentators, including 
Japan Times writer and ex-diplomat Masamichi Hanabusa, considered China to 
“have long neglected to see Japan's reality and sentiments without prejudice” 
(Hanabusa 2005). Hanabusa promoted that China had no reason to be afraid of Japan, 
because Japan had never harbored hostile intentions toward China; and, because 
Japan had not intervened in China’s internal affairs, he believed China should have 
acknowledged this. He also accused China to be one that was threatening others, by 
saying “it is China not Japan that possesses a formidable nuclear arsenal and deploys 
long-range missiles aimed at Taiwan and other” (Hanabusa 2005). The magnitude of 
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the 2005 incidents terrified many Japanese and generated distasteful feelings 
(Johnston 2007, 119). However, the 2005 anti-Japanese sentiment was simply a new 
chapter in the textbook controversies which began in the 1980s; it could be see that, 
even though a textbook had such a low adoption rate in Japan, it enraged some of the 
Chinese. Despite right-wing thinking remaining to be a non-mainstream discourse in 
education, Lind points out that “Japanese education was largely unapologetic: [the] 
discussion of past misdeeds – if not totally absent – were often cursory at best.”  
Therefore, it should reflect on past wrongdoings and understand the concern of its 
neighbor on its educational system (Lind 2008, 51). 
On the other hand, patriotic education has always been an important measure 
for the PRC government. With the Education Law passed in 1995, stories of the 
KMT and Japanese invasion forces have been widely used for patriotic education; for 
example, there is a story used in the “Thought and Value” (sixiang pinde) course 
about young resistance fighters led by a boy, who was then executed by the Japanese 
for refusing to sell out his country (Hughes 2006, 73-74). Stories like this negative 
shape images of Japan in the minds of the younger generation. When comparing 
textbooks used in Japan, the texts used in China seem even more polarized; David P. 
Jänes discovered that Chinese History, Book 1., the dominant history textbook used 
in Chinese middle school by 80% of market, was “polarized” in content by devoting 
a whole chapter on the Nanjing Massacre.  It provided detailed illustrations of the 
atrocities, such as a “killing game” played by Japanese troops, and implies Japanese 
students are taught with right-wing texts (Jänes 2005, 1-9, 1-10). However, Jänes 
points out that the most used Japanese history textbook has its own deficiencies but 
still provides a more balanced view than the right-wing textbook: The New History 
Textbook (Jänes 2005, 1-10). Jeffrey Kingston, an Asian studies scholar at Temple 
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University in Tokyo, comments “Japan was demonized in state education as a way of 
shoring up the sagging legitimacy of the [Chinese] Communist Party, which took 
credit for defeating the invaders.”  He also points out that Chinese education texts 
include ideas such as “Guarding against the revival of Japanese militarism and 
fascism remains one of the most important problems that we face” (Lawrence and 
Martin 2008). Kristof also suggests that Asian school textbooks, including those of 
China, are sources of “Unrelenting anti-Japanese propaganda” and even racist 
(Kristof 1999, 42). Thus Chinese students’ negative views and uncritical blame on 
the Japanese is believed to be deeply-seated, because they believe their Japanese 
counterparts do not have enough understanding of their country’s past behavior and 
therefore, may carry out or have the potential to breed militaristic thinking toward 
the Chinese. In fact, after the Tiananmen Incident, Japan wartime behavior once 
again became the focus of Chinese patriotic education, combining other issues such 
as the growth of the U.S.-Japan security commitment and visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine by former Prime Minister Koizumi. Additionally, anti-Japanese sentiment in 
Chinese popular nationalism has been heightening since then.   
It is not unusual for a country to conduct patriotic education of some form, but 
there is danger that this type of patriotic education will turn into “blind patriotism.”  
There is a form called “pesudopatriotism,” which results in “blind attachment to 
certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group ways, 
and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson 
and Sanford 1950, 107).  One manifestation of patriotism is through nationalistic 
ideas such as military and war; and those ideas could often lead to a feeling of 
“national vulnerability,” a feeling that their national security is under foreign threat, 
and “heightened distrust of foreign nations and exaggerated vigilance and 
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preparedness” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 1999, 154-155). Another concern arising 
from blind patriotism is “cultural contamination” in which “foreign influence erode[s] 
the homogeneity and distinctiveness of national culture” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 
1999, 155). Contrary to blind patriotism, constructive patriotism recognizes internal 
problems of the nation, rather than having “global and uncritical positive evaluation 
of the ingroup” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 1999, 163). 
 
3.4.1 Discussion 
Although it is would be unconvincing to say that patriotic education in Japan 
and China would or has led to the formation of “blind patriotism,” the above 
discussion shows some elements. First, the Chinese public might not acknowledge or 
have indeed overlooked the fact that the majority of Japanese student are not taught 
from right-wing textbooks. Therefore, it is not accurate to conclude that the Japanese 
have been instilled with rightist views, thus generating resentment toward them. The 
Japanese, on the other hand, feel confused, upset, fearful and angry due to Chinese 
hostility and a failure to understand why the Chinese are so anti-Japanese, even 
though the majority have nothing to do with the right wing or militarism.  They may 
consider the Chinese as unfriendly and untrustworthy, which is through the belief 
that Chinese are growing in strength, with the state and people being feared.  
The above illustration exemplifies the predicament of uncertainty of intentions, 
as one party assumes the other knows and understands its own intentions, and has no 
reason to fear itself; therefore, any suspicious moves by the other will be considered 
unreasonable and even malign. The Chinese younger generation, who are nurtured by 
lopsided views of patriotic education and the official portrayal of Japan; meaning 
they may hold a biased view toward their Japanese counterparts and be unable to 
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develop a more balanced understanding of Japan.   
For Japan’s younger generation, it is hard to determine whether, and to what 
extent, right-wing nationalistic ideas will become popularized in the future. As Rose 
concludes, even though the right-wing nationalistic educational agenda is moving 
forward, it is far from being mainstream and is not currently accepted by Japanese 
academics. However, under pressure from patriotic campaigns, many Japanese 
wartime aggressions were toned down in textbooks (Rose 2006, 147). The 
continuous lowering in the significance of Japanese wartime wrongdoings may 
eventually make Japan’s younger generations feel that the Chinese persistently ask an 
apology from Japan, or that reflection is unfair and unjust, and thus will generate 
negative feelings over the longer term.     
 
Nevertheless, Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments are deemed to be unreasonable, 
generating negative feelings and a fear of China in the minds of some younger 
Japanese individuals who have witnessed bilateral relations and disputes with China.  
Therefore, they may consider China as an unfriendly neighbor and will easily accept 
the “China Threat” theory.    
 
 
3.5 Politicians and ruling leaders 
3.5.1 Japan 
    China’s growing military is a concern for some individuals in Japan, with a 
number being prominent political figures. Prime Minister Taro Aso expressed his 
personal view in December 2005, when he was Foreign Minister, saying that China 
“pose[s] a considerate threat” because it lacked military transparency and had a 
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nuclear program. Aso’s statement was the first time a minister of Japan said 
something so explicit over the “China threat.”  Then, two days later, the Japanese 
government officially announced it would be one of the developers of the U.S. 
proposed missile shield project (Marquand 2005). This was not the final statement 
made on China’s growing military by Aso, as he subsequently expressed his concerns 
on a number of other occasions. Aso told Fuji Television, on April 2nd 2006 that, “It's 
not clear what China is using the money for. This creates a sense of threat for 
surrounding countries,” when commenting on China’s military expenditure and 
transparency (International Herald Tribune 2006). Not only Aso but another Prime 
Minister, Shinzo Abe, who pioneered the “ice-melting visit” to China, agreed with 
the 2005 Aso’s assessment. Aso, as Chief Cabinet Secretary at that time, said “He 
must have made the comment based on the view that China should ensure 
transparency over the growth in its military spending,” and “There is no major 
discrepancy in that sense” (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2005).  
The growing military strength of China also influenced the leader of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (the main opposition party) to hold similar views over 
China shifting to the right (Marquand 2005). Seiji Maehara stated China was a 
“realistic threat” because of its growing military, while on in a trip to the United 
States in December 2005. He further told the PLA deputy chief of staff, Xiong 
Guangkai, “when we look into China’s military buildup, I cannot but have doubts of 
its intent” (Przystep 2006, 116). He further made comments on the “China threat” 
issue when he was back in Japan, pointing out several aspects such as increasing 
military expenditure, the upgrade and overhaul of its nuclear arsenal and other 
weapons, and China’s plan on the East China Sea energy sources as evidence of the 
China threat (Takahara 2005).  
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Shoichi Nakagawa, who held a number of important positions in the Japanese 
cabinet and LDP, including being LDP’s Policy Research Council Chairman, the 
Minister of the Economy, Trade and Industry, and Minister of Finance, once said “If 
something were to happen to Taiwan in the next 15 years, then within 20 years, Japan 
might become just another Chinese province”, in a speech. (China Daily 2007, 
Chang, 2007). He also suspected that the anti-satellite missile test was targeted at 
Japan. He predicted it was likely that China might rise in a non-peaceful manner after 
2010 and urged Japan citizens to focus more on this matter (Chang 2007). 
Furthermore, Prime Minister Koizumi said, when addressing a “China threat” 
question in Diet in January 2006, that in order for a country to become a threat it 
must have both the capability and intention; China, despite its repaid military 
modernization, was still on a long road to modernizing its hardware, and he did not 
consider China as a threat; this was because of the 1972 Joint Communiqué and the 
1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. However, he did not provide a clear answer on 
whether China was a “latent threat,” or its “intentions shift over time” and its military 
capabilities were the only indication that the country had become a “latent threat” 
because a military capable country have ability to invade or attack other if it had the 
intention  (Matsuda 2007, 187-188).   
Meanwhile, there was positive comment. The Secretary-General of Japan’s 
LDP, Hidenao Nakagawa, denied China as a threat to Japan, during his visit to China, 
by saying “China, which is seeking to build a harmonious society and become an 
economic power, is not a threat to Japan, and Japan, which is striving to become a 
political power, also poses no threat to China” (Xinhua 2007).  However, Nakagawa 
is known to be a pro-Chinese politician in the LDP (Masaki 2006). Another former 
LDP secretary-general, Koichi Kato, was said to be a leading member of the 
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pro-China group (Kyodo News 2006). He criticized Koizumi’s visit to Yusukuni 
Shrine and nationalists’ lack of reflection for Japan’s wartime behavior. His view, 
however, attracted some aggressive behavior by radical nationalists, including setting 
fire to one of his houses in 2006 (Bnet 2006). 
 
3.5.2 China 
The previous Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, has personal aspect as after 
spending his childhood in a Japan-occupied region; also, his uncle was killed by 
Japanese soldiers during the invasion (Shirk 2007, 154).  Therefore, he seems to 
have a reason for personal resentment toward Japan. However, personal reasons 
aside, it is believed that he took a more hard line approach, as exemplified in his 
1998 visit to Japan, by continually mentioning the history issue in order to gain 
support from the military and conservatives in China (Rose 2005, 106).   
After the transition of power, China’s diplomacy style, under the Hu-Wen 
leadership, was “seeking diplomatic balance and flashing the economic card;” which 
had the aim of maintaining warm and friendly relations with most of the major 
powers such as the “EU, ASEAN, Russia, and Japan [and] a nonconfrontional 
relationship with the United States.”  And, it would do so by using its flourishing 
economy to ensure diplomatic smoothness (Lee 2006, 163-164); something which is 
consistent with China’s “peaceful development” doctrine. The essence of “peaceful 
development” is to “develop by taking advantage of the peaceful international 
environment, and at the same time, to maintain world peace through its 
development.”  This is a term derived from Zheng Bijian’s “peaceful rise” idea. 
However, fearing that the word “rise” would bear a threatening intention to other 
states, Hu Jintao modified the term to “peaceful development;” a term which has 
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become the official standpoint ever since (Guo 2006, 1-2).  
China’s leadership has been quite successful in maintaining a consistent 
relationship with most of the major powers. Furthermore, its relations with former 
foes and competitors, including India, Vietnam, Russia and ASEAN members with 
which China has territorial dispute in South China Sea, have seen various degrees of 
improvement.  However, Japan is an exceptional case, as Sino-Japanese relations 
have entered a vicious cycle since the beginning of the 21st century (Lam 2006, 166).  
And, this situation has not improved much over time, even after the “peaceful 
development” idea was made. One outstanding event was when Chinese navy 
warships appeared in the East China Sea near the disputed oil gas field in 2005; 
which was a show of military might. It was believed that China wanted to send a 
signal of determination just two weeks before the production began (French, Onishi 
2005). It is quite remarkable for the current Chinese leadership, which has stressed 
on maintaining an image of peaceful and benevolent power, to demonstrate such 
unfriendly behavior. As a result, it is worth acknowledging why Japan is one of the 
few exceptions to the overall warm foreign relations of China; the question to answer 
is: why is the Sino-Japanese relationship so special and different?  
One common argument is that Japan has much to do with the Chinese 
leadership’s core interests. Since the Chinese leadership turned to nationalism, in 
order to boost its popularity and legitimacy, Japan unavoidably became a prime 
target for nationalistic sentiment; mainly because Japan was a memorable aggressor 
in recent Chinese history, its scaling back of the(and subsequently cancelled) 
economic aid, and had an overall unwillingness to address historical issues 
concerning Chinese expectations were frequently sources of resentment among 
China officials (Sutter 2006, 400-401). In fact, Japanese related questions may have 
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become more volatile during the Hu-Wen leadership, as they “demonstrated a 
readiness to be more receptive to public demands as long as the Communist Party’s 
monopoly on power is not compromised.” Additionally, public grievances and 
demands over foreign affairs may also need to be addressed under “putting people 
first” mentality (Lam 2006, 175). And, as a result, tolerance of the current Chinese 
leadership toward Japanese related issues may be reduced due to public demand.  
Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations have recovered from their lowest point during 
the Koizumi period, being improved by his successors Shinzo Abe (BBC 2006) and 
Yasuo Fukuda (Lawrence and Martin 2008); and, through the Chinese Premier’s, 
Wen Jiabao, “ice-melting” visit to Japan (BBC 2007, Onishi 2007) and Hu Jintao’s 
visit to Japan (Fackler 2008). However, as Ezra Vogel, the former head of Harvard 
University’s Asia Center, assesses it is still not “at the stage where there is popular 
support in China for good relations with Japan, or confidence in Japan that relations 
are stable and completely trustworthy.” And, the improvement of their bilateral 
relations is still “tentative,” despite noteworthy improvement (Lawrence and Martin 
2008).  
The current Hu-Wen leadership holds a two-folded view of Japan, at least for 
the rest of this decade; they regard Japan as a “quasi-superpower” economically, 
while they also view Japan as a “second-class” diplomatic and military power. This 
is a pragmatic approach because the Beijing leadership is more willing to forge a 
closer economic partnership with Tokyo.  Also, it can be seen that China, including 
Hong Kong, has replaced the United States as Japan’s number one trading partner 
since 2004. While, on the other hand, the Chinese leadership wants to prevent Japan 
from becoming a “normal country” through political and diplomatic means; therefore, 
China continues to comment and criticize any steps which might facilitate Japan’s 
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“remilitarization.” Also, Lam comments that “intense Sino-Japanese mistrust and 
competition have overshadowed what might have been [a] silver lining on the 
horizon” (Lam 2006, 201). Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations have yet to go from 
political-cold to an economic-hot pattern. The deep mistrust from China’s leadership 
is rooted in how Japan will play a security role in the Taiwan issue. As one writer 
comments, “the only conceivable issue which Japan and China can be draw into a 
war is over Taiwan.”  Therefore, no matter whether there is the possibility that 
China and Japan may be pitted against each other in a military conflict with other 
scenarios, these comments show the possibility of Japan being involved in Taiwan 
security as a fear of China’s leadership.  However, their involvement will be in the 
form of actual military logistics support to U.S. troops, under the guise of the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance, or Japanese participation in missile defense research. All of 
which could pose obstacles to Chinese unification or indeed encourage Taiwan de 
jure independence.  However, no matter which is the case, the Chinese leadership 
does fear Japan as a security threat (Lam 2006, 180-181). 
 
3.5.3 Discussion of politicians’ perceptions 
3.5.3.1 Japan 
The China threat argument has been mentioned by some senior LDP politicians 
in Japan, such as Shoichi Nakagawa, Aso, and Abe; all of these individuals were 
considered to be nationalists and expressed concern on the military threat of China. 
However, it is hard to determine if the “China threat” is widely accepted in the LDP, 
as there are various factions in the LDP that are pro-China as well as ones that are 
anti-China.   
Moreover, Abe and Aso have not expressed similar comments in the capacity 
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of Prime Minister. Ironically, Abe’s first overseas visit was to China, rather than a 
usual trip to the United States. However, which is Japan’s true attitude toward China? 
One speculation is that the role of the Japanese Prime Minister has made then to 
refrain from expressing their attitude more freely. As the Prime Minister, their 
responsibility is to make decisions more comprehensively. Also, it can be seen that 
even Prime Minister Koizumi, a nationalistic LDP who was not scared about 
upsetting China by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, would not go so far to putting his 
nationalistic thinking in front of other factors such as economic opportunities with 
China. Also, it was reported there were Japanese worries over Koizumi’s behavior 
could damage their economic relations with China and therefore, put pressure on him 
to maintain their business prospects (Curtin 2004). A more recent example of this 
pattern can be seen when Aso took a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations, rather 
than making nationalistic comments, on the recent diplomatic dispute over Chinese 
research ships sailing near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; as Japan needed to cooperate 
with China to combat the global economic crisis (Zhong 2008; ASTM 2008). It is 
reasonable to believe that domestic politics and various interest groups have also 
placed pressure on how and if the Prime Minister should express their own personal 
view freely, before coming to office. 
Another explanation which may be attributable to their threat perception 
toward China is due to the fact that they are post World War generations; they have 
not directly experienced or been involved in the World War Two process of 
normalization of relations with China. Although this may not have had a direct 
impact on the rise in tension of Sino-Japanese relations, the lack of feelings toward 
each other may have influenced a more pragmatic view and strategic approach to 
relations. This is one explanation as to why Koizumi seemed more willing to use the 
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military as a diplomatic asset. It is argued that older generations, such as Noboru 
Takeshita, had experienced war and his faction is considered to be pro-China (Wan 
2006, 102, 143-144). After all, with the disappearance of special feelings toward 
China, Japanese politicians’ feelings toward China could be subject to other factors. 
For example, China, as a nondemocractic state, may be an obstacle to developing a 
benevolent image among Japanese politicians and bureaucracies; just as one Chinese 
specialist in the Japanese Foreign Ministry commented, “[The] Tiananman (incident) 
taught me a major lesson: Communism is communism” (Wan 2006, 163). 
Nevertheless, these examples were selected due to the importance of those 
political figures, as many held important or influential positions in the LDP and the 
cabinet. It is reasonable to believe that there are a growing number of Japanese 
politicians who have a genuine reservation on China’s long-term intentions, due to 
the older generation of politicians retiring, even though there are still a number of 
pro-China camps in the LDP. 
The conclusion of this section is that the threat perception of Japanese 
politicians is that they are “slightly worried on China as a threat but the trend is 
increasing.”  
 
3.5.3.2 China 
It seems that the Chinese leadership has a firm stand on certain issues relating 
to Japan, because those issues are related to the country’s core interests – the 
legitimacy of the regime. It is argued that the Hu-Wen leadership embraces a populist 
approach in domestic politics, which in turn restrains their own room for 
maneuvering in foreign affairs due to Chinese popular opinions being anti-Japanese 
(Wan 2006, 150). However, one Chinese expert, Peter Gries, argues “the CCP is 
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losing its control over nationalist discourse” (Gries 2004, 180-181).  
The true fear in the mind of the current Chinese leadership can be understood 
from the experience of China’s previous leader Jiang Zemin, as he was criticized 
within China for his stance on handling the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
(Hughes 2006, 147).  One could imagine what the Chinese public would feel if the 
issues become more explosive, such as a skirmish near the Diaoyu/Senkuka Islands 
or Japan providing logistic support to the U.S. in a Taiwan crisis.  Therefore, we can 
infer that the Chinese leadership’s fear over Japan, as a security threat, is twofold. 
First, it is the rise of nationalistic thinking in Japan and the more assertive actions 
taken by Japanese leaders against China; including the intention behind the 
possibility of revising Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. Also, all of the above 
elements may create some genuine competition between the two states, with the 
possibility of a military clash in some form.  Second, if the threat of losing popular 
support arises domestically, and is triggered by Japanese behavior on issues which 
the Chinese public or nationalists have great concern then the Chinese leadership 
would face a difficult position.  They could either appeal to the demands of an 
increasing nationalistic-thinking public, but this may damage China’s overall 
international image and effort, resulting in a potential disastrous result for China in 
the long-term; or, they could choose to ignore public demands and rationally handle 
the security issue, but may run the risk of losing public support and being trapped in 
a legitimate dilemma with the public.   
Both choices are equally bad for Chinese leaders and the possibility of the 
above scenarios will increase should Japan become more militarily active and 
abandon pacifism. An increasingly active security behavior, such as an involvement 
in missile defense and joining peacekeeping efforts, may trigger concerns over 
  
 
132 
whether Japan will change or is currently changing its policy on security issues. As a 
result, the Chinese leadership should be aware of Japan’s future security behavior. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
From the information explored in this chapter, it has been found that the 
Chinese general public dislike Japan and consider it to be a source of security 
concerns; which is mainly due to how the Japanese government handled history 
issues.  However, the Japanese general public also holds similar fear of China’s 
military strength and does not have a positive attitude toward China, mainly due to 
the anti-Japan sentiment in China. 
China’s military, the PLA, is very suspicious of Japan’s security intentions, as 
they believe Japan’s security measures, such as strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
joining the missile defense, and upgrading the Defense Agency to ministry level, is 
directed toward China and holds malign intention. On the other hand, the Japan 
Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force are also wary about China’s military 
behavior, due to various suspicious behavior conducted by alleged Chinese vessels 
and aircraft, and a relatively fast-paced military buildup without improvement on the 
transparency of its intention.   
For scholars on both sides, the majority of Chinese scholars have some 
reservations over Japan’s security intentions, while few have mentioned a 
hypothesized military conflict; and most do not hold much hope of an overall 
reconciliation between the two states. Scholars who hold a moderate view do exist, 
but are still in the minority. Mainstream Japanese scholars generally have a balanced 
view on China, through suggestions of improved cooperation and trust between the 
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two states.  However, they do acknowledge the existence of obstacles, but suggest 
some attention should be placed on China’s military behavior and intentions in case 
an unexpected situation occurs.  Rightists or more radical views do exist, but these 
views are not shared by mainstream opinion. 
The younger Chinese generation has an unreasonable, and sometimes irrational, 
negative impression of Japan, which is mainly due to the unbalanced and heavily 
biased educational agenda. Japan’s younger generation has received a relatively 
balanced education on history compared to that of China’s, and rightists’ educational 
materials have not entered the mainstream education agenda. 
The overall trend of Japanese politicians and their perception of China is 
believed to show slight concern over China as a security threat, with this belief 
becoming more popular.  This is while China’s leadership fears Japanese security 
behavior will place them in a dilemma of policy choice, either to be assertive and 
lose international reputation (which China needs), or handling it moderately and 
losing popularity among its people. 
After exploring perceptions of various sub-state actors in both states, the 
following chapter will discuss whether there is a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
134 
 
4. Is there a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations? 
 
4.1 Discussion 
In order to determine whether a security dilemma exists between China and 
Japan, the threat perception of sub-actors in each state will be discussed, rather than 
taking each state as a unitary actor. The discussion will be based on information used 
in the previous section, but this information is by no means exclusive or 
comprehensive; because the information is only based on availability and how well it 
represents the opinions of certain groups of actors. The observations deduced from 
the previous discussion will be summarized as follows. 
 
Figure 4. China’s threat perception toward Japan 
China sub-state actors Threat perception toward Japan 
General Public Generally hold an unfavorable opinion 
and are quite fearful of Japan threatening 
their security in military terms. 
Military (PLA) Very suspicious of Japan’s military 
intentions and are anti-Japanese. 
Academic Mainstream opinion believed to be 
worried about Japan as a security threat. 
Political Ruling Elite  
(CCP Leadership) 
Afraid that future security issues with 
Japan will present them with a 
policy-making dilemma, thus worried 
about Japan’s military intentions and 
behavior. 
Younger generation Very nationalistic, prone to become 
anti-Japanese and hold a low opinion of 
Japan. 
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Figure 5. Japan’s threat perception toward China 
Japan sub-state actors Threat perception toward China 
General Public Hold unfavorable opinion of China, and 
quite fearful of China threatening their 
security in military terms. 
Military (MoD, SDF) Suspicious and concerned over China’s 
military behavior and intentions. 
Academic Increasingly concerned about China as a 
security threat, but mainstream view is 
still balanced and encourages 
cooperation between the two states. 
Political Ruling Elite  
(LDP, DPJ) 
Somewhat worried over China as a 
security threat and the trend is 
increasing. 
Younger generation Mainstream education discourse does not 
consider China as a security threat; 
conservative nationalistic education has 
not been mainstream for some time. 
 
4.1.1 Sources of the Security Dilemma: identities, norms, interests and 
policies 
 
According to the above investigation, the groups who show more concrete 
evidence of fearing the other are the general public of both countries. Both the 
Chinese and Japanese governments may have played a part in creating public opinion, 
but may eventually be affected by such opinion and have to act accordingly. The 
following discussion will attempt to explore how public opinions are shaped and how 
they can be reshaped by other sub-state groups by using the framework in figure 1. 
We then need to understand why the Chinese public holds a fear of Japan as a 
security threat and vice versa, by using the framework in figure 2. 
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4.1.1.1 Chinese’ identities, norms, interest and government policies 
As Jeffrey Kingston points out, the Chinese educational system has used Japan 
as an external threat to develop its own legitimacy (Lawrence & Martin 2008). 
Long-term effects to Sino-Japanese relationships are brought about by historical 
narration in history, and anti-Japanese sentiment is then created to distract people 
from domestic problems (Jänes 2005, 1.9).  Indeed, some have argued that the 
Chinese government uses education and public media as a means to spread 
nationalistic rhetoric, as a way to maintain legitimacy (Jia 2005, 17).  One example 
was the enactment of “Fundamental Principles on Implementing Patriotic Education” 
by the Propaganda Department of the CCP in 1994. The CCP also tried to maintain 
legitimacy by taking the role of defender of “economic development, political 
stability and national unity” (Chen 2005, 48).  
Although Jänes argues the effect of education will take a long time to 
materialize (Jänes 2005, 1.9), I argue the effect has already emerged in recent years, 
at least in some aspects. Jia argues that Chinese nationalism has become stronger 
recently, in several aspects; first, the Chinese are more easily offended by criticism 
from foreign countries than people in other countries; second, the Chinese have great 
pride toward China’s growing national strength; third, they now employ a realist 
view concerning international affairs (Jia 2005, 15-16). 
As a result, I would argue this represents three elements which form China’s 
identity in many Chinese people’s minds; which are: “China is great now” and “it 
has recovered from a hundred years humiliation and should be respected,” and “it is 
the leading East Asian power.” 
These identities shape norms. The following will illustrate some norms which 
are derived from these identities.  Jia suggests that some of the external factors, 
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such as bias media coverage from the West and a lack of respect for China’s national 
interest shown by foreign countries, as having an important part in creating strong 
nationalism (Jia 2005, 15-16). However, how important these external factors are, in 
contributing to the rise of nationalism, is still in debate. The first point to note is that 
China has extensive censorship over the internet; many different keywords are 
sensitive and 85 percent are politically related; these are blocked on searches and 
many domestic and overseas websites are banned from accessing  This is done in an 
effort to control “ultranationalism,” by banning such words as “Defend the Diaoyu 
Islands” (Shirk 2007, 91-92).  And, it is thought that this process will also prevent 
the Chinese public from accessing alternative political or historical perspectives from 
other origins. Second, it is not known how many Chinese have acquired a foreign 
viewpoint on China, whether this is from foreign websites or media; the reason for 
this is because Chinese language-based sources, such as newspaper and websites, 
will still be a major source of information – even though there is growing foreign 
language literacy. How these Chinese sources select and report information from 
foreign sources will determine what types of information the Chinese public would 
know.  Just as the Genron-NPO’s Third Japan-China Opinion poll in 2007 has 
shown, Chinese news media (87.8%), books (including textbooks) and TV drama 
books (40.6%), and special programs and movies (37.2%) were the top 3 channels 
that Chinese individuals learned about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations.  Direct 
contact with Japanese media was only the choice of 5.8% of the surveyed sample 
(Genron-NPO 2007, 5).  
As a result, how the Chinese media and official information channels portray 
Japan and the Japanese should be more important than how the foreign media does. It 
is said that many Chinese consider that Japan has not reflected enough for its 
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wartime aggression and this is the reason why so many Chinese people dislike Japan 
and consider it a threat (Genron-NPO 2007, 27; Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). However, 
the key question is: have the Japanese truly reflected?  Philip Seaton carried out 
research to compare the number of Japanese Prime Ministers who had apologized 
against the Prime Ministers who had visited the Yusukuni Shrine.  The research 
identified that, from September 1990 to October 2005, Japanese Prime Ministers 
have issued an apology, expressed remorse, and reflect their historical wrongdoing in 
various forms 26 times; while the Yusukuni Shrine was visited by Prime Ministers in 
various capacities on seven occasions, five of which were by Koizumi. This 
compares with the ratio of apologies to Yusukuni visits, by Prime Ministers in an 
earlier period, from July 1972 to August 1990; which were three to thirty-four 
(Seaton 2007, 88-91). It seems that the frequency of Prime Ministerial visits and 
visits to the Yusukuni Shrine have decreased over time, and Japan’s PMs are more 
willing to apologize for Japan’s wartime behavior since the 1990s.  However, the 
wording, phraseology and formalness of those apologies can also be a subject in 
determining if the Chinese are satisfied with them.  If a more balanced coverage had 
been presented by Chinese officials or the media, then the Chinese public would 
have acknowledged a more balanced attitude on Japanese’s reflection of its wartime 
behavior; for example, Professor Ienaga’s effort in fighting for a balanced view on 
history textbooks (Kristof 1997). However, we should recognize that even though 
there were numerous apologies in various forms, this will never really represent the 
standpoint of the Japanese government.  As, Prime Minister Murayama failed to 
persuade the conservative members of Diet to support his attempt of issuing an 
official apology and, as a result, his apology, despite its sincerity, can at best only 
represent himself (Dahl 2008, 245). Therefore, this may provide the impression that 
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an apology by some Japanese politicians can be considered superficial and 
instructional. Moreover, the Chinese public have been socialized in to believing that 
the Japanese are steadily taught right-wing militarism through their educational 
(Jänes 2005, 1-9, 1-11). Another reason which makes those apologies less fruitful 
may be from the view that the attempts were only done instructionally, in order to 
boost economic exchange (Dahl 2008, 245). This view will be even more deeply 
seated by seemingly contradictory behavior by Japan, as Kristof suggests: 
“[…]Japan's statements of regret always end up sounding hollow and calculating, as 
if they come from some committee in the Foreign Ministry. Every August 15, to 
mark the anniversary of the end of the war, the prime minister reads a carefully 
worded speech expressing hansei—a vague term meaning remorse or self-reflection. 
Any sense of regret, however, is undermined by the procession of cabinet ministers 
who march to [the] Yasukuni Shrine, a traditional center of Japanese militarism” 
(Kristof 1999, 40). 
 
Indeed, there are a certain number of right-wing conservative nationalistic 
discourses regarding its wartime behavior in Japan, but how deep this thinking 
penetrates Japan’s mainstream society is debatable. It is reasonable to believe that the 
Japanese public is far less right-wing, let alone militaristic, than many Chinese 
individuals perceive. However, such contradictory behavior could undermine the 
effect of an apology by any person representing Japan. Although, it is simplistic to 
conclude over this, one reasonable explanation could be that the Chinese media or 
government propaganda channels have overly emphasized negative portrayals of 
Japan.  Whether this is intentional or unintentional it would remind people that the 
ghost of militarism is still very active. Nevertheless, “anti-Japanese militarism” has 
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become a major norm in the minds of the Chinese public, and is the reason why they 
have a biased portrayal of Japan and the Japanese. 
Moreover, igniting radical nationalism may not be the Chinese leadership’s 
original intention, as the Chinese leadership have not wanted to utilize “assertive or 
aggressive nationalism,” as such nationalism would do more harm than good for 
China’s international image; something which is important when fostering 
international cooperation (Chen 2005, 51). However, as China has deepened its 
contact and involvement with the international community, more domestic problems 
have followed, such as laid off state-owned enterprise workers. It is also likely that 
the fourth-generation leadership may need to face the challenge of popular 
nationalism, which give pressure them to give top priority to China’s interest 
(Secington 2005, 32). A recent example was a negative opinion expressed by some 
of the Chinese public on the agreement between China and Japan on the development 
of the East Sea oil and gas field, in June 2008; some individuals expressed their 
criticism against this agreement on the internet (Huanqiu Forum 2008), criticizing 
the Chinese government for being too soft on this issue (Ming Pao Daily News 2008).  
However, some individuals praised the Chinese research ships’ appearance near 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in December 2006, with comments such as “[the] Chinese 
government has finally learnt to be tough,” “We Chinese wish to see this kind of 
expression very much” (Mok 2008).  This uncompromising attitude is a 
manifestation of the identity of “China is a great power,” which generates the norm 
of “[aggressive] counter foreign malign intention and disrespect […].”  Therefore, 
the Chinese public is prone to use its strength, influence and assertive policies, rather 
than compromising when dealing with Japan. This could be the mentality resulting 
from China’s past as the victim of Japan’s expansionism and aggression, as 
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Alexander Wendt has argued the current “predator” can be a past victim (Wendt 
1992, 409). This exemplifies the danger that public opinion could hijack such 
decision-making of the Chinese government, and even force the Chinese leadership 
to become increasingly more assertive, blame the leadership of being ineffective to 
deal with domestic demand, or even request them to deploy an aggressive strategy 
over dealing with Japan in the long run. Therefore, it can be seen that Chinese’s 
nationalistic or anti-Japanese norms may affect and restrict government policies. 
Also, because the realist’s world view is widely accepted by the Chinese 
public, it is apparent that one realist’s core assumption, the “zero-sum world” view, 
has also become a common norm when thinking about Japan. The uncompromising 
attitude of the Chinese public cannot be understood, and as a result the combination 
of the norms forms a “zero-sum world view” and “anti-Japanese militarism.”  Using 
the above energy security as an example, this combination of norms is clear. Using 
the data from research into university students’ views on Chinese energy issues, 
which was conducted by Hong Kong UST, 57% out of 944 respondents, having a 
college or higher level of education, said it is “possible” or “completely possible” 
that “energy imports will allow other countries to control China.”  This shows that 
they are worried about China’s energy dependence on other states (Zweig and Ye 
2008, 289-290). At the same time, around 68% (25% said very likely and 43% said 
likely) considered armed conflict likely with the other state over energy issues 
(Zweig and Ye 2008, 289, 291). It seems that many hold a conflicting and 
pessimistic view on international politics. Although Japan was ranked as the number 
two rival on energy behind the U.S., when asked which state the respondents were 
least willing for China to cooperate with, only 3.6% favored cooperation with Japan 
(Zewig and Ye 2008, 290-292). The respondents also held a hawkish view on Japan 
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in dealing with the East China Sea oil gas issue; the mean score was 3.9 in a 1-5 
scale (5 being most hawkish, 1 being most cooperative).  Therefore, their attitude 
on Japan is much more hawkish than on the U.S. (mean score 2.99) (Zweig and Ye 
2008, 290, 293). Generally speaking, the respondents suggested domestic solutions 
were more important than an external strategic solution, such as military options 
(Zweig and Ye 2008, 295). However, some hard liners answered the survey’s 
open-ended question by stating that the Chinese government should utilize the East 
China Sea oil and gas reserves and not overly make concessions for Japan (Zweig 
and Ye 2008, 296). The above example shows that well-educated people in China do 
hold a more cooperative stance towards others in energy security, and they seek to 
have a peaceful means to deal with it; but there is an exception to this attitude when 
it comes to Japan. By seeing the findings of this research and the Internet comments 
made by other Chinese individuals, it seems that the Chinese hold a “zero-sum view” 
of bilateral relations with Japan. And, the Chinese public’s hawkish view on Japan 
may put pressure on the Chinese government, even though it will want to employ a 
more cooperative strategy when dealing with Japan. Therefore, the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs will need to re-state that the official stand point on the East China 
oil gas field has not changed (China Review News 2008).  
This might be how the norms “anti-Japanese’s militarism,” and “counter 
foreign malign intention and disrespect aggressively,” as well as the “zero-sum world 
view” sublimates from those identities to be internalized in perceptions of the 
Chinese public. Thus, those norms and identities would in turn leave the Chinese 
government less room but only to appeal against popular sentiment, by acting as a 
firm guardian of national interests, which will lead to aggressive and conflicting 
polices. Consequently, conflict, disputes, quarrels, and arguments with Japan may 
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increase, causing a backlash from Japanese public opinion which in turn will further 
provoke Chinese public resentment toward Japan and restart the vicious cycle.   
As a result, the Chinese government’s fear over Japan as a security threat is 
partly coming from within (from public reaction) due to security actions taken by 
Japan; and, these reactions create a policy dilemma for the Chinese government. 
Therefore, any dramatic or controversial action by the Japanese would create a 
number of problems for the Chinese leadership; as such problems will stir up public 
emotion.  
As for the Chinese military, the CMC is the center of the command structure 
(Shambaugh 2002, 111-113) and Hu is head of state of China and the chairman of the 
CMC. Theoretically, the attitude held by the Chinese military should reflect Hu’s 
leadership perceptions on Japan; however, it is uncertain how the Chinese military 
work and whether there is overall independent thinking from Chinese civilian 
leadership. In fact, it is argued that the civilian leadership may find it difficult to 
control the discourse of the Chinese military (Green 2006), and will sometimes need 
to please or appease anti-Japanese sentiment within the military and conservatives as 
Jiang did in 1998 Japan’s visit (Rose 2005, 106). As a result, this thesis chose not to 
speculate over how the general public does or does not affect the Chinese military’s 
perception in the discussion, simply because the military has, on a number of 
occasions, taken its own view of other states. Additionally, the PLA is believed to be 
significantly anti-Japanese and it is highly possible the military, through its own 
publications such as the “PLA Daily” and other magazines such as “PLA Pictorial,” 
has some influence over its readers. 
In short, the fear and suspicion by China, over the security issues relating to 
Japan, can be shown by using the results of figure 4 and placing them into the 
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framework shown in figure 1.   
  
           
 
 
 
 
          
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between Chinese public identities, norms, national interests, and government policies. 
 
4.1.1.2 Japanese’ identities, norms, interest and government policies  
For Japan, the general public is also a group with more concrete and negative 
view of China, and it is identified that they are quite fearful of China as a military 
2. Chinese Public’s Norms 
- anti-Japanese militarism 
- counter foreign malign 
intention and disrespect, 
aggressively and confidently 
- zero-sum view in IR 
 
1. Chinese Public’s Identities 
Chinese public consider: 
- China is a great power  
- recovered from a hundred years of 
humiliation 
- Is the leading East Asia power 
 
3. Chinese Public’s Interests 
- safeguard China’s core 
national interests assertively 
and by any means, such as 
uphold the sovereignty of 
disputed islands and Taiwan, 
securing East Sea oil/gas field.  
 
4. Government Policies 
- Government responses to safeguard 
interests by more assertive, even 
conflicting foreign policies in order to 
please the public; such as the show of 
naval force in 2005, proactive stance 
in East China Sea, anti-secession law 
of 2005, and an increase in air and 
maritime activities near Japanese 
territorial waters and airspace, as well 
as the disputed region. 
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threat.  
Since the early 1990s, Japan has experienced the “lost decade” and has 
witnessed the rapid growing economic power of China; the Japanese have felt an 
increase in their vulnerability. Events that conform to China’s malign images started 
to emerge around the end of the Cold War. Events including the Tiananmen Incident, 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, numerous appearances in or near to Japan’s air 
and maritime territories, a persistence of demanding Japan’s apology for World War 
Two aggression, thwarting Japan’s bid on UNSC, and anti-Japanese mass movements 
have all added to Japan’s negative image of China (Chen & Bridges 2006, 141-142). 
Also, some Japanese individuals do not believe they should to be blamed for 
anything to do with Japan’s past aggression against China. Katsuchi Honda, a 
journalist dedicated to promoting wide understanding of Japan wartime history, 
claimed that wartime censorship made many adults ignorant about what their country 
and government took part in. Although he feels obligated as a journalist to report true 
stories about the war, “expressing remorse to China is the task of the Japanese 
government” (Dahl 2008, 250). Indeed, many Japanese know very little on the 
country’s wartime history. It is reported that a considerable proportion of the 
Japanese, including many people living in rural parts of Japan and young people, do 
not feel they had anything to do with wartime behavior and have no need to feel 
sorry (Kristof 1999, 39, 41). As a result, China has persistently mentioned wartime 
issues to exploit Japan and the Japanese complain that “They're like gangsters, 
always asking for pay-offs, always demanding more. You can never get rid of them! 
What more do they want?” (Kristof 1999, 42). As many Japanese individuals do not 
accept the accusations and consider anti-Japanese sentiments as unreasonable, one 
puzzling fact is the hostility of some younger Chinese individuals who have had no 
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wartime experience (Kristof 1999, 41) As a result, Japanese people may consider 
China’s mistrust and accusations as unsubstantiated and therefore, view China 
negatively in return for the perceived unjustified blame. 
One argument is that Japan’s national identity is deeply rooted in its post-war 
relationship with the United States. The uneasy and distasteful feeling is generated 
when China and America compete for supremacy in East Asia.  Tamamoto claimed 
“the more China asserts its claim [for supremacy in China], the more Japan will be 
driven toward the United States to foil and counter” (Tamamoto 2003, 196-197).  
Since World War Two, Japan’s constitution has borne the label of pacifism and 
considers itself a democratic state; with this came a norm of distrust in 
non-democratic countries, especially mistrust of communist countries.  This 
awareness between “we democracy” and “they non democracy” was manifested in 
the sharp decrease of favorable feeling by the Japanese public toward China in 1989; 
which was due to the Tiananmen incident, and the Japanese public attitude toward 
China has never recovered to the level before 1989 (Government of Japan’s Cabinet 
Office 2008). Another variable that leads to a mistrust of China is through a link 
between the internal and external orientation of states to use force. It is believed by 
some that states who are reluctant to use force in a domestic situation would 
externalize this orientation in the international system; thus resulting in being less 
prone to use force. Therefore, states may use the other states’ willingness to use force 
unreasonably, as an indicator to judge their inclination to use force in order to settle 
international affairs.  Therefore, one would not expect a state that “used force 
arbitrarily at home against its own citizens to refrain in a principled way from the use 
of force against citizens of other countries abroad.” However, this link between the 
internal and external orientation of the use of force could be misguiding and thus 
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lead to misperception (Nau 2003, 220). Nau uses two scales, the Political Freedom 
Rating and the Polity III Ranking to illustrate and determine if the states in East Asia 
are willing to use force internally. The result was that China scores high on both 
scales and Japan scores low (Nau 2003, 225-226). This means, according to the scale, 
China is a nondemocratic state and will be much more willing to use force internally 
than Japan. As a result, this misperception could lead to a security dilemma. North 
Korea’s nuclear program and missile ambition further fueled Japanese mistrust of 
non-democracies (Hughes 2004, 87-90). If a relatively poor country such as North 
Korea was threatening, then they should also be aware of China as a powerful 
non-democratic state.  
The perceived support for strengthening national security, such as the 
joint-development of TMD and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance, by the Japanese 
public, has increased since the mid-1990s because of the emergence of various 
security challenges. The public support of Pacifism has been quite strong. For 
example, it is believed the discussion on TMD was limited between Japanese 
ministries before North Korean’s launch in August 1998; and support from the public 
only came after the 1998 Taepodong-1 test-launch (Kamiya 2003; Medeiros 2001). 
Therefore, the 1998 North Korea Taepodong-1 launch helped shift public opinion to 
support Japan’s participation in the missile defense project (Duan 2000). The 
Japanese public also voiced their opinion for Koizumi’s government to take a harsher 
approach to North Korea, mainly due to North Korea’s new adventure on the nuclear 
program and its abduction of Japanese citizens.  Thus, Koizumi took those demands 
into account and took a harsher position against North Korea (Kamiya 2003).   
It is believed that public opinion has had significant influence over the 
Japanese government and its position on security issues. It is argued that Japanese 
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foreign policy has been increasingly affected by the public opinion, which is often 
under the influence of media and social interest groups (Ni 2002, 74). Also, public 
opinions have created social norms that Japanese politicians and policy makers 
“invoke and appeal to.”  The media also “express[es] and […] interpret[s] public 
opinions […] creating a political reality that politician[s] and bureaucrats, including 
leading members of the police and the SDF, cannot neglect” (Katzenstein 1996, 39).  
Katzenstein suggests that the domestic factor within Japan carries more weight on its 
security policy than the international balance of power (Katzenstein 1996, 204-205); 
he also predicted that the revision of the Peace Constitution, bidding for UNSC 
permanent membership and participation of the PKO in “normal military terms,” 
would not be urgent issues that needed to be discussed with great seriousness in near 
future, without dramatic incidents taking place (Katzenstein 1996, 205). However, as 
he made this prediction in a 1996 volume, there were indeed a series of dramatic 
incidents; such as the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile which flew over 
Japanese territorial waters, the 9/11 attacks, and the 2005 anti-Japanese movement in 
China.  In fact, it is evident that Japan’s attitude on participating in security affairs, 
whether on a regional or global level, has changed. The phraseology used in three 
important security related acts, passed by the Diet – the International Peace 
Cooperation Act (1992), the Anti-Terrorism Special Act (2001), and The Iraqi 
Special Act (2003) – show active involvement from merely joining a UN effort 
“actively” in International Peace Cooperation Act to “actively and by Japan’s own 
initiative” in Anti-Terrorism Special Act and eventually to “by Japan’s own initiative 
and actively” in The Iraqi Special Act. The changes in phraseology show Japan is 
actively taking a large security role and take it not because of United States pressure 
(Yamamoto 2007, 139).  
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Although Japanese public support for a larger security role and strengthening 
the state’s defense is larger, as discussed above, pacifism among the society is a 
considerable force which Japanese decision-makers cannot ignore. It can be seen that 
the Japanese public are reluctant to support security actions which are not directly 
related to regional territories. The public opinion survey, completed by “Yomiuri 
Shimbun,” discovered that 37% of respondents supported the Surrounding Areas Act 
while 43% opposed it before it passed in 1999.  After the Act passed, 33% said it 
would be good for Japanese security, 28% were worried it could be seen as 
threatening, and 35% were in between (Yamamoto 2007, 142). It should be noted 
that the Surrounding Areas Act could pave a way for Japan to support the U.S. in 
cases where this is needed.   
The percentage of people who gave their support for the 2003 Iraqi Special Act 
were more or less the same as those against; the Nikki Telecom poll showed 43% of 
respondents supported the act while 41% opposed it before the bill passed.  
Opinions were reversed after the Diet passed the act, and the Broadcast Studies and 
Research showed there were 43% of respondents in favor of the act and 48% against 
it, after the act had passed (Yamamoto 2007, 143).    
On the other hand, acts that have more direct relevance to Japanese homeland 
security would gain wider support. The Anti-Terrorism Act after the 9/11 attacks had 
51% of respondents supporting it with only 29% against before it passed, as a “Asahi 
Shimbun” poll showed.  The support remained quite high after the act was passed, 
with 49% of respondents in favor and 37% against, recorded in a survey by the same 
news agency (Yamamoto 2007, 143). Even though the geographical scope of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act included foreign countries, the reason for wider support of the 
Act could have been from a genuine fear of terrorism, and from the memory of the 
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1995 Aum Shinirikyo cult attack on the Tokyo Subway with sarin gas, the related 
activities of the cult discovered later, and earlier activities of the Japanese Red Army 
(Katzenstein 2007, 76-77, 141-142; Hughes 2004, 202). The quick action taken by 
Japan was also an expression to show solidarity with the U.S. alliance, the main 
pillar of Japan’s security (Hughes 2004, 202). As a result, the Japanese public might 
have considered this act to have significant relevancy to Japanese security. However, 
after several years of the original Anti-Terrorism Special Act being passed, a recent 
survey suggests that the number of supporters for the renewal or replacing of it has 
decreased.  When asked whether supporting the new bill to support the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, in late 2007, 36% supported it while 45% opposed the bill 
(Asahi Shimbun 2007). Furthermore, in August 2008, 50% stated that deployment of 
the SDF in the Indian Ocean, to support anti-terrorism operations under the 
Anti-Terrorism Act were unnecessary, with only 37% stating there was such a need 
(Asahi Shimbun 2008). Another poll, conducted in 2007, also showed 53% opposing 
the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Act (Nikki Shimbun 2007).  
Further legislation which gained wider supporter was the Armed Attack Act, an 
act that provided a legal basis for the SDF to react to armed attack or anticipated 
armed attack (Matsui 2008). The geographic scope of the 2003 Armed Attack Act is 
also restricted to Japanese territory; the support of this act was a large majority of 
66% who thought the act was necessary, while only 21% considered there to be little 
need for such an act to be passed in the Diet. The support for this act remained quite 
high after it passed, with 56% in support and 30% against; both polls were carried 
out by Broadcast Studies and Research (Yamamoto 2007, 143).  From the above 
illustration, it is apparent that the Japanese public were quite reluctant to give support 
for their country to take a larger security role in activities which do not have a direct 
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relation to their homeland security.  However, they are more willing to support 
security strengthening measures with more relevancy to the perceived security 
interests of Japan.  
As for the revision of the Japanese Constitution, public opinion may reveal a 
number of attitudes on this issue. First, it is true that revisions to the constitution are 
supported by a certain proportion of the Japanese public. In a poll conducted by 
“Nikkei Shimbun” in April 2005, 54% of 1,553 respondents supported the revision of 
the Constitution, while 29% thought it should remain the same. If asked “What do 
you think about the characterization of the Self Defense Force under the 
Constitution?” 26% of all respondents said it should be mentioned in the Constitution 
as “Self-Defense Force,” 20% said it should be called the “Self-Defense Army” to 
clarify that it is military, and 24% said it should not be mentioned in the Constitution. 
Also, 10% said the SDF should be abolished or reduced in size (Nikkiei Shimbun 
2005). It should be noted that the 1947 Constitution does not use the words 
“Self-Defense Force,” and Article 9 states that Japan should not maintain any armed 
forces. Another poll carried out by “Yomiuri Shimbu” in February 2007 also showed 
that 46.2% believed it should be amended, outnumbering 39.1% opposing the 
amendment. However, the poll included some information from a 2006 poll which 
suggested 80% of respondents wanted the “renouncement of war” clause, in 
Constitution Article 9, not to be amended; with 54% believing the clause about 
“absence of military power” should remain the same (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007).  
“Asahi Shimbun” also found that 40% of 1,807 respondents supported the national 
referendum bill, which was part of the procedure of Constitutional change, while 
37% opposed it in an April 2007 poll. It was also found that a majority of the 
Japanese (78%) considered Article 9 of the current Constitution helped Japan with a 
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peaceful post-war environment, and 58% valued it as contributing to the “peace and 
stability of East Asia.”  Also, 56% agreed to write SDF into the constitution, but 
70% disagreed to rename it the Self-Defense Army.  64% allowed overseas 
deployment if armed force was not used; with 49% opposing changes to Article 9 of 
the Constitution and 58% said the whole of it should be revised. The major reason 
for those opposing changes to the Constitution was because “there is a danger that 
Article 9 might be changed” and the main reason of agreeing to constitutional 
revision was “to include new rights and institutions” (Asahi Shimbun 2007). In April 
2007, in a “Nikkei Shimbun” poll, over half of the respondents (51%) supported a 
revision of the Constitution, with the reason that “it is necessary to incorporate new 
ideas;” while 35% suggested it should be untouched, with the main reason of 
opposing the revision being that “The revision of the constitution may trigger a 
change on the pacifism” (Nikkei Shimbun 2007). However, support slightly 
decreased in March 2008, with only 42% supporting and those opposing changes 
once again succeeded with 43.1%.  An overwhelming majority opposed revising the 
Article 9 clause of “the renunciation of war” and “armed forces and war potential 
will not be maintained,” with 81.6% and 54.5% opposing it respectively (Nikkei 
Shimbun 2008). Finally, the percentage of those supporting revisions to the 
Constitution and those opposing it were 43% and 48% respectively, calculated in 
another poll in April 2008 (Nikkei Shmbun 2008). All of the above data identifies 
two clear trends; the supporting rate for revisions of the Constitution has stayed 
around or just below half.  This shows that the Japanese public have been divided 
over this issue, with the highest proportion of revision support seen in the 2005 
results when Sino-Japanese relations were almost at their lowest point; however, 
there is no clear correlation between these two issues. The second finding shows that 
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the majority of Japanese individuals consider Article 9 of the Constitution to be good 
for peace and overwhelming oppose any amendment, showing that pacifism is still a 
strong belief. 
With several decades of Pacifist tradition, the Japanese public may not be 
aware that measures considered to strengthen their security, such as joining TMD or 
demanding better international standing, or bidding for a UNSC permanent seat, 
would touch the nerves of China. First, it is suggested that it would be impossible for 
Japan to be “the Switzerland of Asia” (Katzenstein 1996, 208), as self-defensive 
measures taken by Japan will be viewed as offensive by others, and could be 
considered as steps toward “autonomous military strategy.”  It may be hard for the 
Japanese public to understand why China is so sensitive to these defensive measures 
and policies, and consider their country to be legitimate in deploying such measures, 
as well as failing to understand why China cannot understand they do not harbor any 
malign intentions.  In turn, however, they may be suspicious over the intentions 
behind Chinese opposition. Second, because a seat on the UNSC is recognition of a 
state’s great power status (Katzenstein 1996, 207), Japan considers it a reasonable 
bid due to the contributions it has made to the UN.  Therefore, Japan views China’s 
opposition as unreasonable, as they believe China should have acknowledged that 
permanent membership of the UNSC would have no affect on mutual peace. In short, 
the Japanese public consider China’s assertive behavior against Japan as 
unreasonable because China should not fear a state in which pacifism has been a 
major for belief several decades unless they have some malign and believe China is 
using history and related matters as an excuse. 
 
 
  
 
154 
The results of figure 5 being added to the framework are shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Interaction between Japanese public identities, norms, national interests, and government 
policies. 
 
4.1.1.3 The formation and intensifying of the security dilemma  
The interaction between key elements of figures 4 and 5 are combined to 
explain the formation of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations. From these 
findings, there is no clear indication that either side has malign intentions toward the 
other.  
First, both sides believe what they are doing is necessary to defend their own 
interests. Japan has expressed more concern over its national security since the late 
1. Japanese Public’s 
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- Japan is a normal Nation 
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pacifism 
- Japan is a democracy 
2. Japanese Public’s Norms 
- Distrust of non-democracy 
- Earn more international respect 
- To take reasonable self-defense 
measures if necessary, but 
other states do not need to 
worry because of its pacific 
belief. 
3. Japanese Public’s Interest  
- Maintain close alliance with the U.S. 
but prevent entrapment. 
- Defend homeland from terrorism and 
perceived threat from non-democratic 
neighbors, by taking necessary 
defensive measures. 
- More active participation in 
international community. 
 
4. Government Policies  
-  TMD, Aegis-system based 
Atago-class destroyers  
- Increasing sympathy to Taiwan 
through intensive yet informal 
interaction between militaries 
and commercial personnel.   
- Bid for UNSC permanent 
membership, to be active in UN 
PKO missions. 
- Increase patrols near disputed 
territories. 
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1990s due to the North Korea Threat and uncertainty over China’s intentions.  They 
have also showed stronger support towards playing a larger role in international 
security activities (Chanlett-Avery 2008, 13-14). For example, the Japanese public 
considers it legitimate for them to defend themselves by enhancing their defense 
systems to be ready for potential threats.  They have done this by joining TMD and 
maintaining the security of important sea lanes as manifested by increased maritime 
patrol, which is in alliance with the United States.  Japan also considers its bid for a 
UNSC permanent seat as a right and just demand for their contributions to the UN. 
However, many of these actions are perceived by the Chinese public to be a sign of 
Japan’s resurgence to become a great military power and the rebirth of militarism. 
On the other hand, the Chinese public considers Japan as a potentially 
dangerous and hostile country in the long run, which means they do not want to 
compromise on the East Sea issue and will continue to press on the historical issues. 
Although the Chinese government may want to take a more cooperative approach in 
some issues, they will need to respond to public opinion as part of the sources of 
regime legitimacy which come from regime ability to maintain the continuing rise of 
the Chinese.  They will need to earn international respect for China and safeguard 
the public’s perceived interest, such as pressure to develop the East China Sea oil gas 
field, put pressure over history issues, and fight for the sovereignty of the 
Diaoyu\Senkuka Islands and Taiwan.  As a result, more assertive and unfriendly 
gestures will arise. The increase of maritime activities are the action taken to declare 
those regions as China’s territories, and the incursion into Japanese territory for 
gathering intelligence on Japanese and U.S. military capacities, in order for China to 
prepare for any potential conflict with them over Taiwan and other disputed issues.  
The criticism of Japan’s attitude on history is to respond to the dissatisfaction shown 
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by the Chinese public over Japanese’s disrespect to what they did in the war. 
However, it does not seem that the Chinese government has other ambitions towards 
Japan besides safeguarding its core perceived interests. Yet, these activities are 
perceived by Japan as unfriendly and hostile; for example, China’s incursions are not 
justifiable in the eyes of the Japanese, as the Peace Constitution is considered more 
than enough to show that Japan is pacific country, and thus China’s provoking 
behavior will only yield suspicion and tension.  
In short, the mutual suspicion and fear of both states is the result of  
“irresolvable uncertainty,” namely what the other state does as being contradictory to 
what they proclaim; and the actions taken by the other seem to be malign, as those 
actions are provoking or damaging to the other country’s core interests such as 
territorial integrity (for China and Japan), undisturbed import of essential resources 
(for Japan), homeland security (for Japan), and respect for oneself (for China).  
While political leaders of both states often claiming to be friendly and benevolent 
toward the other.  
As a result, both leaders face a “dilemma of policy choices.” Japan’s leaders 
face a choice between increasing defense which triggers suspicion from China 
through an enlargement of their security cooperation, participation in international 
security activities, and upgrading military size and quality; or, keeping the defense 
posture as it is but risking potential hostility from North Korea and damage to many 
of its national interests, should China turn out to be much more aggressive than was 
first thought. For China, its leaders face a dilemma of taking aggressive and 
unfriendly policies or gestures but with increased regional suspicion, mistrust and 
risk of military rivalry or conflict; or losing legitimacy and popularity with the 
Chinese people by maintaining a more compromising and cooperative stance toward 
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Japan.   
However, the perceived unfriendly actions and behavior from both sides would 
further fuel resentment, suspicion and fear of one another for both states’ public. 
Allowing each to demand the their own government take even more provoking or 
uncompromising responses will ignite a cycle that will intensify the security 
dilemma. 
It can be seen that, in the three conditions there is “no clear malign intentions” 
presented; “the mutual irresolvable uncertainty” for both sides and “the dilemma in 
policy choice” for both policy-makers, are present in Sino-Japanese relations. The 
current Sino-Japanese relations can, therefore, be understood as a security dilemma, 
with the general public as a one of the main driving forces.   
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The following figure is an illustration of how the security dilemma would 
intensify (Figure 8). 
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4.1.2 Mitigation of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations 
Since the key source of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations is the 
public, other actors are restricted or respond to public opinion and views, at least to a 
certain extent. The key to mitigate or prevent the security dilemma is to work on the 
perception of the public.  
From the Chinese perspective, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has, to some extent, 
been a “bottle cap” for Japanese military buildup; however, this view has become 
obsolete and formed an “egg shell” type function; something which is protected by 
the U.S. military umbrella when developing into a great military great power 
(Christensen 1999, 30-31, 34). The above data has shown that pacifism is still strong 
among the Japanese public, which means that the Japanese people will not accept 
full-scale security independence in the near future.   However, it is believed that the 
Chinese are sensitive to any content changes of this alliance (Christensen 1999, 
34-35). How long the Chinese will feel assured by this alliance, which is supposed to 
contain the growth of Japan’s military, is unknown. And, it has been witnessed in 
recent years that security related activities have been ill-received by China. Therefore, 
I would argue that the U.S., as a factor to stabilize the region’s security, is still 
somehow effective; but that the U.S., as a stabling factor, should not be depended on 
in the long-term, as it will not be of any great help in the threat perception of the 
Chinese.  
This analysis also suggests that confidence building measures (CBMs) 
between the Chinese and Japanese leadership and military will help lessen the 
security dilemma. Indeed, measures, including military exchange and the 
establishment of hotline for defense issues, will help improve understanding and trust 
between the two nations (Takeda 2007, 24-25). However, how far these high level 
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contacts will contribute in lessening the security dilemma is debatable, as is 
exemplified by the Chinese public’s expressed opposition and resentment to a visit 
by a Japanese destroyer (to Chinese territorial waters) in June 2008.  This was after 
Chinese President Hu visited Japan as a good-will gesture; however, such a visit had 
to be kept relatively low profile (French 2008). It is apparent that, if substantial 
improvements between the security relations of China and Japan are to be achieved, 
then it will take much more than simply conducting high-level interactions.  
This thesis has identified that the general public is an important aspect which 
contribute to the security dilemma between the two countries. For the high-level 
measures to enjoy their full effect, the deep-rooted mistrust, suspicion and 
resentment will need to be worked out, alongside other measures conducted at the 
civilian level. 
According to the information presented above, people who have direct contact 
with one another will hold more objective or friendly attitudes towards each other. 
Therefore, enhancing the depth and frequency of interaction can be an important step 
toward eliminating mutual suspicion between the Chinese and Japanese. Using the 
data from all three CASS surveys, covering Chinese public opinion on Japan, the 
effect is shown as follows. 
Group having unfriendly feelings to Japan 
                                    Year 
Unfriendly to Japan (%)            
2002 2004 2006 
Whole Sample 43.3 53.6 52.9 
Understand Japanese language & have interaction 
with Japan 
16.2 18.8 17.3/23.6* 
Chinese residing in Japan 11.5 20 12.6 
  
 
161 
*the option ”Can speak Japanese & have interaction with Japan” was further divided into two options “Can speak 
Japanese” and “have interaction with Japan” in 2006, the number shown represents percentage of “can speak 
Japanese / have interaction with Japan” respectively 
 
It can be seen from the above table that those groups who have a better ability 
to understand Japan (by knowing the Japanese language) and closer contact with 
Japan (by living in Japan) tend to have less negative feelings toward Japan. Also, it 
seems that these growing interactions will have positive improvements over 
understanding; closer interaction with each other may help the public to receive 
first-hand experience, rather than through biased portrayals by the media. Further 
broadening of civilian exchange channels, such as student exchange and tourists 
group, may help this aspect in the long-term, and thus helping positive feelings to 
increase. However, there are preconditions for this improvement to take full effect. 
Wan shows that the overall atmosphere of having negative views toward Japan in 
China would make those with good feelings toward Japan hesitant to promote this.  
Something which would need to be worked towards, because in order for them to 
express their opinions more freely, individuals will need to be free from a fear of 
being criticized. The media should take partial responsibility for the creation of this 
negative atmosphere, through past negative reports on Japan-related issues (Wan 
2006, 78, 79).  In order to introduce a cycle of positive feeling, existing prejudices 
and biases will need to be reduced. And, as Wan also points out, negative views in 
one country would reinforce negativity in the other (Wan 2006, 72). This is when the 
Japanese affinity to China has seen a recent decline in October 2005 (Government of 
Japan’s Cabinet Office 2008); something believed to be as a result of the 
anti-Japanese mass movement earlier and increasing worries over China as a military 
threat (Genron-NPO 2007; Lee 2007, 136).  
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The Chinese and Japanese media will need to offer a more balanced view on 
the other country, if a positive effect of growing of people-to-people interactions is to 
materialize. Preventing biased views such as the portrayal of Chinese citizens as a 
major source of crime by the Japanese media, or overly stressing Japanese 
mistreatment to the Chinese, or misbehavior in China by the Chinese media, will 
need to be reduced (Wan 2006, 72). Education is another important institution too; 
thus, if any fundamental change of long-term impression of people towards the other 
country, just as the media, schools should provide a more balanced view on the 
history and portrayal of the other country, which will be an effective way to foster a 
friendlier atmosphere between the two countries. 
Another way to create a more positive general atmosphere will be to foster a 
more balanced view on each other through positive symbolic diplomatic actions by 
the respective leaders. This approach was used by German and French leaders in 
steps toward reconciliation after World War Two. President De Gaulle and 
Chancellor Adenauer, chose Reim Cathedral, a spot of countless Franco-German 
conflicts, as the location of a ceremony where they appear together.  President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl’s friendship ceremony at Verdum, a famous 
battlefield of World War One, was photographed and has become a historical 
moment of Franco-German reconciliation (Lind 2008, 191).  Therefore, symbolic 
actions at a symbolic location can show commitment and dedication of both leaders, 
to “reconciliation and cooperation” (Lind 2008, 191). Despite this, Jennifer Lind 
claims that this approach may not be as useful in Sino-Japanese relations because 
there is no strong incentive for both sides to do so (Lind 2008, 193-194).  However, 
I would argue that this approach does have some use in the improvement of relations. 
In fact, there are a number of incentives, such as the Chinese leadership wanting 
  
 
163 
freedom of choice over foreign policies, and not to be hijacked by the emotional 
anti-Japanese sentiment of the Chinese public – something which will damage 
long-term Chinese development and its international image.  While the Japanese 
government does not want an increasingly strong China to be an enemy in the future. 
Such a symbolic location could be a historical battlefield such as the Marco-Polo 
Bridge, and the leaders involved would be should be the top leader of both states: the 
President of China and Japan’s Prime Minister. Such a high profile reconciliation 
would show that both states are dedicated to building mutual trust, and will also 
show they do not consider one another a threat. This would hopefully allow both sets 
of public to forgive past actions and For both states’ public, as the Chinese public 
might consider Japan has fully reflected its past wrongdoings and the Japan public 
would consider China has let the past passed and fully accept this symbolic action as 
the final apology, lessening the worry of China showing the “history card” in the 
future.  
Moreover, conditions for such an action may not be present for now because 
the overall impression of both states’ public is negative. In fact, other strategies such 
as “costly signaling” mentioned earlier (Kydd 2003) – a tactic used by a state leader 
to initiate reciprocity in order to reduce tension and develop trust – would face 
opposition from the public as well. However, even though the public in both states, 
especially the Chinese public, would currently oppose their leader to do this for now, 
if the portrayal of the other state becomes more balanced, then the overall 
atmosphere will improve over time.  
Additionally, the Chinese government should refrain from continually asking 
the Japanese for an apology, if it wants to create an atmosphere for reconciliation; as 
this would cause a backlash in Japan (Lind 2008, 181-186). Even though such a 
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backlash would be created by a small group of right-wing conservatives, its actions 
would further fuel anger toward the Chinese, and their hostile attitude would scare 
off future pro-contribution or pro-reconciliation politicians to take further step to 
repair the relations. Therefore, symbolic action and costly signaling could be the final 
blow to this mutual distrust and suspicion. By successfully eliminating mutual 
distrust and suspicion, it is natural that people will no longer see the other state as a 
threat. If the effect of this approach is not as effective as it is expected, it should at 
least prevent the current threat perception of both states’ public to make the security 
dilemma escalating.  
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis attempted to analyze current relations between China and Japan 
using the security dilemma concept.  
The traditional realist perspective of international relations may consider the a 
change in material capabilities such as an increase military strength, would trigger 
the security dilemma. However, if we apply the constructivist approach to the 
analysis, it will take more than material capabilities to trigger a security dilemma. 
For example, the Japanese government may not be afraid of the United States 
military, even with the U.S. having a garrison on Japanese soil and U.S. weapons 
becoming increasingly advanced. China, despite a growing military strength, is still 
inferior in terms of military technology compared to the U.S. and Japan. Because the 
constructivist school considers merely examining material capabilities as not enough 
to understand overall security, this thesis has attempted to examine various sub-state 
actors which have threatened the perception of the other state; in order to identify 
whether a security dilemma exists and how it operates.   
After exploring the threat perception of selected sub-state actors, including the 
general public, military (and ministry of defense), academics, politicians and ruling 
elite, and the younger generation, several groups have shown fear, dislike or 
suspicion of the other country. The general public was chosen as a central group for 
analysis, because this group is one which has the most concrete data to support fears 
on the other state’s security intentions. However, it would be too arbitrary to suggest 
that the threat perception of the general public is the only source of the security 
dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations. Which is not to say that other actors’ threat 
perceptions are completely under the influence of the general public. However, 
because it is this group which has the most evidence identifying the fear, it is 
considered reasonable to use this group as central unit; in an effort to understand the 
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interaction between different sub-state actors, while also avoiding speculation.  
By applying the general public as the main unit of analysis over norms, 
identities, interests and policy, proposed by Jepperson Katzenstein and Wendt (1996, 
53), we can identify that norms, interests and identities of the general public may 
help shape the state’s policies; and therefore, the state’s policies might thus reshape 
the general public’s norms, interests and identities in return. However, this is also not 
to say that the general public will dictate government policies. However, even in a 
non-western democratic state such as China, the government seems to appeal to 
public demand to some extent, in order to maintain popularity; especially where there 
is more domestic unrest and a decline of ideologies in recent years.  Also, Japan, as 
a democratic state, has public opinion which could bear more weight in influencing 
government decision-making.  
The second stage of the analysis was to analyze public opinion, identities and 
interests against both government’s policies, forming these in a framework of the 
codetermination of institutions, proposed by Wendt (1992, 406). By using this 
framework, we can see how mutual suspicion and fear is generated and heightened. 
Returning to the main question of this research, is there a security dilemma in 
Sino-Japanese relations? The research findings indicated there is a security dilemma, 
as relations between China and Japan show three characteristics of a security 
dilemma, according to the definition used in this thesis (Collins 1997, 23-24).  
Sino-Japanese relations show the three conditions proposed by Alan Collins. 
First, no involved states have explicitly expressed or shown evidence of aggressive 
intention; they simply want to safeguard what they perceived to be their rightful 
interests.  For example, some Chinese actors are afraid of the possible Japanese 
involvement in Taiwan, while the Japanese side is worried over the growing military 
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strength of China and its potential danger to their security; this is while neither side 
has shown obvious territorial ambition towards the other. Second, even though both 
sides, under their current threat perception, seem to be suspicious toward the other’s 
future intentions, both states are quite attentive to any change of the other’s military 
strength and defensive policies. This means that policy-makers in both states face a 
dilemma in policy options. As China’s leadership is now facing a choice between a 
domestically popular hard line approach or an internationally popular and moderate 
approach; both choices are not without their shortcomings. While Japan will need to 
choose between strengthening its defensive posture, which will alert China or keep 
its current defensive strength and policy but fail to adopt a security challenge, such as 
a nuclear threat by North Korea. Therefore, security relations between China and 
Japan can be described as a security dilemma. 
As for the mitigation of the security dilemma, one important prerequisite is to 
create a friendlier attitude of the public toward the other state, before carrying out 
other measures such as costly signaling. This is because the overall atmosphere 
among people in both states is still suspicions and will affect such actions by each 
state. One important way to improve this overall atmosphere would be a symbolic 
reconciliation by the state leaders; and, a long term measure would be through the 
media and the educational system to provide a more balanced view on the other state. 
Only after the overall attitude of people has changed will the mutual trust be 
increased. 
This research concludes that, even though a security dilemma exists, it can be 
mitigated, at least to some extent; provided that both states have the determination. It 
is not suggested this will be easy however; nor will the government and leaders 
currently have the willingness to do so in current times. In fact, even if the leaders 
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have the willingness, domestic politics will have a determining factor on any actions. 
What this research suggests is a long-term effort which will take significant effort 
and time to materialize. The important factor of this research is that the security 
dilemma should not be viewed as a fatalistic result of international politics; rather, if 
this was explored through another perspective, then different results could be 
reached. 
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